Abstract
Recently it has been shown that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable. In this note we show that this finding depends on the use of the infinite population ESS (Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982). When applying the finite-population ESS (Schaffer, J Theor Biol 132:469–478, 1988) we show that the conjectures surviving in the long run are not consistent.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Müller, W., Normann, HT. Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations. J Evol Econ 17, 53–61 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0042-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0042-4