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Coalitions

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The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management

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Abstract

Groups often need to reach collective decisions when the group’s members do not all agree. In these situations, the subset of a group that agrees on the group’s final decision can be considered a winning coalition. Game theory, social psychology and political science have all addressed the dynamics of coalition formation; organizational behaviour has also recognized the importance of coalition formation processes, although it has not utilized the other literatures’ advances in theory and research findings to increase the understanding of important strategic processes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Warandelaan 2, P O Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Ilja van Beest

  2. Kellogg School of Management, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    J. Keith Murnigham

Authors
  1. Ilja van Beest
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  2. J. Keith Murnigham
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ilja van Beest .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University , Stanford, California, USA

    Mie Augier

  2. Tusher Ctr Intellectual Capital, University of California Tusher Ctr Intellectual Capital, Berkeley, California, USA

    David J. Teece

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© 2016 The Author(s)

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van Beest, I., Murnigham, J.K. (2016). Coalitions. In: Augier, M., Teece, D. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_625-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_625-1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-94848-2

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