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Invisible decisive coalitions in large hierarchies

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Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which organizational hierarchies are democratic or (in the more usual language of administrative studies) participative, in the sense that the views of a large proportion of organizational membership are taken into account when an organizational choice is made. We view organizations as making choices in a “bottom-up” manner: subordinates recommend options to their superior, and if subordinates are in sufficient agreement their superior accepts their advice. We prove that as the number of levels in the hierarchy increases, organizational choices can be dominated by a smaller and smaller proportion of the total organizational membership. In the limit, a vanishing small proportion of the membership can dominate policymaking.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 48824-1032, East Lansing, MI

    Thomas H. Hammond

  2. Economic Research, 18-70, Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, 90846-0001, Long Beach, CA

    Paul A. Thomas

Authors
  1. Thomas H. Hammond
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  2. Paul A. Thomas
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Additional information

We would like to thank Gary Cox for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Work on the subject was originally supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8207904 to T. Hammond. P. Thomas notes that the opinions expressed in this article are of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of McDonnell Douglas Corporation or its management. An earlier draft of this article appeared as Political Economy Working Paper No. 123, Center in Political Economy, Washington University (March 1988).

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Hammond, T.H., Thomas, P.A. Invisible decisive coalitions in large hierarchies. Public Choice 66, 101–116 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127796

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