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Pricing and consumption in the P2P product sharing era: How does the dual-channel manufacturer cooperate with third-party sharing platforms?

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Abstract

Recently, mobile communication technologies and sharing platforms have made peer-to-peer product sharing among consumers a major trend in the sharing economy. Product sharing has changed not only the purchasing and use behavior of consumers but also the operating decisions of manufacturers. This paper employs a game-theoretic analytical model to study consumers’ best choices, their sustainable consumption behavior, and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing strategy. Our analysis shows that peer-to-peer product sharing will increase the optimal prices, decrease customers’ demand for the product and reduce the profits of the manufacturer.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the editors and the anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions and comments through the revision process.

Funding

This research was funded by the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of MOE of China (18YJC630136).

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Authors

Contributions

Conceptualization, DQ, BX and CG; methodology, DQ; writing-original draft preparation, DQ; writing-review and editing, CG and BX; funding acquisition, DQ. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Daogang Qu.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2

Plugging Eq. (8) into Eq. (7) and Eq. (4), we can obtain consumers’ purchasing demand with product sharing \({D^S} = {{d(\beta (1 - d) + d)} / {(2(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2}))}}\). While in the no product-sharing scenario \({D^N} = {1 / 2}\), for \(0 < d \le 1\) and \(0 < \beta \le 1\), we can prove \({D^N} - {D^S} = {{\beta (1 - d)} / {(2(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2}))}} > 0\), thus, the product sharing will reduce the purchasing demand. Due to \({{d(\Delta {D^P})} / {d\beta }} = {{(1 - d){d^2}} / {(2(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2}))}} > 0\), \(\Delta {D^P}\) will increase when \(\beta\) increases. For \({{d(\Delta {D^P})} / {d(d)}} = - {{\beta (\beta {{(1 - d)}^2} + d(2 - d))} / {(2(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2}))}} < 0\), \(\Delta {D^P}\) will decrease when d increases. Plugging Eq.  (8) into Eq. (7) and Eq. (5), we have consumers’ rent in demand \({D^R}\). Then we can obtain \({D^S} + {D^R} - {D^N} = {{d(1 - d)(1 - \beta )} / {(2(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2})}}\), we can easily prove \(\Delta {D^U} > 0\), which implies product sharing will increase the total amount of products users. For \({{d(\Delta {D^U})} / {d\beta }} = - {{\beta (1 - \beta )} / {(2{{(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2})}^2})}} < 0\), \(\Delta {D^U}\) will decrease when \(\beta\) increases. For \({{d(\Delta {D^U})} / {d(d)}} = {{(1 - \beta )(\beta {{(1 - d)}^2} - {d^2})} / {2{{(\beta + (1 - \beta ){d^2})}^2}}}\), if \(0 < d \le {{\sqrt{\beta }} / {(1 + \sqrt{\beta })}}\), we have \({{d(\Delta {D^U})} / {d(d)}} > 0\), then \(\Delta {D^U}\) will increase in d, if \({{\sqrt{\beta }} \ {(1 + \sqrt{\beta })}} < d \le 1\), we have \({{d(\Delta {D^U})} / {d(d)}} < 0\), then \(\Delta {D^U}\) will decrease in d.

Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3

First \(\Delta p = {p^S} - {p^N} = {{\beta (1 - d)} / 2} > 0\),, for \(\beta > 0\) and \(1 - d > 0\), we can easily prove \({p^S} > {p^N}\) and \(\Delta p\) will increase when \(\beta\) increases, and decrease when d increases. Second, \(\Delta \pi = {\pi ^N} - {\pi ^S} = {{d\beta (1 - \beta ){{(1 - d)}^2}} / {(4(\beta (1 - {d^2}) + {d^2}))}}\), we can easily prove that \({\pi ^N} > {\pi ^S}\). If \({d / {(1 + d)}}< \beta < 1\), we have \({(1 - \beta )^2}{d^2} - {\beta ^2} < 0\) and \({{d(\Delta \pi )} / {d\beta }} < 0\), then \(\Delta \pi\) will decrease with the increase of \(\beta\). If \(0< \beta < {d / {(1 + d)}}\), we have \({(1 - \beta )^2}{d^2} - {\beta ^2} > 0\) and \({{d(\Delta \pi )} / {d\beta }} > 0\), then \(\Delta \pi\) will increase with the increase of \(\beta\). Third, if \(0< d < {d^*}\), we have \({{d(\Delta \pi )} / {d(d)}} > 0\), then \(\Delta \pi\) will increase with the increase of d. If \({d^*}< d < 1\), we have \({{d(\Delta \pi )} / {d(d)}} < 0\), then \(\Delta \pi\) will decrease with the increase of d. Note that \(d* = \root 3 \of {{\root 2 \of {{({A^2} - {B^3})}} - A}} + {B / {\root 3 \of {{\root 2 \of {{({A^2} - {B^3})}} - A}}}} - {1 / 3}\), and \(A = {1 / {27}} - {\beta / {(1 - \beta )}}\), \(B = {1 / 9} - {\beta / {(1 - \beta )}}\).

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Qu, D., Gao, C. & Xu, B. Pricing and consumption in the P2P product sharing era: How does the dual-channel manufacturer cooperate with third-party sharing platforms?. Electron Commer Res (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-023-09710-8

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