Abstract
Many think that sentences about what metaphysically explains what are true iff there exist grounding relations. This suggests that sceptics about grounding should be error theorists about metaphysical explanation. We think there is a better option: a theory of metaphysical explanation which offers truth conditions for claims about what metaphysically explains what that are not couched in terms of grounding relations, but are instead couched in terms of, inter alia, psychological facts. We do not argue that our account is superior to grounding-based accounts. Rather, we offer it to those already ill-disposed towards grounding.
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Notes
We use \(<>\) to pick out propositions.
This is the consensus amongst those who believe in the entities mentioned, though some believe (E*): X is good because God loves X.
We use ‘non-diachronic’ rather than ‘synchronic’ because in some cases one or both relata are not associated with any time, as is the case with abstract objects like {Darwin}.
We follow these theorists in adopting what Raven (2015) calls separatism, the view that grounding and metaphysical explanation are distinct. Rodriguez-Pereyra, for example, claims that “Explanation is not and does not account for grounding—on the contrary, grounding is what makes possible and “grounds” explanation” (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, p. 28). There are other ways one could divide the conceptual terrain. If unionism is true (i.e. grounding just is a kind of metaphysical explanation), and grounding need not be mind-independent, what we offer could be parlayed into a psychologistic account of grounding.
According to this view the relata of grounding are facts, which are worldly entities comprised of objects, properties, and relations (Audi 2012; Raven 2012). This view is not universal; see, for instance, Schaffer (2009) for the view that the relata of grounding include a more liberal range of kinds of entities. See Trogdon (2013) for a useful overview of the various axes of the debate over the precise nature of grounding.
It is contentious whether sentences expressing truths about grounding are hyperintensional. See Duncan et al. (2017) for discussion.
We use italicised ‘because’ to indicate metaphysical explanation, as opposed to other uses of ‘because’. We use corner quotes to indicate that \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) is a kind of sentence, where x and y are variables that range over sentences. We will say ‘an instance of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because } \hbox { y}\urcorner \)’ when we intend to talk about some instance or other of the schema. We will simply talk of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because}~\hbox {y} \urcorner \) when we want to talk of all instances of the schema. For ease of exposition, we focus on singular-singular metaphysical explanation, but the account can be readily extended to cover plural-singular explanations.
We use corner quotes since which sentence x and y are, depends on which sentences feature in the relevant instance of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \).
There are possible separatist views whereby not all grounding relations have a corresponding explanation. On such views, that [y] grounds [x] is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the truth of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \). As we briefly discuss in Sect. 2, such views will not be attractive to grounding sceptics (those to whom our view is pitched). However, this kind of separatist might appeal to the machinery we offer as the ‘extra ingredient’, over and above grounding, that is required for \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) to be true.
Shaheen (2017) offers alternative grounding-free truth conditions for \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \). On his view, the truth or falsity of metaphysical explanations is accounted for by metaphorical and conceptual connections with the causal ‘because’.
We suppose that x necessitates y iff in any world in which x exists, y exists. The necessitation relations with which we shall be concerned are those between facts. Entailment is the sentential correlate of necessitation: for two sentences, x and y, x entails y iff any world at which x is true is a world at which y is true.
Realism in that the relevant claims are taken to be truth-apt and sometimes true.
Moreover, modal relations are typically thought not to be explanatory unless they are, themselves, evidence for some further dependence relation. See, for instance, Kim (1993).
Some terminological clarification: R is a symmetrical relation if, for any x, y, if x R y, then y R x. R is asymmetric if, for any x, y, if x R y then \(\sim \) y R x. R is non-symmetric if, for some x, y, x R y and \(\sim \) y R x. Traditional modal relations are non-symmetric: they have symmetric instances where x R y and y R x and non-symmetric instances where x R y and \(\sim \) y R x.
We assume numbers exist necessarily.
A natural response to our proposal is to suggest that we are conflating two distinct senses of explanation. Following Achinstein (1983), we can distinguish explanation qua speech act and explanation qua explanatory product expressed by said act. The thought is that one can offer an explanatory speech act that is correct without being good, by giving a true answer to an explanatory question (having a true explanatory product) in a way that is insensitive to the interests, beliefs, etc. of one’s interlocutor (Achinstein 2010, p. xi). Perhaps, then, a psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation merely tells us whether a correct explanation will also be good, without telling us anything of which explanations are correct. This proposal makes sense, we think, for the separatist about grounding who makes use of our machinery as the ‘extra ingredient’ required for true metaphysical explanation. For on that view there are grounding relations that can determine the correctness of the explanation, and the psychologistic account we offer might determine whether it is also good. Our view, however, is more extreme: we are proposing that whether the explanatory product is true depends on what the community, after due reflection and equilibration, is disposed to believe. (With thanks to an anonymous referee).
One might worry that there is a threat of circularity here (not ameliorated by our later amendments) if the truth of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) is explained by an individual’s belief that \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \), while the individual’s belief that \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) is (partially) explained by the truth of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. We deny that the truth of \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) explains the individual’s belief that \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \). Instead, we think that the belief is entirely explained by psychological mechanisms, in a way akin to the account offered in Miller and Norton (2016), on which we elaborate below.
Cases in which there are diachronic and non-diachronic elements will then be ones in which there are aspects of metaphysical, and aspects of causal, explanation at play.
Determining which individuals count as members of the community in which i is embedded is not a simple matter. We return to this issue later.
With thanks to a referee for pointing out this problem.
See List (2005).
An anonymous referee wondered why anyone should care about metaphysical explanations if the truth conditions are as we describe.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this analogy.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
Take Fine’s Puzzles of Ground (2010) as an example. He outlines a plausible PME, like irreflexivity, and then presents us with a compelling counterexample, thus hoping to stimulate debate about whether we are more committed to the truth of the PME or the truth of the particular \(\ulcorner \hbox {x } { because} \hbox { y}\urcorner \) claim. This is paradigmatic of the kind of equilibration metaphysicians should be undertaking if the truth conditions we offer in terms of the output of THE PROCEDURE are roughly right.
With thanks to Sam Baron, Michael Duncan and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Norton, J., Miller, K. A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation. Synthese 196, 2777–2802 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1566-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1566-x