Abstract
We consider the bargaining problems with a variable number of agents. Lensberg had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto-Optimality.
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Support from NSF under grant 8511136 is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to H. Moulin for his comments at an early stage of this research.
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Lensberg, T., Thomson, W. Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-Optimality. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 247–259 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00735765
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00735765