Abstract
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
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Notes
The terms ‘state-given’ and ‘attitude-given’ were developed by Derek Parfit and Christian Piller, respectively.
Evidentialism is the most common view among normativity theorists concerning reasons for belief. The list of those who support evidentialism, either explicitly or implicitly, is too long to present exhaustively. A representative sampling of places where this view is espoused or assumed includes Adler (2002); Kelly (2002); Parfit (2001); Railton (1994); Shah (2006), and Skorupski (forthcoming).
Richard Feldman and Hieronymi are both ecumenical evidentialists. Feldman in particular holds that evidence provides the only epistemic reasons for belief, but that there are genuine non-epistemic (e.g. practical) reasons for belief.
While what I argue in this paper is consistent with the ecumenical evidentialism expressed by Feldman and Hieornymi, I have argued that pragmatic reasons should be accorded a more significant role in determining what an agent ought to believe than that given to them by either Feldman or Hieronymi. See Reisner (2008).
Pascal’s wager provides a more traditional example. I have avoided using it here, however, as Pascal’s wager is flawed; even if we accept all of its premises, it still does not count in favour of theistic beliefs. For a clear account of why, see Hájek (2003).
One class of arguments for evidentialism that is both common and, in my view, deeply suspect is transparency arguments. These arguments aim to show that there is something in the concept of belief that entails evidentialism. Arguments of this sort are closely related to certain arguments concerning the normativity of content. I have not addressed these arguments here, as they have been much discussed elsewhere and I believe cast into serious doubt. The most thorough and persuasive criticism of transparency arguments in the case of reasons for belief is Steglich-Petersen (2006).
It is not hard to imagine expanding the number of places in the relation: … under circumstances c at time t …. The questions of whether to add additional relata and which to add are not important to the argument here, so they will not be discussed. The account of the logical structure of reasons here is based loosely on positions set out by John Skorupski (forthcoming) and in Skorupski (1997).
It may be preferable to regard the third place in the relation as being occupied by propositions concerning actions, belief, feelings, and so on, as this would allow normal logical operations to be performed on the relata that occupy the third place of the reason relation.
It may be objected that it is not the fact that one sees the rhino that gives one a reason to act, but rather it is the fact that there is a charging rhino that gives one a reason to act. An example that presumably would not raise this worry is the following. Suppose that you have been asked by your guide to tell him immediately when you see a rhino, so that he can tell the other people on the safari to look in that direction. In that case, the fact that you see a rhino is a reason for you to tell the guide that you have seen a rhino.
For example, a pragmatic reason for belief is a fact that stands in relation to a belief such that the fact makes it so that having the belief is prudentially or morally good.
It is not clear that there could be an evidential reason for action.
Doings and believings are, of course, not propositions. If one wants reasons to count in favour of propositions or states of affairs, it is possible to read ‘to ψ’ propositionally. Thus in ‘The fact that it is raining is a reason for Bob to bring an umbrella’, we may parse ‘to bring an umbrella’ as ‘that Bob brings an umbrella’.
Harman (1999, p. 17).
Ibid.
Most examples concerning pragmatic reasons for belief are consequentialist in nature and rely on the good or bad effects of believing something. An interesting exception is Stroud (2006). She argues that on a plausible interpretation of the norms generated by friendship, believing according to the evidence (and according to other traditional epistemic norms) will in fact conflict with the norms generated by friendship. Although Stroud does not attempt to resolve the tension, it is tempting to suggest in the context of this paper that friendship could in principle provide us with pragmatic reasons for belief.
Skorupski (forthcoming) observes that there are some further restrictions that must be placed on what evidence can count as an evidential reason. Skorupski argues that the epistemic accessibility of the evidence to the agent determines whether or not a piece of evidence can be a reason. Because I do not want to take up more detailed questions of the metaphysics of evidential reasons here, I have left the definition general, recognising that it needs refinement.
Railton (1994) cites this as an example of something that might be wrongly taken to be a reason for belief, but in fact is a reason to be a ‘believer of’. It is not clear what the force of the distinction is.
It is not entirely certain that we would regard increasing our ratio of ‘true minus false’ beliefs to be an epistemological desideratum. One way to accomplish that feat would be to spend most of one’s time reading lists of tautologies. I am not sure that there is a reason to do that.
Hookway (2000, p. 60).
Kelly (2002, p. 6).
Adler (2002, p. 2).
The beginning of any modern discussion of doxastic involuntarism is Williams (1973). It has had a broad influence in establishing doxastic involuntarism as the dominant view in current debates.
I use ‘make good on’ to mean something like ‘act on’ and ‘believe in virtue of’. Note that it is necessary to employ the awkward expression ‘make good on’ here, because English lacks a universal verb. If ‘do’ were a universal verb, then it would be nicer to say that normative reasons must be reasons for things that we can do. But, at least in philosophical usage, ‘do’ suggests an action, whereas a universal verb would cover stative verbs (like believing), as well.
Of course, even on this picture I do retain some control, by choosing where to direct my attention and what sort of inquiries to pursue. Nevertheless, given those choices, I am simply forced to believe whatever I end up believing as a result of those actions.
Kelly (2002, p. 6).
An anonymous referee suggested that the evidentialist could avoid the objection from the unity of normativity by claiming that apparent pragmatic reasons for belief are reasons to try to believe something. Trying to ψ is compatible with not ψ-ing, and trying not to ψ is compatible with ψ-ing. This approach may successfully answer the unity of normativity objection, but it will run into trouble with the remaining objections in this section.
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Acknowledgements
This paper in present and earlier versions has been improved by comments from a number of individuals. I would like to thank especially John Bishop, John Broome, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Pamela Hieronymi, Sven Nyholm, Derek Parfit, Jessica Pepp, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Joseph Raz, John Skorupski, Sarah Stroud, and Nick Tebben. I would also like to thank CAPPE Melbourne, the Moral Philosophy Seminar at the University of Oxford, and the Philosophy Department at the University of Auckland for opportunities to present versions of this paper and for the valuable feedback from those in attendance.
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Reisner, A. The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem. Philos Stud 145, 257–272 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9222-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9222-4