Topical Issues in the Study of Soviet Social Policy, 1917−1929

Abstract

A series of 100th anniversaries of recent years (the First World War, the Revolution of 1917, the Russian Civil War, the introduction of the NEP) has stimulated historians and representatives of related sciences (sociologists, philosophers, political scientists, culturologists, economic historians, etc.) to summarize the study of this turning point for the national history of the period, which is increasingly often regarded as homogeneous (“the time of wars and revolutions”), as well as its immediate consequences, stretching back to the 1920s and 1930s. The works published within the framework of the anniversaries and the discussions that flared up around them more clearly exposed the least studied and controversial aspects of the problems and made it possible to identify urgent tasks for the future. Quite expectedly, the focus was on subjects such as rethinking the causes of the revolutionary events and the role of various social groups in them; comparison of the events of February and October 1917, the degree of discontinuity and continuity of processes and the existence of alternative ways of Russia’s development; characteristics of the armed forces and political movements opposed to the Bolsheviks; the relation of “red” and “white” terror; problems of social stratification in postrevolutionary Russia and the relationship between the concepts of former people, the socially alien, economically dangerous elements, NEPmen; etc. In addition, summarizing the results of studying the revolution and its consequences has contributed to the revival of conceptual discussions about totalitarianism, the social base of the Soviet regime of the 1920s−1930s, and the features of the formation of civil society in Russia, as well as about the conditions for the formation and specifics of the “welfare state” of the Soviet type. At the same time, one should admit that the problem of the social policy of the Bolsheviks, which directly relates to many of the above conceptual or debatable issues, remained practically outside the framework of scientific, historical, and political discussions. Meanwhile, for example, the outcome of the Civil War and the further fate of Russia were largely determined by the nature and priorities of the social policy of the warring parties, the degree of the attractiveness of their slogans for ordinary people in the rear and at the front, as well as the ability to bring these slogans to life. The problems of continuity with the pre-Soviet past of the country, the novelty and relevance for society of the Bolsheviks’ transformations in the social sphere, and their compliance with the global trends of the era also seem key to understanding many debatable issues of early Soviet history. In particular, it is impossible to answer the question about the presence or absence of elements of civil society and the so-called “welfare state” in Soviet Russia without an objective assessment of the social slogans declared by the state and the methods of their implementation, as well as the nature of the interaction between the authorities and society in solving certain topical tasks.

HISTORIOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND THE FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

Despite the significant domestic and foreign historiography of the transformations of the Bolsheviks in the social sphere, the problem of a comprehensive study of social policy as an integral historical phenomenon and not of its individual trends remains poorly understood. One should admit that this is to a certain extent due to the uncertainty of the subject of research itself and the vagueness of its boundaries. Understanding that there are two main actors in social policy—the state, which forms social policy, and society, which is the object of application of this policy—we adhere to a broad interpretation of the problems of social policy, since it is difficult to find aspects of economics, culture, demography, etc., that would not directly or indirectly relate to the sociopolitical sphere and would exist autonomously from society and its institutions. Welfare, labor protection, health care, and housing policy; maternal and child health, family and women’s policies; features of the development of public initiatives; the development of the education system and the sphere of leisure; the formation of everyday and festive culture—all this is included in the sphere of social policy.

The question arises: how can all these subjects be combined within the framework of one study? Is this combination expedient? Will such a cumbersome research construction not turn into a “patchwork quilt” devoid of scientific value? How can we reconstruct such a complex, contradictory, and multilevel sociohistorical phenomenon to obtain a holistic, scientifically significant picture?

To answer this question, at least a brief historical digression is needed. The first scientific interpretations of the content of social policy and its object, subject, goals, and methods were developed at the end of the 19th century by German economists and sociologists who were members of the German Economic Association (W. Sombart, O. von Zwiedinek, A. Wagner, etc.). In the 20th century, this topic also became traditional for Western researchers¹ interested in the social policy of postrevolutionary Russia.² On the contrary, in Soviet historiography, the theoretical and methodological foundations for studying this problem remained unexplored for a long time. “Welfare” as an integral object did not exist; it was divided into sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociodemographic components. Certain issues related to the sphere of social policy were considered within the study of problems such as the struggle for a classless society, the destruction of the exploiting classes, and changes in the social structure; the nationalization of industry and the legislation of labor relations; trade union history; improving the living conditions of laborers and providing them with free medical care; transformations in education, culture, leisure; etc.³ It is indicative in this regard that the multivolume History of the USSR from Ancient Times to the Present Day, prepared in the 1960s−early 1970s, did not have special sections on social policy. Volume 7, dedicated to the period 1917−1920, does not even give a general description of the social priorities, goals, and objectives declared by the Bolsheviks, and subjects related to social transformations are scattered across different chapters.⁴ This was largely due to the absence of the definition of social policy in Soviet historiography at that time. It was often identified with the narrower concepts of social protection and social security, the study of which actually boiled down to the reconstruction of their institutional organization—above all, to the activities of the People’s Commissariats for Social Security, Labor, and Health.

The first wave of interest in the theoretical aspects of social policy in Soviet historiography is associated with the formation of the concept of developed socialism, which led to the development of theoretical issues of social policy in the framework of building socialism in the late 1960s−early 1980s.⁵ The first studies of Soviet social policy as a complex scientific problem belong to the same period.⁶ As a result, an understanding of a special socialist social policy, aimed at building a classless society, was developed. However, the problem of the conceptual content and research boundaries of social policy as a whole remained open.⁷ A new stage in the development of the national historiography of the problem is associated with the growth of the popularity of the historical−anthropological approaches and trends of social history in the 1990s.

The first definitions of social policy proposed by Russian historiography did not go beyond the usual methodological guidelines and proceeded from the postulate that social policy is “an integral part of the internal policy of the state”⁸; the differences concerned only the degree to which the subject field was expanded. As a result, the history of social policy was a list of laws, orders, and instructions adopted by the authorities, partially affecting the methods of their implementation and the results obtained.

Such an understanding of social policy undoubtedly reflects only a part of this complex and multilevel phenomenon, in the formation of which, along with political and state institutions and figures, cultural and religious traditions, national customs, and sustainable sociocultural practices play an important role. Within the framework of social and not political−etatist history, the actor of social policy is not limited to the state, including public institutions and the set of individuals as well.⁹ E.I. Kholostova, for example, understands social policy as, on the one hand, “the art of combining human interests, the interests of individuals and the state, and those of human communities and groups of various levels in the sphere of social relations” and, on the other hand, as “a system of constantly renewing interactions between state power, nonstate structures, and the individual as such on issues of human life support.”¹⁰

Despite the different approaches to this problem, in general, as a result of terminological discussions of the late 20th−early 21st centuries in the historical and sociological literature, a broad integral understanding of social policy has been established as a purposeful activity of the state and public institutions in the field of social development in general, aimed, on the one hand, at regulating social relations and processes of social stratification and forming a social structure of society and, on the other hand, at solving the main social problems (including the problems of protecting and stimulating labor, ensuring employment, regulating the level of income and distributing basic goods and resources, improving housing and living conditions, protecting health, etc.), that is, the system measures taken by the state and society to implement relevant social programs.¹¹

Thus, social policy is a complex sociohistorical phenomenon, the very definition of which contains internal contradictions. In addition to the extremely wide range of research areas, note the ambiguity of the subject, which unites power, public institutions, and individuals. Moreover, the state itself, as Kholostova rightly notes, is “a complex and controversial subject of social policy, individual elements or bodies of which may pursue various types of social policies, not always consistent with each other.”¹² Meanwhile, the reconstruction and comprehension of social policy as a whole make it possible to create a kind of portrait of society, to look at it through the prism of social problems and social relations in a particular period of our history.

Being a product and reflection of a certain era and accumulating not only social but also political and economic problems, social policy is not static. This was clearly manifested in its transformations with account for the changing realities of the first decade of Soviet power. Thus, the rejection of the policy of “war communism” and the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) made noticeable adjustments to social policy, demonstrating its close connection with economic and political conditions and the ability to be dynamic while maintaining the basic principles.

In our opinion, one of the central tasks of the modern historiographic stage is to move from the in-depth development of individual research subjects to the generalization of accumulated knowledge to study more general problems, to a comprehensive reconstruction of the social policy of various periods and an analysis of its principles and priorities and the respective basic components of the social program in dynamics. It seems that the key to understanding Soviet social policy is the period of its formation, that is, the time of the Civil War and the NEP. The social policy of the Bolsheviks, which arose during a period of tough civil confrontation, rested on deep internal contradictions. On the one hand, it was supposed to contribute to the maximum expansion of the social base of the new government, and, consequently, to rely on popular among the people and partly populist slogans based on the ideas of social justice. On the other hand, in relation to all opponents of the new government and representatives of the former privileged strata, the new social policy was bound to be discriminatory. The principle of social justice came into conflict with both the class approach and the objectives of economic expediency. All these contradictions were reflected in one way or another in the decisions made by the authorities, becoming even more acute at the level of political practice—both because of the objective impossibility for the state to fulfill its obligations under the conditions of the deepening economic crisis and because of the predominance on the ground of “revolutionary legal consciousness” instead of norms of law.

The class principle was replaced by the respective rhetoric and often receded into the background under the influence of economic or political expediency. The internal contradiction was laid down in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918, Article 22 of which proclaimed equal rights of all citizens, while Article 23 deprived representatives of the former exploiting classes of a number of civil rights. There was an interweaving of the class approach and ideological dogmatism with pragmatism, populist slogans with discriminatory decisions, and democratic reforms with antidemocratic punitive measures.

Obviously, such a complex and contradictory historical phenomenon cannot be adequately reflected by the set of stereotypes and postulates prevailing in modern historiography. They require rethinking with account for new sources, many of which were not previously available, as well as for an interdisciplinary approach and modern research tools. As the Austrian researcher R. Sieder rightly noted, individual social sciences and the humanities differ from each other primarily not in the “subjects” of study, which they often have in common, but in the formulation of the problem and the methods used.¹³ This directly relates to the study of social policy, which performs an integrative function, combining elements of political and economic history, the history of everyday life, gender history, demography, political science, sociology, and cultural studies.

This article is not a systematic and comprehensive study of Soviet social policy. The author’s task is to draw attention to the most pressing problems of its study, to the ambiguity of some well-established and, at first glance, obvious stereotypes, and to the inadmissibility of simplified approaches and conclusive assessments.

THE CLASS PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The main postulate underlying the modern historiography of the social policy of postrevolutionary Russia is the unconditional recognition of its pronounced class character. This fact has been established in historical research as an axiom. Meanwhile, the question of the practical content of the class principle is far from being so unambiguous. Traditionally, it is interpreted as a manifestation of discrimination based on social origin. The real situation was much more complicated.

First, the practical implementation of the class approach in social transformations required that the authorities clearly define the criteria for class identification, which in fact was absent. As S. Fitzpatrick rightly noted, it had nothing to do with the real social structure but had the most direct relationship to the fate of the individual.¹⁴ In the absence of clear criteria and guidelines “from above,” the issue of social identification of citizens in the first years after the revolution was often solved mainly at the grassroots level—by representatives of local Soviet and party authorities, heads of institutions, teachers at school, etc.

As a result, documents of 1918−1920 mention as social “classes” workers and employees; capitalists, landlords, and nobles; merchants, handicraftsmen, and peasants who do not exploit the labor of others; artisans, merchants, and peasants who use hired labor; landlords; professionals; “the bureaucratic apparatus”; students; disabled people; moonshiners, persons of no definite occupation, and the unemployed; and dozens of other very diverse “classes” that in reality have nothing to do with classes and with the social structure. The criterion for determining the social (in the terminology of those years, class) status of citizens, in addition to their origin, could be a profession, current occupation, including temporary (for example, an engineer, lawyer, student, small merchant, housewife, unemployed); a person’s ability to work (“disabled person”); and even his/her place of birth (“citizen of such and such city”).¹⁵ There was no clarity on the questions of what “classes” are and what the criteria are for the social identification of citizens, even among the leader associates of state and party institutions and legal bodies. In particular, USSR Assistant Prosecutor in 1926−1927 I.S. Kondurushkin, analyzing the social composition of those who during the NEP period were associated with private entrepreneurship, in the column “social status” indicated: engineer, chemical engineer, nobleman engineer, former lawyer, electrical engineer, deacon, etc. At the same time, in the “profession” column, he wrote down a merchant of the 1st guild, a trader, etc.¹⁶ In fact, we can say that, until the end of the 1920s, there were no clear criteria for social identification in the country, and arbitrary “assignment” of citizens to one “class” or another was practiced locally; those “classes” were mostly artificially created by people in power according to their own ideas.¹⁷ This led to the extreme instability of the social structure of Soviet society from the very beginning of the existence of Soviet Russia. On the one hand, citizens retained the ability to quite successfully disguise their real social origins. On the other hand, if desired, the authorities could take advantage of the vagueness of the criteria of class affiliation to classify people as “socially alien” or representatives of other discriminated categories.

The so-called “class standards” (class rations, the class principle of distribution of housing, class justice, class education, etc.) really quickly penetrated into all spheres of society. However, their real content in the conditions of social stigmatization of citizens was much more complex than the simplified picture of discrimination based on origin. The introduction of “class” standards was not only a manifestation of repressive measures. Often it was due to the pragmatic goals of providing the most “useful” working strata in the face of a total shortage of resources in the first place.

The situation in the country and the solution of certain specific tasks forced the authorities to be guided not only by a purely class approach but also to take into account other factors. Actually, the priority of workers in the distribution of resources was justified primarily by pragmatic considerations and not by ideological dogmas. “In a country that is ruined,” wrote V.I. Lenin in 1919, “the first task is to save the laborer. The primary productive force of all mankind is the worker, the laborer. If he survives, we will save and restore everything.”¹⁸

A careful study of legislative and administrative documents regulating the welfare system and the distribution of various social benefits (such as housing, food security, free education, etc.) testifies to the desire to combine the so-called class approach with the principles of social justice in the distribution of scarce resources (priority satisfaction of the most needy, including at the expense of the propertied strata), humanism (priority supply of children and pregnant women, care for the disabled), and economic feasibility. Thus, in accordance with the Regulations on Social Security of October 31, 1918, it applied to all laborers, “regardless of the nature and duration of work, as well as whether they work in state, nationalized, private, joint-stock, or public enterprises, institutions, or farms; for individuals or independently.” Below (Article 8 of the Regulations), it was clarified that benefits and pensions are not issued if the disability is not accompanied by loss of earnings. If only part of the earnings is saved, then this part must be deducted from the amount of the allowance or pension. In cases of “acute industrial and economic crises,” the People’s Commissariat of Labor had the right to reduce the amount of all benefits received by one person, together with earnings and other income, to the amount of the minimum benefit (Article 10).¹⁹ The size of pensions for disabled Red Army soldiers also depended on the degree of disability (from complete to partial disability, but not less than 15%).²⁰

The so-called “class ration” during the years of the Civil War also, upon closer examination, turns out to be based largely on the expedient distribution of food rather than on the class principle. For example, in September 1918, by the decision of the Moscow Soviet (Mossoviet), the entire population of Moscow was divided into four groups: (A) workers engaged in heavy physical labor, (B) workers engaged in light physical labor and employees, (C) an intermediate group, and (D) children. For each group, its own bread and food cards were developed, the amount of food received on them went down in history as a “class ration,” due to which it is often used in the literature as evidence of the discriminatory nature of the food supply system. In November 1918, by a joint decision of the Petrograd Labor Commune and the collegium of the Mossoviet Food Department, the norms of class rations common to both capitals were introduced. In July 1919, the Mossoviet Food Department decided on additional rations for factory workers engaged in heavy physical labor or working in hazardous production conditions. By the spring of 1920, the rationing system, which until then had functioned only in large cities, was extended to the entire urban population of Soviet Russia. In accordance with the Decree of the RSFSR Council of People’s Commissars of April 30, 1920, On the Introduction of Labor Food Rations, the entire working urban population was provided with free food according to the norms corresponding to three main categories. “Workers of physical labor employed in Soviet enterprises and institutions” included in Group A were supplied better than others. This was justified from a physiological point of view since workers engaged in heavy physical labor need more calories. Group B consisted of “people engaged in mental and office work in Soviet institutions and enterprises,” as well as some nonworking categories of citizens: disabled people; students over 16; people engaged in caring for children under 12 years of age or housewives from working families of at least three people; finally, pregnant women, starting from the fifth month of pregnancy. The worst were the Group C rations, which were provided to workers employed in private enterprises, as well as nonexploiting handicraftsmen, artisans, and the registered unemployed. According to a special norm, above Group A, the following categories of the urban working population were supplied: workers and employees of enterprises of “particular national importance” (mainly defense plants); workers engaged in “particularly difficult or harmful” labor; and those whose working day, for technological and other reasons, exceeded the established norm. All children under 16, families of Red Army soldiers, and medical and sanitary personnel involved in fighting against epidemics also received enhanced rations.²¹ Such a distribution of acutely scarce food seems to be quite reasonable and economically feasible: food rations depended on the socioeconomic significance of the profession and the severity of work. As is known, a similar principle of distribution was practiced during the Great Patriotic War.

The constantly evolving complex system of special rations, reflecting the current political and economic tasks of a particular period, was added to the card system. Thus, in late 1919 and early 1920, the Bolsheviks took measures to improve the financial situation of the representatives of the “old” scientific and artistic intelligentsia. Getting them on the Bolsheviks’ side was important from the political point of view, and in the case of the technical intelligentsia, it was also important for the development of the economy. In accordance with the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of December 23, 1919, On Improving the Situation of Scientific Specialists, outstanding scientists were now entitled to “increased allowances” (rations, clothing, fuel), exemption “from all kinds of duties (labor, military, etc.),” and housing and living conditions favorable for creative work.²² In January 1920, to create conditions for scientists and specialists to live and work, the Petrograd Commission for the Improvement of the Life of Scientists (PetroKUBU) was created, and in 1921, similar Moscow and Central Commissions (MKUBU and TsEKUBU). On June 14, 1920, the Council of People’s Commissars adopted the Regulations on Rations for Especially Responsible and Completely Irreplaceable Employees of Central Institutions. This category includes senior officials of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Central Statistical Administration; “Chusosnabarm” (extraordinary authorized representative of the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense for the supply of the Red Army and Navy), as well as their dependent family members.²³

The conditionality of the “class standards” is also clearly seen in housing policy and in the field of education, which were considered in Soviet historiography to be the unconditional achievements of Soviet social policy, while in the post-Soviet literature they are interpreted mainly within the framework of class policy as measures of a discriminatory nature. In particular, M.G. Meerovich, the author of a whole series of works on the history of Soviet housing policy, is convinced that it was of an exclusively repressive nature, and the “dwelling” itself was allegedly “a means of disciplinary coercion to work and a ‘correct’ way of life,” “a means of encouraging loyalty of the service” to the authorities. Claiming that the Bolshevik government “postulated a ban on people to live in ‘rich apartments,’”²⁴ Meerovich obviously forgets about the difficult situation in the housing sector in Russia back at the turn of the 19th−20th centuries.

The famous economist and architect of the late 19th−early 20th century M.G. Dikanskii classified the housing issue as one of the most “burning” social problems of the early 20th century.²⁵ In industrial centers, workers lived in barracks, basements, and so-called “corner” and “bunk−closet” apartments, that is, in apartments divided by curtains or thin partitions into corners and sections, in which only beds were placed, at best with a stool. A survey of these apartments, conducted in Moscow in 1899, showed them unsuitable for life in terms of sanitary and hygienic standards:

An average (in terms of its living conditions) bunk apartment is dirty, with spoiled air, full of all sorts of insects, and in many cases damp and cold; in any case, such an apartment accommodates more people than is admissible, and the overcrowding of the population sometimes reaches the point that it becomes incomprehensible how people can live in such an environment.²⁶

Cases when entrepreneurs invested in improving the living conditions of their employees certainly took place, but they were not a typical phenomenon and could not radically improve the situation in the country as a whole. According to the 1912 census, in Moscow over 300 000 workers with their families lived in unsanitary conditions, and 120 000 lived in damp basements and semibasements.²⁷ A similar situation was observed in other large cities.²⁸ The workers of large factories slept mainly in barracks next door. Here is what a typical bedroom of factory workers of the early 20th century looked like: “The bedroom was lined with bunks arranged in two tiers; only at the head were the bunks divided by boards, while at the foot there were ‘nest boxes’—boxes where bread, dirty linen, and other things were stored.”²⁹ Who can forget the words of Rodion Raskolnikov, the main character of F.M. Dostoevsky’s wonderful novel Crime and Punishment, written back in 1866, that “low ceilings and tiny rooms cramp the soul and the mind.” “Ah, how I hated that garret!” Raskolnikov said with despair to Sonya Marmeladova. Similar feelings were experienced by millions of people in Russia. During the First World War, due to the massive influx of refugees from the western provinces to the center of Russia, the problem of the housing shortage became even more acute.³⁰ Since it was unrealistic to build new housing in those conditions, the only way out, in principle, was to “optimize” the existing housing stock. After 1917, the Bolsheviks tried to resolve the issue mainly through a “revolutionary redistribution of housing” to the benefit of those in need through evictions, “compaction,” assigning living quarters, municipalization, and then de-municipalization. This reform was based on the idea of a more equitable redistribution of the housing stock. The new government, in conditions of economic ruin and a total shortage of resources, tried to provide housing for those in need, primarily families of workers, in the only way available to it—by withdrawing the so-called “surplus” living space from the urban well-to-do strata.³¹

How unattractive this policy was from the point of view of those who were evicted and “compacted” is universally known thanks to the brilliant work of M.A. Bulgakov Heart of a Dog:

Eating in the bedroom, reading in the examination room, dressing in the waiting room, operating in the servants’ room, and inspecting in the dining room?! It is very possible that Isadora Duncan does just that. Maybe she dines in the office, and slaughters rabbits in the bathroom. May be. But I’m not Isadora Duncan!!! I will have lunch in the dining room and operate in the operating room!

This angry tirade of Professor Preobrazhenskii, who lived in a seven-room apartment, in response to the proposal to “compact” finds a receptive audience in modern readers. This is not surprising. We all want to sleep in the bedroom, dine in the dining room, work in the study, and play with the kids in the nursery. However, an attentive reader will not miss one seemingly insignificant nuance. Concluding the conversation with the compaction commission, the professor asks to be given the opportunity to “go on partaking of my meals where all normal people do so, that is, in the dining room and not in the hall and not in the nursery.” Thus, he excluded from “normal people” millions of workers and members of their families who lived in barracks and corner and bunk−closet apartments and had neither bedrooms, nor dining rooms, nor nurseries. If we distract ourselves from Bulgakov’s brilliant artistic images, we will recall that the basement and semibasement apartments and overcrowded barracks of workers were hotbeds of tuberculosis and other serious diseases. Thus, the solution of the housing problem was not only a matter of social justice but also a matter of preserving labor resources, combating epidemics, and protecting motherhood and childhood, that is, a matter of strategic importance. Accordingly, the tasks of improving the living conditions of the working people cannot be considered from the point of view of the class principle.

The welfare system, guaranteed food supply of the population, provision of housing, etc., were adjusted in accordance with changes in the general social and political situation. Thus, during the Civil War, one of the priority areas of social policy was concern for the “red commanders” and soldiers of the Red Army. The difficult epidemiological situation forced the authorities to pay attention to the situation of medical workers and their families. In particular, in February 1919, the state extended pensions to the families of medical workers who died in the fight against epidemics.³² The objectives of industrialization made the government focus on improving the standard of living of engineers and technical specialists. The toughening of the “class struggle” in the late 1920s led to restrictions on the rights in the field of welfare of a number of representatives of the former privileged strata. Thus, in 1929, by a decree of the Union Council of Social Insurance under the USSR People’s Commissariat of Labor, all former landowners, factory owners, gendarmes, policemen, leaders of counterrevolutionary gangs, etc., were deprived of the right to pensions and unemployment benefits.³³ In addition, the guaranteed welfare system did not include the rural population, which constituted the overwhelming majority of citizens of Soviet Russia, as well as lishenetses (the “disenfranchised”) and urban “nonworking” elements. Thus, the hierarchy of social priorities that took shape in the first decade of Soviet power is a complex and dynamic system that is not limited to the class approach.

Obviously, the actual practice differed significantly from the declared policy. However, at the local level, the class principle turned out to be even less pronounced, becoming more and more an element of political rhetoric.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL POLICY: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE OR TOTAL CONTROL ON ITS PART?

In all areas of social policy, the Bolsheviks from the very first days consistently pursued the principle of centralization and state regulation. Gradually, unified centralized state systems of social security and health care were created. An attempt to create a centralized system of childcare was only partially successful; these functions were divided between the people’s commissariats of education, social security, and health; and the functions of protecting motherhood and infancy, between the people’s commissariats of health and social security. One way or another, all spheres of social policy were institutionalized, which, on the one hand, gave the necessary state guarantees of social security, medical care, education, care for orphans, etc., but, on the other hand, often led to total control of the state, limiting real freedoms.

While Soviet historiography emphasized the advantages of the institutionalization of social policy in Soviet Russia, post-Soviet historiography, on the contrary, focuses largely on its negative consequences. In particular, widespread is the statement about the complete destruction of charity by the Bolsheviks, the monopolization of the right of social assistance by the Soviet state, and the complete removal of society from it, as well as the overall destruction of public initiative under the Bolsheviks.

Indeed, in accordance with the new principles, social assistance, medical care, and care for motherhood and childhood were transferred in full to the responsibility of the state, which assumed obligations to provide social assistance in the amount and forms established by law. All charitable societies and organizations that had existed before October 1917 were abolished. People’s Commissar for Social Security A.N. Vinokurov repeatedly emphasized that “any kind of charity, philanthropy, or beggarly handouts must be eradicated and replaced with rationally delivered social assistance.” For example, the social security of the disabled should consist in the fact that, if possible, they “should be cured, put on their feet, equipped with prostheses, and trained in some trade so that they can work again and not be a burden to the state.”³⁴ However, society not only continued helping those in need but also, on the contrary, the Bolsheviks welcomed and even stimulated this help in every possible way.

Unable to cope with their obligations, even before the end of the Civil War, state structures deliberately delegated part of their powers to society, encouraging private initiatives but at the same time directing them in the right direction and controlling them. This was especially evident in the social sphere, including in the field of maternal and child health. Widespread were various mass “public” campaigns initiated by the government (and, consequently, regulated by it) (“weeks of the homeless and sick child,” “weeks of maternity and infancy care,” “circle collection” in favor of starving children, meetings, sports and gymnastic holidays, etc.). During the NEP years, when most social institutions were transferred to scarce local funding, this trend became even more pronounced. The need to develop public initiative more widely or to encourage the creation of “all kinds of free societies and circles among workers and peasants” (for example, circles and societies for technical education, agronomy, invention, radio, “friends of the book,” etc.) is mentioned in the decisions of the party congresses as well.³⁵ However, the more the authorities encouraged and stimulated public activity, the more this activity was controlled by the state, and voluntary public organizations gradually merged with party and state structures. In fact, public assistance was incorporated into the state system, which, on the one hand, leveled the very essence of “voluntary public initiatives” and, on the other, provided state support (organizational, financial, etc.) to those public initiatives that the authorities recognized as “useful.”³⁶

The contradictory combination of encouragement and suppression of public initiatives in the policy of the 1920s led to equally contradictory assessments of this phenomenon by researchers. Some are convinced that the “natural development of volunteering” was interrupted by the revolution of 1917 and that a “reverse process” began in the development of the social movement, taken under “firm proletarian leadership.”³⁷ Others, on the contrary, are sure that it was after 1917 that volunteer labor acquired “an emotionally attractive self-sufficient form of the practices of social activity of the population.”³⁸ Both points of view are fair in their own way, but each reflects only one of the sides of a more complex and contradictory reality.

The problem of the correlation of the pros and cons of the institutionalization of social policy leads to a number of other significant questions, such as the correlation of social education and family values, the problems of adoption and foster care, state intervention in family relations, and the so-called “women’s issue.” All these and many other problems of Soviet social policy need a depoliticized view, free from stereotypes and established clichés.

Rethinking Soviet social policy will not only provide an opportunity to answer a number of significant questions in Russian history but will also help to understand a number of acute problems of our time—in particular, to assess the advantages and disadvantages of various models of social policy, to resolve the dispute about the advantages of its residual,³⁹ meritocratic,⁴⁰ and institutional⁴¹ models.⁴² Reconstruction of the experience of the 1920s in the field of social education will be interesting and useful within the framework of modern discussions around juvenile justice. All these subjects in one way or another lead us to the question of what the permissible limits of state regulation of social processes and interference in social relations are, and where the fine line between state assistance and state control is.