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Knowledge and Understanding

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Virtue Epistemology Naturalized

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 366))

Abstract

A standard account of understanding—one that is especially prevalent in the philosophy of science—treats understanding as essentially a type of knowledge—viz., knowledge of causes. Unfortunately, this proposal is untenable, in that there are cases of genuine understanding where the relevant knowledge is lacking, and cases where the relevant knowledge is present but understanding is lacking. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative view which treats understanding as a kind of cognitive achievement. In recent work, however, Stephen Grimm has argued for an adapted version of the view that understanding is constituted by knowledge of causes, one that appeals to a kind of knowledge of causes which is non-propositional. I argue that Grimm’s proposal, while admittedly ingenious, does not stand up to close scrutiny.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that we are here implicitly focussing on a particular kind of understanding, one which concerns understanding why something quite specific is the case. Typically, this will involve knowing why a specific event occurred. This kind of understanding is sometimes contrasted with a more general kind of understanding which concerns, say, an entire subject matter (e.g., ‘S understands quantum physics’). While there are connections between the two kinds of understanding, and while one would clearly desire an account of understanding which could accommodate both types, it would take us too far from the main thread to consider this more general notion of understanding here. For further discussion of these two types of understanding, see Brogaard (2007) and Kvanvig (2009).

  2. 2.

    Consider the following remark made by Lipton, for example:

    Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes. (Lipton 2004, 30)

    Grimm (2014) also attributes the knowledge account, broadly conceived anyway, to Aristotle, Lewis (1986), Miller (1987), Strevens (2008) and Greco (2014).

  3. 3.

    It is specifically environmental epistemic luck which is at issue in the famous ‘barn façade’ case, or so I have argued anyway. See, for example, Pritchard (2009) for more on this point.

  4. 4.

    For further discussion of the claim that a luckily true belief cannot amount to knowledge, see Pritchard (2013). For a critical response to this claim, see Hetherington (2013).

  5. 5.

    Interestingly, Kvanvig (2003) argues that understanding, unlike knowledge, is compatible with the kind of epistemic luck at issue in standard Gettier-style cases too. As I claim in Pritchard (2009), however, I think he reaches this conclusion because he fails to make the distinction between standard Gettier-style epistemic luck and environmental epistemic luck.

  6. 6.

    For further discussion of the nature of achievements, see Pritchard et al. (2010, chs. 2 & 4) and Pritchard (2010).

  7. 7.

    For the main proponents of a view of this general form (though often not expressed in quite these terms), see Sosa (1988, 1991, 2007, 2009), Zagzebski (1996, 1999) and Greco (2003, 2007, 2008, 2009a, b, c).

  8. 8.

    It is an interesting question why knowledge should be such that it marks out an epistemic standing distinct from cognitive achievements, though it is not one that I can usefully engage with her. For further discussion of this issue, see Pritchard et al. (2010, ch. 3) and Pritchard (2011).

  9. 9.

    Drawing on my work on this topic, Hills (2009, 2010) has developed her own variant of the view that I am here calling the cognitive achievement account, though her focus is specifically on moral knowledge and understanding.

  10. 10.

    I think that what is muddying the waters here is that the example that Grimm focuses on—found in earlier work by myself (see, e.g., Pritchard 2009)—concerns a child who gains knowledge of the cause of an event while nonetheless lacking the corresponding understanding. As such, it is perhaps natural to wonder, as Grimm does, whether this child really does have knowledge of the cause that is being credited to her. As the case of ‘Kate*’ here illustrates, however, it is entirely incidental to this objection to the knowledge account that the agent concerned is a child.

  11. 11.

    Note that I am here setting to one side the potential complication that might be posed by a priori knowledge of contingent propositions, a possibility defended by Evans (1979) and Kripke (1980), amongst others.

  12. 12.

    The foremost exponent of this particular way of thinking about a priori knowledge is Bonjour (2001, 2005, cf. Bonjour 1998).

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Acknowledgements

This paper was written while I was in receipt of a Phillip Leverhulme Prize, and I am grateful to them for their support. Thanks also to Abrol Fairweather, Georgi Gardiner, Emma Gordon, Allan Hazlett, Alison Hills, Andrew Mason and Lani Watson for helpful discussions of topics related to this paper. Special thanks to Stephen Grimm and Dory Scaltsas.

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  1. University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

    Duncan Pritchard

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  1. Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, USA

    Abrol Fairweather

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Pritchard, D. (2014). Knowledge and Understanding. In: Fairweather, A. (eds) Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library, vol 366. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_18

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