Abstract. It is well-known that, when agents in an organization possess private information that is unverifiable by an outside party, games where agents simply announce their information can have multiple equilibria that may impede the successful implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator, supervisor) can help to destroy the “bad'' equilibria when agents have private information but have incomplete info rmation about others' information.
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Received: 21 May 1998 / Accepted: 26 May 2000
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Baliga, S. The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation. Rev Econ Design 7, 17–26 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100038
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100038