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Caseworkers’ attitudes: Do they matter?

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Abstract

The caseworkers in public insurance systems possess considerable discretion in terms of making decisions. This creates scope for preferences and attitudes to reflect on initiatives taken during sick leave and on individuals’ return to work. This paper utilizes a unique caseworker–individual data set in the public sickness insurance (SI) in Sweden to analyze the impact of caseworkers’ attitudes towards SI rules and rehabilitation programs promoting individuals’ return to work. We find that a positive attitude towards SI rules increased return to work by 3 %, or 3.5 days, after comparing the 25 % most positive caseworkers with the 25 % least positive. Also, a positive attitude towards existing rehabilitation methods reduced return to work by about 2.5 %, or 3 days.

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Notes

  1. Data lack information on when the personal caseworker takes charge of the case. The SIA (2010b) concludes that the majority of cases ongoing at 8 weeks had been handed over to a caseworker.

  2. Sassam is a Swedish abbreviation for “A formalized method for sick-leave investigation and rehabilitation.”

  3. In contrast to Sassam, the assessment meeting is stipulated by law (see government bill 2002/03:89). Both Sassam and the assessment meeting are mandatory and failure to participate can lead to the withdrawal of benefits.

  4. See the Social Insurance Code. Exceptions to this rule could be made if, for instance, the individual were likely to return to work for the existing employer by day 365 at the latest.

  5. The survey is described in detail in ISF (2013b).

  6. ISF (2013b) describes how the index was created.

  7. SOU (2010) analyzes various exits from sickness absence for workers and concludes that the vast majority return to work. For instance, the monthly hazard to unemployment and disability insurance respectively is well below 1 % up to nine months.

  8. See for instance Johansson et al. (2010), or Hägglund et al. (2012).

  9. See Vaida and Xu (2000) for details of the random effects model.

  10. The estimation was performed with the Kaplan–Meier method. We calculate the effects by summing up the area between the survival curves corresponding to the individuals assigned the 25 % most positive and the 25 % most negative caseworkers with regard to attitude towards rehabilitation and the SI rules, respectively.

  11. It is possible for a person to participate in multiple Sassam and assessment meetings; this is, however, unusual.

  12. If a person has participated in multiple Sassam or assessment meetings, the analysis refers to the first one.

  13. Lancaster (1990).

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Correspondence to Pathric Hägglund.

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The paper has benefited from comments by Daniel Hallberg, Per Johansson and Stefan Eriksson.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8 Characteristics of individuals’ assigned caseworkers positive and negative to rehabilitation measures and sickness insurance rules, respectively
Table 9 Estimates of marginal impact (linear probability model) of caseworkers’ attitudes on return to work at 6 months

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Granqvist, N., Hägglund, P. & Jakobsson, S. Caseworkers’ attitudes: Do they matter?. Empir Econ 52, 1271–1288 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-016-1117-1

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