Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle

  • Living reference work entry
  • Latest version View entry history
  • First Online:
Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics

Abstract

This chapter reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular, and the emergence and persistence of rules or norms, from a family perspective. In models where every new person is effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new traits making their appearance occurs in models where the trait characterizing any given member of any given generation is a combination of traits drawn at random from those represented in the previous generation. Preferences may be altruistic or non-altruistic, but individuals may behave as if they were altruistic even if they are not, because a rule or norm may make it in their interest to do so. Evolutionary stability and renegotiation-proofness play analogous roles, the former by selecting altruistic preferences, and the latter by selecting cooperation-inducing rules.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acemoglu D, Wolitzky A (2020) Sustaining cooperation: community enforcement versus specialized enforcement. J Eur Econ Assoc 18(2):1078–1122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2000) Economics and identity. Q J Econ 115:715–753

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Albanese G, de Blasio G, Sestito P (2016) My parents taught me: evidence on the family transmission of values. J Popul Econ 29:571–592

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina A, Giuliano P, Nunn N (2013) On the origins of gender roles. Q J Econ 128:469–530

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alger I, Cox D (2020) Evolution of the family: theory and implications for economics. Toulouse School of Economics working papers 20.1139

    Google Scholar 

  • Alger I, Weibull JW (2013) Homo moralis: preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. Econometrica 81:2269–2302

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alger I, Weibull JW (2019) Evolutionary models of preference formation. Ann Rev Econ 11:329–354

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ashraf QH, Galor O (2013a) The out of Africa hypothesis, human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development. Am Econ Rev 103:1–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ashraf QH, Galor O (2013b) Genetic diversity and the origins of cultural fragmentation. Am Econ Rev 103:528–533

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Attema AE (2012) Developments in time preference and their implications for medical decision making. J Oper Res Soc 63(10):1388–1399

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod RM (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod RM (1986) An evolutionary approach to norms. Am Polit Sci Rev 80:1095–1111

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bader M, Leuzinger S (2019) Hydraulic coupling of a leafless Kauri tree remnant to conspecific hosts. iScience 19:1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2019.05.009

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baland J-M, Robinson JA (2000) Is child labor inefficient? J Polit Econ 108:663–679

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baland J-M, Robinson JA (2002) Rotten parents. J Public Econ 84:341–356

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barnett R, Bhattacharya J, Puhakka M (2018) Private versus public old-age security. J Popul Econ 31:703–746

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Basu K (2011) Beyond the invisible hand. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Baudin T (2010) A role for cultural transmission in fertility transitions. Macroecon Dyn 14:454–481

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becchetti L, Solferino N, Elisabetta Tessitore M (2016) Education not for money: an economic analysis on education, civic engagement and life satisfaction. Theor Econ Lett 6:39–47

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1973) A theory of marriage: part I. J Polit Econ 81:813–846

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1974) A theory of marriage: part II. J Polit Econ 82:S11–S26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1976) Altruism, egoism, and genetic fitness: economics and sociobiology. J Econ Lit 14:817–826

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1981a) Altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place. Economica 48:1–15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker GS (1981b) A treatise on the family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker A, Enke B, Falk A (2020) Ancient origins of the global variation in economic preferences. AEA Pap Proc 110:319–323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergstrom TC (1989) A fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries. J Polit Econ 97:1138–1159

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergstrom TC (1996) Economics in a family way. J Econ Lit 34:1903–1934

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernheim D, Ray D (1989) Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1:295–326

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Billari FC, Galasso V (2014) Fertility decisions and pension reforms. Evidence from natural experiments in Italy. IdEP economic papers 1403, USI Università della Svizzera Italiana

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K (2010) Social norms or social preferences? Mind Soc 9:139–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bisin A, Verdier T (2000) Beyond the melting pot: cultural transmission, marriage and the evolution of ethnic and religious traits. Q J Econ 115:955–988

    Google Scholar 

  • Bisin A, Topa G (2003) Empirical models of cultural transmission. J Eur Econ Assoc 1:363–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bisin A, Verdier T (2001) Agents with imperfect empathy might survive natural selection. Econ Lett 2:277–285

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bisin A, Topa G, Verdier T (2004) Religious intermarriage and socialization in the United States. J Polit Econ 112:615–664

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Björklund A, Lindahl M, Plug E (2006) The origins of intergenerational associations: lessons from Swedish adoption data. Q J Econ 121:999–1028

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borjas GJ (1992) Ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility. Q J Econ 107:123–150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borjas GJ (1994) Long-run convergence of ethnic skill differentials: the children and grandchildren of the great migration. ILR Rev 47:553–573

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol Sociobiol 13:171–195

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R, Richerson PJ (2002) Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. J Theor Biol 215:287–296

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R, Richerson PJ (2009) Voting with your feet: payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior. J Theor Biol 257:331–339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1987) Constitutional economics. In: The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulow JD, Geanakoplos J, Klemperer PD (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and strategic complements. J Polit Econ 93:488–511

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caillaud B, Cohen D (2000) Intergenerational transfers and common values in a society. Eur Econ Rev 44:1091–1103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Callaway RM, Mahall BE (2007) Family roots. Nature 448:145–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camera G, Gioffré A (2017) Asymmetric social norms. Econ Lett 152:27–30

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Campbell DE (2006) What is education’s impact on civic and social engagement? In: Measuring the effects of education on health and civic engagement: proceedings of the Copenhagen symposium. OECD, Paris, pp 25–118

    Google Scholar 

  • Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW (1981) Cultural transmission and evolution: a quantitative approach. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW, Chen K-H, Dornbusch SM (1982) Theory and observation in cultural transmission. Science 218:19–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiapa C, Juarez L (2016) The schooling repayment hypothesis for private transfers: evidence from the PROGRESA/Oportunidades experiment. Rev Econ Househ 14:811–828

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury S, Sutter M, Zimmermann KF (2020) Economic preferences across generations and family clusters: a large-scale experiment. CEPR discussion papers 14998

    Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (1991) Economics of the family. Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, New York/Oxford, UK

    Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (1993) Intergenerational transfers without altruism: family, market and state. Eur J Polit Econ 9:505–518

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (2006) A constitutional theory of the family. J Popul Econ 19:259–283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (2012) Marriage as a commitment device. Rev Econ Househ 10:193–213

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (2014) Is marriage as good as a contract? CESifo Econ Stud 60:599–612

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A (2022) A strictly economic explanation of gender roles: the lasting legacy of the plough. Rev Econ Househ 20:1–13

    Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Rosati FC (1992) The effects of financial markets and social security on saving and fertility behaviour in Italy. J Popul Econ 5:319–341

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Rosati FC (1996) Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: theory, and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK, and USA. Eur Econ Rev 40:1561–1589

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Rosati FC (1997) Rise and fall of the Japanese saving rate: the role of social security and intra-family transfers. Jpn World Econ 9:81–92

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Rosati FC (2005) The economics of child labour. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Werding M (2007) Children and pensions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Casolaro L, Rosati FC (2003) The impact of social security on saving and fertility in Germany. FinanzArchiv 59:189–211

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Giannelli GC, Rosati FC, Vuri D (2006) Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing. Rev Econ Househ 4:183–204

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Komura M, Luporini A (2017) Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention. J Popul Econ 30:805–834

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cigno A, Gioffré A, Luporini A (2021) Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules. Rev Econ Househ 19:935–958

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen-Zada D (2006) Preserving religious identity through education: economic analysis and evidence from the US. J Urban Econ 60:372–398

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman JS (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am J Sociol 94:S95–S120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper RW (1999) Coordination games: complementarities and macroeconomics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Darwin C (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection. John Murray, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond J (2005) Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of human societies. W. W. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixit A (2004) Lawlessness and economics: alternative models of governance. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Dudley SA, File AL (2007) Kin recognition in an annual plant. Biol Lett 3:435–438

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar RIM (1992) Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. J Hum Evol 22:469–493

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar RIM (2010) How many friends does one person need? Dunbar’s number and other evolutionary quirks. Faber and Faber, London/Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Dutrochet RJH (1833) Observations sur la longue persistance de la vie et de l’accroissement dans la racine et dans la souche du Pinus picea L., après qu’il a été abbattu. Ann Sci Nat 29:300–303

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellickson RC (1994) The aim of order without law. J Inst Theor Econ 150:97–100

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellison G (1994) Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma with anonymous random matching. Rev Econ Stud 61:567–588

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farrell J, Maskin E (1989) Renegotiation in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1:327–360

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenge R, Scheubel B (2017) Pensions and fertility: back to the roots. J Popul Econ 30:93–139

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernandez R, Fogli A (2009) Culture: an empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility. Am Econ J Macroecon 1:146–177

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Folbre N (1994) Children as public goods. Am Econ Rev 84:86–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M (1953) Essays in positive economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman JW (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Rev Econ Stud 38:1–12

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 50:533–554

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gábos A, Gál RI, Kézdi G (2009) The effects of child-related benefits and pensions on fertility by birth order: a test on Hungarian data. Popul Stud 63:215–231

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Galasso V, Gatti R, Profeta P (2009) Investing for the old age: pensions, children and savings. Int Tax Public Financ 16:538–559

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Galor O (2011) Unified growth theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Galor O, Moav O (2002) Natural selection and the origin of economic growth. Q J Econ 117:1133–1191

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif A (2006) Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2016) Long-term persistence. J Eur Econ Assoc 14:1401–1436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Güth W (1995) An evolutionary approach to explaining co-operative behavior by reciprocal incentives. Int J Game Theory 24:323–344

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Güth W, Kliemt H (1998) The indirect evolutionary approach:: bridging the gap between rationality and adaptation. Ration Soc. https://doi.org/10.1177/104346398010003005

  • Güth W, Yaari M (1992) An evolutionary approach to explain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game. In: Witt U (ed) Explaining process and change in a simple strategic game. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Guttman JM (2001) Self-enforcing reciprocity norms and intergenerational transfers. J Public Econ 81:117–151

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iyigun M, Walsh RP (2007) Building the family nest: premarital investments, marriage markets, and spousal allocations. Rev Econ Stud 74:507–535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jellal M, Wolff F-C (2002) Cultural evolutionary altruism: theory and evidence. Eur J Polit Econ 18:241–262

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kandori M (1992) Social norms and community enforcement. Rev Econ Stud 59:63–80

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimbrough EO, Vostroknutov A (2015) Norms make preferences social. J Eur Econ Assoc 14:608–638

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klimaviciute J, Perelman S, Pestieau P, Schoenmaeckers J (2017) Caring for dependent parents: altruism, exchange or family norm? J Popul Econ 30:835–873

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kosse F, Deckers T, Pinger P, Schildberg-Hörisch H, Falk A (2020) The formation of prosociality: causal evidence on the role of social environment. J Polit Econ 128:434–467

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laffont J-J (1975) Macroeconomic constraints, economic efficiency and ethics: an introduction to Kantian economics. Economica 42:430–437

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewontin RC (1961) Evolution and the theory of games. J Theor Biol 1:382–403

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loehlin JC, Nichols RC (1976) Heredity, environment and personality. University of Texas Press, Austin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lotka AJ (1925) Elements of physical biology. Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowenstein A, Daatland SO (2006) Filial norms and family support in a comparative cross-national context: evidence from the OASIS study. Ageing Soc 26:203–223

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lundberg S, Pollak RA (1993) Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. J Polit Econ 101:988–1010

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malthus TR (1798) An essay on the principle of population as it affects the future improvement of society, with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Goodwin, M. Condorcet and other writers. J. Johnson in St. Paul’s Churchyard, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Manser M, Brown M (1980) Marriage and house-hold decision-making: a bargaining analysis. Int Econ Rev 21:31–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (1976) Evolution and the theory of games. Am Sci 64:41–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J, Price G (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 146:15–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McElroy MB, Horney MJ (1981) Nash-bargained household decisions: toward a generalization of the theory of demand. Int Econ Rev 22:333–349

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Monod J (1970) Le Hasard et la Nécessité. Essai sur la Philosophie Naturelle de la Biologie Moderne. Éditions du Seuil, Paris. English version: Chance and necessity: an essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971

    Google Scholar 

  • Monod J (1974) On chance and necessity. In: Ayala FJ, Dobzhansky T (eds) Studies in the philosophy of biology. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Myrdal G (1957) Economic theory and underdeveloped regions. Gerald Duckworth, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ogaki M, Zhang Q (2001) Decreasing relative risk aversion and tests of risk sharing. Econometrica 69(2):515–526

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Okuno-Fujiwara M, Postlewaite A, Suzumura K (1990) Strategic information revelation. Rev Econ Stud 57:25–47

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ottoni-Wilhelm M, Zhang Y, Estell DB, Perdue NH (2017) Raising charitable children: the effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling on children’s giving. J Popul Econ 30:189–224

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Tabellini G (2000) Political economics. Explaining economic policy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Tabellini G (2020) Culture, institutions and policy. Mimeo, New York (forthcoming: Bisin A, Federico G (eds) The handbook of historical economics)

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters M, Siow A (2002) Competing premarital investments. J Polit Econ 110:592–608

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Phelps E (1961) The golden rule of accumulation: a fable for growthmen. Am Econ Rev 51:638–643

    Google Scholar 

  • Ponthière G (2010) Unequal longevities and lifestyles transmission. J Public Econ Theory 12:93–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Postlewaite A (2011) Social norms and preferences. In: Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson M (eds) Handbook for social economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport A, Chammah AM (1965) Prisoner’s dilemma: a study in conflict and cooperation. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Richerson PJ et al (2016) Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. Behav Brain Sci 39:e30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1400106X

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robson AJ, Samuelson L (2011) The evolutionary foundations of preferences. In: Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson M (eds) Handbook for social economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Roemer J (2019) How to cooperate. A theory of Kantian optimization. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rosati FC (1996) Social security in a non-altruistic model with uncertainty and endogenous fertility. J Public Econ 60:283–294

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russo L (1996) La rivoluzione dimenticata. Feltrinelli Editore, Milano. English translation: Levy S (2004) The forgotten revolution: how science was born in 300 BC and why it had to be reborn. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter JA (1911) Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig. English translation: Opie R (1934) The theory of economic development. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith A (1761) The theory of moral sentiments. A. Millan in the Strand, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith A (1776) An inquiry into the wealth of nations. Adam Black, Edinburgh

    Google Scholar 

  • Tabellini G (2008) The scope of cooperation: norms and incentives. Q J Econ 123:905–950

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Volterra V (1926) Variazioni e fluttuazioni del numero d’individui in specie animali conviventi. Memorie R Acc Naz Lincei 2:31–113. English version: Variations and fluctuations of the number of individuals in animal species living together. In: Chapman RN (ed.) Animal ecology. New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1931

    Google Scholar 

  • Wu J (2020) Labelling, homophily and preference evolution. Int J Game Theory 49:1–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zumbuehl M, Dohmen T, Pfann G (2021) Parental involvement and intergenerational transmission of economic preferences, attitudes and personality traits. Econ J 131:2642–2670

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Responsible Section Editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann. Valuable comments by Ingela Alger, Alberto Bisin, Donald Cox, Annalisa Luporini, Jaibin Wu, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the author’s. There is no conflict of interest.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    Alessandro Cigno

Authors
  1. Alessandro Cigno
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alessandro Cigno .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. UNU-MERIT & Princeton University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Klaus F. Zimmermann

Section Editor information

  1. Center for Population, Development and Labour Economics at UNU – MERIT, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Klaus F. Zimmermann

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Cigno, A. (2022). Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle
    Published:
    27 April 2022

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-2

  2. Original

    Rules, Preferences, and Evolution from the Family Angle
    Published:
    26 January 2022

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_266-1

Search

Navigation