Abstract
In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view \(O\) and wants to interpret a formal language \(L\), a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for \(L\) in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with \(O\). Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. From those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, showing thus that we can perfectly quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and thus why endorsing an ontological view should have an impact on the kind of logic one should use.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1984). A combinatorial theory of possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bacon, J. (1995). Universals and property instances: The alphabet of being. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cameron, R. (2008). Truthmakers and ontological commitment: Or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble. Philosophical Studies, 140, 1–18.
Cameron, R. (2010). How to have a radically minimal ontology. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 249–264.
Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heil, J. (2003). From an ontological point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mertz, D. W. (1996). Moderate realism and its logic. New Haven: Yale.
Prior, A. (1971). Object of thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schneider, C. (2002). Relational tropes—a holistic definition. Metaphysica International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, 2, 97–112.
Simons, P. (1997). Higher-order quantification and ontological commitment. Dialectica, 51(4), 255–271.
Williams, D. C. (1953). The elements of being. Review of Metaphysics, 7(3–18), 171–192.
Zalta, E. N. (1988). Intensional logic and the metaphysics of intentionality. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Giraud, T. Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics. Synthese 191, 2115–2145 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0387-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0387-9