1. A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

   • François Maniquet

   Original paper Pages: 1 - 15

2. The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation

   • Sandeep Baliga

   Original paper Pages: 17 - 26

3. Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

   • Walter Trockel

   Original paper Pages: 27 - 43

4. How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

   • Hans Gersbach

   Original paper Pages: 45 - 56

5. Can we identify Walrasian allocations?

   • Antonio Manresa

   Original paper Pages: 57 - 73

6. Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

   • Manipushpak Mitra

   Original paper Pages: 75 - 91

7. Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games

   • Marta Faias
   • Emma Moreno-García
   • Mário Rui Páscoa

   Original paper Pages: 93 - 104

8. Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued

   • Lars Ehlers

   Original paper Pages: 105 - 115