Abstract
Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments.
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Notes
An anonymous referee also pointed out that Husserl discusses criteria resembling robustness. A thorough historical study would probably reveal many further sources for the idea.
The distinction between DR and MA was clearly and succinctly pointed out by Calcott (2011), who called the former “robust theorems” and the latter “robust detection”.
One could argue that also the results of MA are in the end propositions, for example propositions stating that some entity exists or has some property. However, even with this interpretation, there is a difference in kind between DR and MA: the results of the former are propositions of one kind (theorems), while the results of the latter are propositions of a different kind (existential propositions or property attributions).
Results from modeling can also contribute to MA by indicating that the target entity or property plays an explanatory role, but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for MA—see Sect. 3.
One implication of my account presented below is that there is a (low) degree of robustness also in the special case where there are just several independent ways of deriving a phenomenon. In this case, the criticism of non-empirical confirmation may apply. However, this is just a limit case, and nothing important turns on it: if empirical confirmation is taken to be necessary, we can simply add a clause stating that independent ways of derivation alone are not sufficient for robustness.
Wimsatt also mentions these features of robustness; my point is merely that they are not reflected in the rough definition he gives.
Strictly speaking, it would be more exact to say that “evidence for X is robust” or “our access to X is robust” instead of “X is robust”, since the latter expression seems to already imply the existence of X, and rule out by definition the robustness of non-existent entities (such as phlogiston). However, in most contexts nothing important turns on this distinction, so for the sake of readability, I continue to talk of X itself as robust (instead of our evidence for it).
It is also likely that what Wimsatt means by ‘definition’ or ‘definability’ is something weaker than what philosophers usually mean by it. For example, a definition of an electron given by a scientist could be that the electron is an elementary particle that has a negative electric charge of about \(1.602 \times 10^{-19}\) coulombs and a mass of about \(9.11 \times 10^{-28}\,\hbox {g}\). A philosopher would see this as a characterization of an electron, and not as a definition. In the context of robustness, multiple definability makes much more sense if we understand it in the weaker sense, i.e., as multiple characterizability. I thank Paul Teller for pointing this out.
To rule out a further potential source of misinterpretation: detectability, measurability, etc., does not refer to detectability, measurability, etc., in principle, or to physical or metaphysical possibility. It refers to detectability, measurability, etc. with current technology, experimental setups, theories, and so on.
Naturally, the different ways of detecting, measuring, or producing a phenomenon can also vary regarding their inherent relevance: some methods are more reliable and produce stronger evidence than others. However, the issue of evaluating strength of evidence has been discussed in other contexts in philosophy of science (see for example Crupi et al. 2007 or Cartwright 2007, Chap. 3 for more). Since the strength of different lines of evidence can be evaluated independently of considerations of robustness, there is no problematic circularity here: robustness appears at a higher level when different strands of evidence are aggregated. A related point worth mentioning is that the different ways of measuring or detecting should be at least minimally reliable—as Calcott (2011) points out, if the independent means have a probability of \(<\)0.5 of being correct, then adding more independent means does not increase the justification (or in Calcott’s terminology, likelihood of truth).
This definition is not explained in more detail, and thus could also be understood as something closer to DR. However, the example that follows (warming of the climate system) clearly exhibits robustness as MA, as it refers to “observations” and not just models. In any case, the main purpose of this brief example is to demonstrate the importance of robustness for scientific debates. It is not intended to further clarify the notion, or to provide an analysis of the exact kind of robustness reasoning applied by the IPCC (which might be an interesting project in its own right).
I do not intend to dismiss such criteria, but rather to point out that they have a different role than robustness. In fact, these criteria are entirely compatible with the robustness approach. For example, one could argue that the ultimate metaphysical criterion for what is real is the causal criterion, but the source of justification for science-based ontological commitments is robustness.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the (five) anonymous referees of this journal, whose insightful and detailed comments were extremely useful in improving the manuscript. I am also very grateful to the following individuals for their helpful comments on earlier drafts: Hugh Desmond, James DiFrisco, Harmen Ghijsen, Chris Kelp, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Jani Raerinne, Paul Teller, and Raphael van Riel, as well as audiences at Ruhr University Bochum, University of Groningen, and KU Leuven. I especially thank Jan Heylen and Laura Bringmann for their very constructive and helpful feedback on several versions of the paper. The research resulting in this paper was funded by the Research Foundation Flanders—FWO (Postdoctoral Fellowship).
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The research resulting in this paper was funded by the Research Foundation Flanders–FWO (Postdoctoral Fellowship).
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Eronen, M.I. Robustness and reality. Synthese 192, 3961–3977 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0801-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0801-6