Abstract
This paper offers a new account of metaphysical explanation. The account is modelled on Kitcher’s unificationist approach to scientific explanation. We begin, in Sect. 2, by briefly introducing the notion of metaphysical explanation and outlining the target of analysis. After that, we introduce a unificationist account of metaphysical explanation (Sect. 3) before arguing that such an account is capable of capturing four core features of metaphysical explanations: (1) irreflexivity, (2) non-monotonicity, (3) asymmetry and (4) relevance. Since the unificationist theory of metaphysical explanation inherits irreflexivity and non-monotonicity directly from the unificationist theory of scientific explanation that underwrites it, we focus on demonstrating how the account can secure asymmetry and relevance (Sect. 4).
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Notes
We use <P> to indicate the proposition that P.
See, e.g., Strevens’ (2008) Kairetic theory of explanation.
Such a view is particularly attractive if one believes that there is a strong analogy between grounding and causation. See Wilson (2017) and Schaffer (2016). Dasgupta (2017: 74) scathingly describes this as the view that grounding is “some metaphysical analogue of the Higgs boson that somehow [holds] the world together. The job of a metaphysician, on this […] conception, [is] to peer into reality and discern where these “groundons” [are] flowing (of course, to see these groundons one need[s] goggles provided by specialist departments)”.
Note that by ‘fact’ we mean ‘true proposition’ rather than ‘state of affairs’.
It might be objected that reflexive argument patterns can be rendered more stringent via restrictions on their filling instructions. For instance, one could restrict the pattern: P therefore P to only range over a single proposition, or a class of propositions. This move is pre-empted by Kitcher, who objects that in such patterns all the work is being done by the filling instructions, and the nonlogical vocabulary in the premises is idle. Thus, any apparent unification offered by patterns of self-derivation is spurious because the non-logical vocabulary ought to be contributing to the unification provided by the pattern (1981: 526–529).
Γ and Δ are sets of sentences.
This version of the problem is discussed by Wilsch (2016) in the context of developing a DN theory of metaphysical explanation.
Though not in all cases, as information is lost as we progress up the ladder. For instance, it is clear how we can derive that objects have determinable properties on the basis of their determinate properties, but less clear how we can derive that an object has particular determinate properties on the basis of the determinable properties it instantiates.
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Baron, S., Norton, J. Metaphysical Explanation: The Kitcher Picture. Erkenn 86, 187–207 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-00101-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-00101-2