Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Coalitions

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management

  • 39 Accesses

Abstract

Groups often need to reach collective decisions when the group’s members do not all agree. In these situations, the subset of a group that agrees on the group’s final decision can be considered a winning coalition. Game theory, social psychology and political science have all addressed the dynamics of coalition formation; organizational behaviour has also recognized the importance of coalition formation processes, although it has not utilized the other literatures’ advances in theory and research findings to increase the understanding of important strategic processes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 1,099.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 1,699.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Caplow, T. 1956. A theory of coalitions in the triad. American Sociological Review 21: 489–493.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cyert, R., and J.G. March. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Swaan, A. 1973. Coalition theories and cabinet formation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gamson, W.A. 1961. An experimental test of a theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Review 26: 565–573.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gamson, W.A. 1964. Experimental studies of coalition formation. In Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 1, ed. L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahan, J.P., and A. Rapoport. 1984. Theories of coalition formation. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelley, H.H., and A.J. Arrowood. 1960. Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment. Sociometry 23: 231–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Komorita, S.S. 1984. Coalition bargaining. In Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 18, ed. L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Komorita, S.S., and J.M. Chertkoff. 1973. A bargaining theory of coalition formation. Psychological Review 80: 149–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murnighan, J.K. 1978a. Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives. Psychological Bulletin 85: 1130–1153.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murnighan, J.K. 1978b. Strength and weakness in four coalition situations. Behavioral Science 23: 195–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murnighan, J.K. 1994. Game theory and organizational behavior. In Research in organizational behavior, ed. B.M. Staw and L.L. Cummings. Greenwich: JAI Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murnighan, J.K., and D.J. Brass. 1991. Intraorganizational coalitions. In Research on negotiation in organizations, ed. M. Bazerman, R. Lewicki, and B. Sheppard. Greenwich: JAI Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J., and G. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polzer, J.T., E.A. Mannix, and M.A. Neale. 1998. Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty negotiation. Academy of Management Journal 1: 42–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Beest, I., and E. Van Dijk. 2007. Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups. European Review of Social Psychology 18: 132–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Beest, I., H. Wilke, and E. Van Dijk. 2003. The excluded player in coalition formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29: 237–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Beest, I., E. Van Dijk, and H. Wilke. 2004. Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff, self-serving behavior, and bargaining length. European Journal of Social Psychology 34: 713–728.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1947. The theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Ilja van Beest

  2. Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    J. Keith Murnigham

Authors
  1. Ilja van Beest
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. J. Keith Murnigham
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ilja van Beest .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. GSBPP, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

    Mie Augier

  2. Berkeley Research Group, LLC, Emeryville, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

  3. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

van Beest, I., Murnigham, J.K. (2018). Coalitions. In: Augier, M., Teece, D.J. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_625

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation