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Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and The Identity of Events

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Abstract

I explore the problem of ``probabilistic causal preemption'' in the context of a``propensity trajectory'' theory of singular probabilistic causation. This involvesa particular conception of events and a substantive thesis concerning events soconceived.

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Eells, E. Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and The Identity of Events. Synthese 132, 119–141 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019627019131

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