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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity

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Abstract

According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.

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Notes

  1. I omit one kind of explanation: according to epistemic error theorists (Olson 2011; Streumer 2013) there are no reasons for belief. For present purposes I simply assume this view to be false. Arguments against the epistemic error theory can be found in e.g. Cuneo (2007), Shah (2011), Rowland (2013).

  2. This understanding of instrumentalism—in terms of explanatory grounds—explicitly follows Schroeder (2007, Ch. 4).

  3. It is a further question whether the normative property of being a reason for belief, so understood, is a natural property (e.g. Heathwood 2009; Jenkins 2011) or a non-natural property (e.g. Parfit 2011; Evans and Shah 2012). It is also a further question how we come to know this normative truth: whether via reflection on the meanings of the constituent terms—as is claimed by those who take the relation between reasons for belief and evidence to be analytic (e.g. Heathwood 2009)—or by ordinary first order epistemic enquiry—as is claimed by those who do not take it to be analytic (e.g. Jenkins 2011).

  4. Schroeder claims an analogue of this to be an advantage of his Hypotheticalism over rival Humean views of reasons. Schroeder (2007, Ch. 2).

  5. Equally, instrumentalists need not take any stand on ‘pragmatic encroachment’ (i.e. whether pragmatic considerations alter the degree of evidential support required in order for one to possess knowledge of a proposition—a matter discussed at length in Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Fantl and McGrath 2007).

  6. For arguments for evidentialism see Adler (2002), Conee and Feldman (2004), Thomson (2008, p. 83). For non-evidentialist responses see especially Reisner (2008, 2009, 2013). For sympathetic discussion of both views see Marusic (2011).

  7. Some instrumentalists have strengthened this criticism with the additional claim that the mere possession of true or evidentially supported beliefs isn’t something that we ‘care about’ or that would ordinarily move us (Stich 1990). Though see Lynch 2004 for criticism.

  8. Compare Street (2009).

  9. It is important to distinguish this from a very different ‘Argument from Coincidence’ according to which it is a coincidence that our normative beliefs have come to reflect the mind-independent normative truth. This argument is made in both the practical and theoretical context by Street (e.g. Street 2006) and it (or something very similar) is discussed under the label of the Argument from Coincidence in e.g. Setiya (2011, p. 66), Parfit (2011, Vol. 2, p. 492).

  10. Compare Wedgwood (2002, 2007).

  11. This isn’t to say that Parfit is attempting to respond to the Argument from Coincidence. His argument may be effective given his aims: aims which are primarily epistemological.

  12. Different constitutivists understand the normative governance relation in different terms. Some (e.g. Velleman 2000; Millar 2004) understand it teleologically. Others (e.g. Shah 2003a, b; Wedgwood 2007) understand it in explicitly normative terms. This distinction is presented in Engel (2013). It should be noted that some teleological views are arguably best understood as a kind of instrumentalism rather than intrinsicalism—see, for example, Steglich-Petersen’s defence of a teleological view in response to Shah’s ‘deliberative argument’ (Steglich-Petersen 2006, 2008). In order to be maximally charitable to the intrinsicalist, I’ll ignore this complication.

  13. Of course, constitutivists may be wrong about this. See e.g. Bykvist and Hattaingadi (2007).

  14. More schematically: If one has reason to engage in the practice of believing with respect to some proposition, then (one has reason to believe in accordance with one’s evidence with respect to that proposition.) Compare Steglich-Petersen (2011).

  15. Compare Joyce (2001, p. 2001, p. 49, fn 17).

  16. This would only be an objection to constitutivists if they were aiming to respond to the Argument from Coincidence.

  17. Lillehammer’s view of epistemic reasons expressed in the cited passage is very close to an ‘institutional’ view. Compare Steglich-Petersen (2011).

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  1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Site, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge , CB30DG, UK

    Christopher Cowie

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Cowie, C. In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191, 4003–4017 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6

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