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Testing the prisoners’ dilemma of counterterrorism: an aggregate analysis of counterterrorist efforts from 2001 to 2010

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Abstract

What compels states to cooperate in the face of a global terrorist threat? On an international scale, the elimination of a common terrorist threat resembles a prisoners’ dilemma, with many states choosing to shore up defences at home rather than bear the costs of cooperative, pre-emptive strikes abroad. Utilising original data, this paper represents an empirical examination of the prisoners’ dilemma of counterterrorism to determine what characteristics drive cooperation and whether that cooperation depends on the institutional characteristics of a state, finding that alliance commitments and state capabilities encourage cooperation, while democracy inhibits the achievement of cooperation. These findings illustrate the argument that, although democracies are generally cooperative with one another in matters of international security, the amorphous nature of terrorism fosters a sense of reluctance among democracies regarding proper counterterrorist action.

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Notes

  1. It has been noted that Al-Qaeda had not become functionally operational as a group until 1998.

  2. Herbert (2009) notes that Western analyses of Islamist identities frequently conflate numerous degrees of Islamic activism at the expense of theoretical rigour. A thorough treatment of the term ‘global militant Islamist organisations’ is beyond the scope of this article and I will refer exclusively to Al-Qaeda, their affiliated organisations, and unaffiliated individuals who use terrorism to attack the United States and other nations of the West (Freeman 2008).

  3. See online appendix. Non-democracies identified by a POLITY IV score of 5 or lower. These data are conservative estimates, excluding attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and only including attacks in which the nationality of the primary victim is known.

  4. See online appendix. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010 — Military Expenditure, available at http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2010/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex (accessed 24 February, 2014).

  5. US National Counterterrorism Center, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror_06.pdf (accessed 10 March, 2014).

  6. This implies that the authors are referring to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and affiliated organisations that possess the resources and organisational abilities to launch a global campaign.

  7. Country Reports on Terrorism after 2004.

  8. Non-democracies identified by a POLITY IV score of 5 or lower.

  9. ‘Austria to Send 93 Soldiers to Afghanistan’, People’s Daily Online, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200508/02/eng20050802_199830.html (accessed 31 March, 2014).

  10. Transnational attacks are separated from domestic attacks by means of the method used by Enders et al. (2011).

  11. Martha Crenshaw (2014) ‘Global Al-Qaeda’, available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/alqaeda (accessed 9 March, 2014).

  12. http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm (accessed 7 June, 2012).

  13. Scores of 0 are assigned to non-democracies, because electoral participation might be voluntary in those states (Li 2005).

  14. This assertion was true even after running models without the POLITY IV measure.

  15. See online appendix. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010 — Military Expenditure.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Amanda Murdie for her helpful and constructive comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, 207 Professional Building, Columbia, 65211-6030, MO, USA

    Kyle T Kattelman

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Appendix

Appendix

Coding for state action

The framework for the analysis of events is based on the international and national counterterrorism measures compiled by the UN Security Council Resolution 1269 and Resolution 1373 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The topics cover the areas of public and foreign policies in relation to which the states’ counterterrorism actions are observed:

  • Institutional

    • Legislation

    • Creating departments

    • Criminalisation

  • Deterrent

    • Controlling borders and people

    • Seizing assets

    • Target-hardening

    • Facilitating preparation of human and technological resources

    • Arrests

  • Punitive

    • Using military and security forces against terrorists

    • Allowing military bases on sovereign soil

  • Other

    • Humanitarian aid

    • Engaging in diplomacy

    • Introducing proposals

    • Sharing intelligence

From this framework, actions that fall under ‘Deterrent’ will be counted as choosing Deter in Figure 1, and actions that fall under ‘Punitive’ will be counted as choosing Pre-empt. If a state chooses a deterrent and punitive action during the same year, the outcome will be coded as Pre-empt. These two choices of Deter and Pre-empt are chosen because they require a greater amount of effort to execute relative to cooperative or institutional measures. Additionally, these actions entail greater consequences in terms of political backlash and a potential retaliatory attack. For example, it can be argued that promising humanitarian aid does little to influence the risk of terrorist attacks. By contrast, freezing the assets of a terrorist organisation can be seen to carry significant consequences by limiting their amount of available resources and influencing their ability to act. The coding criteria for the different areas of counterterrorist action represent a modified schema taken from Omelicheva’s (2007) coding manual, ‘States’ Responses to Terrorism: Manual for Data Collection’, for collecting data on state responses to terrorism.

Institutional

Legislation

Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to criminalise the provision or collection of funds, by nationals within their borders or territories, for the purposes, whether direct or indirect, of funding terrorist acts. Additionally, Security Council Resolution 1269 condemns unequivocally all acts of terrorism as criminal, irrespective of the methods or motives of the organisation in question. Thus, all acts of legislation passed to meet these ends, including amending acts to combat different aspects of terrorism, changing legislation in the interest of combating terrorism, and extending authority to existing state agencies, are coded as such.

Creating departments

This code applies to instances in which a state creates a new agency for the purposes of counterterrorism.

Criminalisation

This category represents all efforts of states to pass laws that either establish terrorism as a serious criminal offence, or criminalise terrorist acts (e.g., hijacking, hostage-taking, bombings, and so on) or any explicit actions regarded as terrorist acts per UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1373.

Deterrent

Controlling borders and people

Security Council resolution 1373 requires states to take measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and financial flows to entities and persons related to terrorism, and to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts. These measures include controls on the issuance of identity papers and travel documents, intensified border controls, and regulations of financial transactions. All actions listed below are coded as ‘Control’.

Control of the movement of people

This code is used when a state establishes, improves, or expands databanks containing information on any of the individual metrics, identity documents or visas, and any other measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identify papers and travel documents (e.g., increasing the security level of passports). This event type also includes compiling lists of persons responsible for perpetration of terrorist acts.

Border controls

This code is used to record a state’s actions aimed at intensification of border controls by supplying border posts with necessary border control equipment, or increasing the presence of border troops at the most dangerous parts of the state border.

Control of financial flows

This code is used to record a state’s measures to protect its financial system. These measures include defining suspicious operations, listing individuals and groups associated with terrorism for the purpose of freezing their financial assets, instructing banks and other institutions on measures to be taken to prevent the utilisation of finances and other assets for commission of terrorist acts. This event code also covers monitoring the activities of national banks and financial intelligence units.

Ban

This code is assigned when a state establishes a ban on functioning of terrorist groups on its territory, or prohibits the activities of banned organisations. This event type also includes courts’ decision declaring certain groups and organisations illegal.

Seizing assets

Seize

This code is used to record various forms of sanctions imposed on the assets of individuals and groups related to terrorism. It includes freezes of accounts, bans on the flow of funds, and sequestration of assets.

Target hardening

Target hardening entails an increase or upgrade in security surrounding potential targets under threat of terrorist attack. The purpose of this action is to dissuade terrorists sufficiently from engaging in terrorist attacks against the protected target. Any of the following actions listed below will be coded as ‘target hardening’.

Target hardening of high-risk activities

This code is used to record measures that a state implements to ensure protection of people during high-risk mass activities, such as sporting events, shows, and public appearances of celebrities or high-profile politicians.

Target hardening of embassies and internationally protected persons

This code is used to record additional measures of protection of embassies and diplomatic representations of states and international organisations. This event code includes measures of protection of diplomats and other internationally protected persons.

Target hardening of transport and communication systems

This code is used to record measures of protection of the systems of transportation – railway, air and naval transport, as well as the systems of communication, including mailing and internet services.

Target hardening of weapons and explosives storage areas

This code is used to record any additional safety measures in the storage areas of weapons and explosives.

Preparation of human and technical resources

This category represents efforts on behalf of states to improve the technological deterrent and monitoring activities as well as the preparation or training of units or groups of people for the express purpose of counterterrorism. Any of the actions listed below will be coded as ‘Preparation of human and technical resources’.

Train personnel

This code is used to record any of the following measures aimed at improving human resources for combating terrorism: recruiting and training human resources for high-alert counter-terrorist special reaction force teams (including hostage rescue units); training bomb disposal teams or other special units to deal with terrorist threat or offensive; carrying out simulation exercises; or enhancing the capacity of law enforcement officials to handle terrorist threats.

Upgrade technical resources

This code is assigned when a state develops, applies or modifies its technological reserves used to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. This includes surveillance devices, means for eavesdropping/interception, satellites and detectors.

Arrests

Non-military punitive reactions to terrorist attacks. This includes arrests made on foreign nationals or domestic citizens within a state’s sovereign territory as well as non-military raids on the headquarters of terrorists within the occupied territories in Iraq and Afghanistan (for the purposes of arrest and/or neutralisation).

Pre-empt

Strike

Strike is used to record an instance in which a state contributes armed forces for participation in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is measured as two separate-count variables, with each state consisting of a value for the number of troops contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and a value for the number of troops contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.

Basing

Base is used to record instances of a nation sanctioning their land for the usage of troop movement or supplies for the purposes of combat or defence against a terrorist organisation.

Other

Humanitarian aid

This variable is coded when a state provides humanitarian aid for the purposes of emergency relief to other international actors.

Engaging in diplomacy

This variable represents instances of international discussion or negotiation of events related to the purpose of combating terrorism and includes engaging in joint counterterrorist exercises, hosting diplomatic events regarding terrorism, traveling to meet foreign dignitaries for the purpose of discussing counterterrorism, and articulating positions to the international community with regard to counterterrorism.

Offering proposals

This variable represents a state’s attempt to suggest or propose counterterrorism policies or strategies of any kind. This action includes proposing treaties, amendments, and initiatives regarding any reference to fighting terrorism.

Sharing intelligence

This variable is coded to represent the exchange of information between states regarding instances of terrorism, early warning, or assisting in criminal investigations.

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Kattelman, K. Testing the prisoners’ dilemma of counterterrorism: an aggregate analysis of counterterrorist efforts from 2001 to 2010. J Int Relat Dev 19, 583–607 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2014.26

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