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Explanation, understanding, and control

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Abstract

There is a recent interest within both philosophy of science as well as within epistemology to provide a defensible account of understanding. In the present article I build on insights from previous work in attempt to provide an account of two related forms of understanding in terms of the ability to form rational intentions when using specific types of mental representations. I propose first that “understanding that X” requires that one form a representation of X and, further, that one must be capable of forming rational intentions using this representation across a range of conceivable conditions. I then propose that “understanding why X” requires that one possess a representation of a successful explanation for why X, and that one must be similarly capable of forming rational intentions using this representation across a range of conceivable conditions. I conclude the manuscript by reviewing objections and considering the way this account relates to other literature on explanation and understanding.

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Notes

  1. Dieks (2009) also offers a contextualist (and pluralist) response with regard to this debate about relativity. He argues that there is no uniquely best way to explain these relativistic effects, and that the difference between geometric and dynamic explanations lies in the ways we use them within the same overarching theoretical framework. That is, the differences on Dieks’ view are pragmatic in that they relate to our specific interests and decided emphases in the context of the questions we are asking.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge and thank Richard Healey for his thoughtful comments and feedback on this manuscript.

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  1. Departments of Psychology and Philosophy, University of Arizona, 1503 East University Boulevard, PO Box 210068, Tucson, AZ,  85721, USA

    Ryan Smith

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  1. Ryan Smith
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Correspondence to Ryan Smith.

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Smith, R. Explanation, understanding, and control. Synthese 191, 4169–4200 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0521-3

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