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Restoring Ramsey tax lessons to Mirrleesian tax settings: Atkinson–Stiglitz and Ramsey reconciled

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Abstract

This paper restores many of the Ramsey tax/pricing lessons perceived as outdated in the optimal tax literature following the Atkinson and Stiglitz (J Public Econ 6:55–75, 1976) framework wherein differential commodity taxes are considered to be redundant. The key to our findings is the incorporation of a “break-even constraint” for public firms into the Atkinson and Stiglitz framework. Break-even constraints are fundamental to the regulatory pricing literature but have somehow been overlooked in the optimal tax literature. Incorporating them reconciles the optimal-tax and the regulatory-pricing views on Ramsey tax/pricing rules.

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Notes

  1. It is a mystery as to why it took the public finance literature more than four decades and until early 1970s to appreciate Ramsey’s (1927) insights. It started with the seminal paper by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and followed by literally hundreds of papers. Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Sandmo (1976) provide an interesting history of this subject. In the original Ramsey problem, individuals are alike and there is no income tax. With heterogeneous individuals, one also allows for a uniform lump-sum tax or rebate (and possibly a linear tax on labor income); see Diamond (1975).

  2. This does not mean that there should be no commodity taxes; Pigouvian taxes, for instance, remain useful.

  3. It is by now well understood though that the AS result has its own limitations. In particular, it may not hold under uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari 1995) or under multi-dimensional heterogeneity (Cremer et al. 1998, 2001b), and that redistribution through prices may then once again be second-best optimal (Cremer and Gahvari 1998, 2002). Still, these limitations notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the Ramsey approach to taxation is considered as dated and no longer “state of the art”. It does continue to occupy a prominent place in all advanced textbooks, but it is taught mainly as an introduction to tax design and not because of its practical relevance.

  4. While it is true that regulators and especially competition authorities are often reluctant to accept Ramsey pricing arguments, this is not because of the AS result. Their objection is more of legal and procedural nature. In particular, Ramsey prices are often viewed as “discriminatory” and subject to informational problems when the operator is better informed about demand condition than the regulator.

  5. We follow the terminology used in the regulation literature but, in reality, this is a quasi-fixed cost relevant also in the long-run (a non convexity in the production set).

  6. Redistributive concerns are not confined to the tax literature and also appear in the regulatory economics literature.

  7. Whether this firm is public, as in Boiteux’s world, or private but regulated does not matter. Either way, one implicitly assumes that the firms’ revenues must also cover some “fair” rate of return on capital.

  8. Our results will not change if a continuous distribution of types are considered.

  9. Alternatively one can think of a privately owned regulated firm whose prices are set not just to cover cost but also a “fair” rate of return on capital.

  10. These demand functions are derived conditional on a given I. Hence the conditional qualifier.

  11. Unless the aid comes as a compensation for specific public-service obligations imposed on an operator. The State Aid legislation is in turn motivated by anti-trust considerations and specifically the concern that member states might subsidize their “national champion”.

  12. We discuss this issue further in the Sect. 5.

  13. The following quote from Joskow (2007, p. 1255) makes this point. It also makes it clear that the break-even constraint is taken for granted in the context of regulation.

    But marginal cost pricing will not produce enough revenues to cover total costs, thus violating the firm viability or break-even constraint. A great deal of the literature on price regulation has focused on responding to this conflict by implementing price structures that achieve the break-even constraint in ways that minimize the efficiency losses associated with departures from marginal cost pricing. Moreover, because the interesting cases involve technologies where long-lived sunk costs are a significant fraction of total costs, the long-term credibility of regulatory rules plays an important role in convincing potential suppliers that the rules of the regulatory game will in fact fairly compensate them for the sunk costs that they must incur to provide service.

  14. Indirectly because the optimization is over a mix of quantities and prices. Then, given the commodity prices, utility maximizing individuals would choose the quantities themselves.

  15. The maximization must leave one of the prices out; see the discussion at the end of this section.

  16. We assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied. Their violation is only interesting in conjunction with the properties of the income tax schedule and the question of bunching.

  17. Observe that with \(p_{1}=1\), one can replace \(\sum _{i=1}^{n}(p_{i}-1)x_{i}^{j}\) in (11) with \(\sum _{i=2}^{n} (p_{i}-1)x_{i}^{j}\).

  18. Suppose there are two public firms. Refer to the one which has a relatively higher fixed cost as #1 and the other as #2. Raising prices proportionately to balance the budget of #1 must imply that #2 will have a surplus, while raising them to balance the budget of #2 must imply that #1 will have a deficit.

  19. Observe that \(\Delta \) is of full rank so that its inverse exists; see Takayama (1985).

  20. Traditionally, however, the Ramsey pricing rules are derived either for a unified government budget constraint (in the public finance literature), or a public firm (in the regulation literature). They have not been derived within a Ramsey setting that includes the two constraints together (as we are doing in this paper within the AS framework). It is nevertheless the case that adding on a break-even constraint to the government’s budget constraint in the Ramsey problem, does not change the structure of Ramsey taxes/pricing rules. This is easy to show. The relevant expressions can be found in an earlier Working Paper version of this paper; see Cremer and Gahvari (2013).

  21. The appearance of the \(\delta /\mu \) term on the right-hand side of this relationship reflects the fact that “average-cost pricing” by public firms creates an additional source of distortion beyond the tax distortion caused purely for revenue raising. Whereas the shadow cost of raising one unit of revenue for covering \(\bar{R}\) is \(\mu \), it is \(\mu +\delta \) for covering F. It is, relative to \(\mu \), \(\delta /\mu \) higher.

  22. Much of the regulation and industrial organization literature uses quasi-linear preference. With these preferences, there are no income effects and the distinction between Hicksian and Marshallian demand becomes irrelevant.

  23. To see this, observe that \(c_{j}\) changes according to \(dc_{j}=x_{i}^{j}dt_{i}\) so that aggregate compensations change by \(\sum _{j}\pi ^{j}dc_{j}=( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}x_{i}^{j})dt_{i}.\)

  24. The simplest form of nonlinear pricing is the two-part tariffs. One might be tempted to think that the firm could simply set the fixed part to cover its fixed cost and then set the marginal price at marginal cost. In reality, however, this would typically involve so large a fixed part that some consumers cannot afford it. Consequently, demand at the extensive margin would be affected (even if there are no income effects; IO models typically assume quasi-linear preferences). Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 147–148) for instance show that this leads to “generalized” Ramsey rules with a tradeoff between intense and extensive margin elasticities. This problem can be mitigated by using more sophisticated pricing rules (menus of two-part tariffs), but it would remain true that the break-even constraint leads to distortions (unless the firm has full information and can use first-degree price discrimination which is not a realistic scenario).

  25. As we have emphasized previously, our objective has been to explore what break-even constraints imply for the role of commodity taxes however one rationalizes these constraints. In a way, this is somewhat akin to the one-consumer Ramsey tax problem wherein one rules out lump-sum taxation for a variety of reasons and studies its implications for the design of optimal commodity taxes.

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Correspondence to Helmuth Cremer.

Additional information

This paper has been presented in seminars at CESifo, Uppsala University, the University of Cologne and University Nova (Lisbon). We thank all the participants and in particular Felix Biebrauer, Sören Blomquist, Denis Epple, Kenneth Kletzer, Etienne Lehmann and Catarina Reis for their useful suggestions and comments. We are grateful to Jean-Tirole for a number of inspiring discussions about the underlying problem. Last but not least, we would like to thank the referee and the Associate Editor for their many constructive and helpful comments.

Appendix A

Appendix A

1.1 First-order characterization of the (constrained) Pareto-efficient allocations

Rearranging the terms in (11), and dropping the constants \(\bar{R}\) and F,  one may usefully rewrite the Lagrangian expression as

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathcal {L}}= & {} \sum _{j}\left( \eta ^{j}+\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) v^{j}+\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ (I^{j}-c^{j})+\sum _{i=1}^{n}(p_{i}-1)x_{i}^{j}\right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{s=1}^{m} (q_{s}-1)y_{s}^{j}\right] -\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}v^{jk}. \end{aligned}$$
(A1)

The first-order conditions of this problem are, for \(j,k=1,2,\ldots ,H,\)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial I^{j}}= & {} \left( \eta ^{j}+\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) v_{I}^{j}+\mu \pi ^{j}\left[ 1+\sum _{i=1}^{n} (p_{i}-1)\frac{\partial x_{i}^{j}}{\partial I^{j}}\right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{s=1}^{m}(q_{s} -1)\frac{\partial y_{s}^{j}}{\partial I^{j}}\right] -\sum _{k\ne j} \lambda ^{kj}v_{I}^{kj}=0, \end{aligned}$$
(A2)
$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial c^{j}}= & {} \left( \eta ^{j}+\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) v_{c}^{j}+\mu \pi ^{j}\left[ -1+\sum _{i=1}^{n} (p_{i}-1)\frac{\partial x_{i}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{s=1}^{m}(q_{s} -1)\frac{\partial y_{s}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right] -\sum _{k\ne j} \lambda ^{kj}v_{c}^{kj}=0, \end{aligned}$$
(A3)
$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial p_{i}}= & {} \sum _{j}\left( \eta ^{j} +\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) v_{i}^{j}+\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{e=1}^{n}(p_{e}-1)\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}+x_{i}^{j}\right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{f=1}^{m} (q_{f}-1)\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}\right] -\sum _{j} \sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}v_{i}^{jk}=0, \nonumber \\&\qquad i=2,3,\ldots ,n, \end{aligned}$$
(A4)
$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial q_{s}}= & {} \sum _{j}\left( \eta ^{j} +\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) v_{s}^{j}+\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{e=1}^{n}(p_{e}-1)\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}\right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{f=1}^{m} (q_{f}-1)\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}+y_{s}^{j}\right] -\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}v_{s}^{jk}=0, \nonumber \\&\qquad s=1,2,\ldots ,m, \end{aligned}$$
(A5)

where a subscript on \(v^{j}\) denotes a partial derivative. Equations (A2)–(A5) characterize the Pareto-efficient allocations constrained both by the public firms’ break-even constraint, the resource constraint, the self-selection constraints, as well as the linearity of commodity tax rates.

1.2 Derivation of (15) for optimal commodity taxes

Multiply Eq. (A3) by \(x_{i}^{j}\), sum over j and add the resulting equation to (A4). Similarly, multiply (A3) by \(y_{s}^{j}\), sum over j and add the resulting equation to (A5). Simplifying results in the following system of equations for \(i=2,\ldots ,n\) and \(s=1,2,\ldots ,m,\)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial p_{i}}+\sum _{j}x_{i}^{j}\frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial c^{j}}= & {} \sum _{j}\left( \eta ^{j}+\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) \left( v_{i}^{j}+x_{i}^{j}v_{c}^{j}\right) \nonumber \\&+\,\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{e=1} ^{n}(p_{e}-1)\left( \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}+x_{i}^{j} \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{f=1}^{m} (q_{f}-1)\left( \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}+x_{i}^{j} \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] \nonumber \\&-\,\sum _{j} \sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( v_{i}^{kj}+x_{i}^{j}v_{c}^{kj}\right) =0, \end{aligned}$$
(A6)
$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial q_{s}}+\sum _{j}y_{s}^{j}\frac{\partial {\mathcal {L}}}{\partial c^{j}}= & {} \sum _{j}\left( \eta ^{j}+\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{jk}\right) \left( v_{s}^{j}+y_{s}^{j}v_{c}^{j}\right) \nonumber \\&+\,\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\sum _{e=1}^{n} (p_{e}-1)\left( \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}+y_{s}^{j} \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \nonumber \\&+\left( \mu +\delta \right) \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left[ \sum _{f=1}^{m} (q_{f}-1)\left( \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}+y_{s}^{j} \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] \nonumber \\&-\,\sum _{j} \sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( v_{s}^{kj}+y_{s}^{j}v_{c}^{kj}\right) +\delta \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}y_{s}^{j}=0. \end{aligned}$$
(A7)

With \(v_{i}^{j}+x_{i}^{j}v_{c}^{j}=0\) from Roy’s identity, the left-hand side of (A6) shows the impact on the Lagrangian expression \({\mathcal {L}}\) of a variation in \(p_{i}\) when the disposable income of individuals is adjusted according to

$$\begin{aligned} dc_{j}=x_{i}^{j}dt_{i}, \end{aligned}$$
(A8)

to keep their utility levels constant. With \(v_{s}^{j}+y_{s}^{j}v_{c}^{j}=0\), the left-hand side of (A7) shows the same compensated effect for a variation in \(q_{s}\) where

$$\begin{aligned} dc_{j}=y_{s}^{j}d\tau _{s}. \end{aligned}$$
(A9)

These compensated derivatives, \((\partial {\mathcal {L}}/\partial p_{i})_{v^{j}=\overline{v}^{j}}\) and \((\partial {\mathcal {L}} /\partial q_{s})_{v^{j}=\overline{v}^{j}}\) vanish at the optimal solution.

Make use of Roy’s identity to set,

$$\begin{aligned} v_{i}^{j}+x_{i}^{j}v_{c}^{j}= & {} 0,\\ v_{i}^{kj}+x_{i}^{kj}v_{c}^{kj}= & {} 0,\\ v_{s}^{j}+y_{s}^{j}v_{c}^{j}= & {} 0,\\ v_{s}^{kj}+y_{s}^{kj}v_{c}^{kj}= & {} 0. \end{aligned}$$

Substitute these values in Eqs. (A6) and (A7), set \(p_{i}-1=t_{i}\) and \(q_{s}-1=\tau _{s}\), and divide by \(\mu .\) Upon changing the order of summation and further simplification one arrives at, for all \(i=2,\ldots ,n,\) and \(s=1,2,\ldots ,m,\)

$$\begin{aligned}&\sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left[ \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left( \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j} }{\partial p_{i}}+x_{i}^{j}\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] +\left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left[ \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left( \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}+x_{i} ^{j}\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] \nonumber \\&\quad -\frac{1}{\mu }\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{i}^{j} -x_{i}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}=0, \end{aligned}$$
(A10)
$$\begin{aligned}&\sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left[ \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left( \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j} }{\partial q_{s}}+y_{s}^{j}\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] +\left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left[ \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\left( \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}+y_{s}^{j}\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}\right) \right] \nonumber \\&\quad -\frac{1}{\mu }\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{s}^{j} -y_{s}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\sum _{j}\pi ^{j}y_{s}^{j}=0. \end{aligned}$$
(A11)

Next, using the Slutsky equations,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}= & {} \frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{e}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}-x_{i}^{j}\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}},\\ \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}= & {} \frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}-x_{i}^{j}\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}},\\ \frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}= & {} \frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{e}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}-y_{s}^{j}\frac{\partial x_{e}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}},\\ \frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}= & {} \frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{f}^{j}}{\partial q_{s}}-y_{s}^{j}\frac{\partial y_{f}^{j}}{\partial c^{j}}, \end{aligned}$$

while making use of the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, one can further simplify (A10) and (A11) to

$$\begin{aligned}&\sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{i}^{j} }{\partial p_{e}}\right) +\left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{i}^{j}}{\partial q_{f}}\right) \nonumber \\&\quad =\frac{1}{\mu }\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{i}^{j}-x_{i}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}, \end{aligned}$$
(A12)
$$\begin{aligned}&\sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{s}^{j} }{\partial p_{e}}\right) +\left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{s}^{j}}{\partial q_{f}}\right) \nonumber \\&\quad =\frac{1}{\mu }\sum _{j}\sum _{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{s}^{j}-y_{s}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}-\frac{\delta }{\mu }\sum _{j}\pi ^{j} y_{s}^{j}, \end{aligned}$$
(A13)

which hold for all \(i=2,\ldots ,n,\) and \(s=1,2,\ldots ,m.\) Finally, collect the terms involving \(\delta /\mu \) and use the definition of \(\Delta \) in (14) to write out Eqs. (A12) and (A13) in matrix notation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \left( \begin{array}[c]{c} t_{2}\\ \vdots \\ t_{n}\\ \left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \tau _{1}\\ \vdots \\ \left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \tau _{m} \end{array} \right)= & {} \frac{1}{\mu }\left( \begin{array}[c]{c} {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{2}^{j}-x_{2}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{n}^{j}-x_{n}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{1}^{j}-y_{1}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{m}^{j}-y_{m}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj} \end{array} \right) -\frac{\delta }{\mu }\left( \begin{array}[c]{c} 0\\ \vdots \\ 0\\ {\sum }_{j}\pi ^{j}y_{1}^{j}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}\pi ^{j}y_{m}^{j} \end{array} \right) .\nonumber \\ \end{aligned}$$
(A14)

Premultiplying through by \(\Delta ^{-1}\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \left( \begin{array}[c]{c} t_{2}\\ \vdots \\ t_{n}\\ \left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \tau _{1}\\ \vdots \\ \left( 1+\frac{\delta }{\mu }\right) \tau _{m} \end{array} \right)= & {} \frac{1}{\mu }\Delta ^{-1}\left( \begin{array}[c]{c} {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{2}^{j}-x_{2}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( x_{n}^{j}-x_{n}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{1}^{j}-y_{1}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}{\sum }_{k\ne j}\lambda ^{kj}\left( y_{m}^{j}-y_{m}^{kj}\right) v_{c}^{kj} \end{array} \right) \nonumber \\&-\,\frac{\delta }{\mu }\Delta ^{-1}\left( \begin{array}[c]{c} 0\\ \vdots \\ 0\\ {\sum }_{j}\pi ^{j}y_{1}^{j}\\ \vdots \\ {\sum }_{j}\pi ^{j}y_{m}^{j} \end{array} \right) . \end{aligned}$$
(A15)

With weak-separability of preferences, Eqs. (12) and (13) hold so that \(x_{i}^{jk}=x_{i}^{k}\) and \(y_{s}^{jk}=y_{s}^{k}\). It then follows immediately that the first vector on the right-hand side of (A15) vanishes, reducing it to (15).

1.3 Derivation of (23)–(24)

With weakly-separable preferences, one can rearrange Eqs. (A12) and (A13) as

$$\begin{aligned} -\mu \sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{i}^{j} }{\partial p_{e}}\right) -\mu \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{x}_{i}^{j}}{\partial q_{f}}\right)= & {} \delta \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \widetilde{y}_{f}^{j}}{\partial p_{i}}\right) ,\\ -\mu \sum _{e=1}^{n}t_{e}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{s}^{j} }{\partial p_{e}}\right) -\mu \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{s}^{j}}{\partial q_{f}}\right)= & {} \delta \sum _{f=1}^{m}\tau _{f}\left( \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}\frac{\partial \tilde{y}_{f}^{j} }{\partial q_{s}}\right) \\&+\,\delta \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}y_{s}^{j}. \end{aligned}$$

Then divide the first set of equations by \(\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}x_{i}^{j}\) and the second set of equations by \(\mu \sum _{j}\pi ^{j}y_{s}^{j}\). They will then be rewritten as (23) and (24).

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Cremer, H., Gahvari, F. Restoring Ramsey tax lessons to Mirrleesian tax settings: Atkinson–Stiglitz and Ramsey reconciled. Soc Choice Welf 49, 11–35 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1046-8

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