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Sly Pete in Dynamic Semantics

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Abstract

In ‘Sly Pete’ or ‘standoff’ cases, reasonable speakers accept incompatible conditionals, and communicate them successfully to a trusting hearer. This paper uses the framework of dynamic semantics to offer a new model of the conversational dynamics at play in standoffs, and to articulate several puzzles posed by such cases. The paper resolves these puzzles by embracing a dynamic semantics for conditionals, according to which indicative conditionals require that their antecedents are possible in their local context, and update this body of information by eliminating the possibilities where the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. In this way, the dynamic analysis draws on insights from the material conditional and contextualist analyses, while explaining how standoffs are genuine disagreements.

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  1. Australian Catholic University, Sydney, Australia

    Simon Goldstein

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  1. Simon Goldstein
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Correspondence to Simon Goldstein.

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Goldstein, S. Sly Pete in Dynamic Semantics. J Philos Logic 51, 1103–1117 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09660-w

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09660-w

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