Abstract
In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view ‘there are Fs’ can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological view.
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Notes
Cameron (2008a).
Schaffer (2008), as we will see below, objects to my claim that the ontological commitments of a theory are what makes it true. He agrees with the Quinean that the ontological commitments are (roughly) those things whose existence its truth entails. But he thinks there’s an important role for the truthmakers: what makes the theory true are those amongst its ontological commitments that are fundamental. And furthermore, he thinks that when judging two theories with respect to which is more ontologically parsimonious, we should look to what they each claim to be fundamental, not what they are committed to. Given that, it’s tempting to think that Schaffer’s disagreement with me is merely terminological. Whether this is really so is a topic I hope to return to in future work.
What proof do I have that things ultimately decompose into simple parts? No proof; it is an ontological conjecture, acceptance of which is justified if the resulting ontology is fruitful.
Objection: “Wait a minute! States of affairs are complex entities constituted from particulars and universals, so if we do this we don’t have the minimal ontology lacking in complexity that you promised us.”
Reply: There are two views one could take on states of affairs. One view sees their constituents as real existents with the state of affairs being built out of them by some kind of composition relation. The other sees states of affairs as the only real existents, with claims about what particulars and properties exist being made true by the states of affairs. It is the latter view I recommend to the truthmaker maximalist. On this view our ontology consists solely of states of affairs; but while it is true to say that these states of affairs have constituents, there is still no complexity in reality because these constituents are not elements of ontology. States of affairs aren’t really complex, as their constituents don’t really exist. For further discussion of the two conceptions of states of affairs see Cameron (forthcoming, b, Sect. 4).
Cf. Rayo (2007).
Brogaard (2008, pp. 28–29).
Schaffer (2008, pp. 14–16).
Ibid., p. 16.
Lewis (1983).
See Sider (2009).
Well, maybe that’s overstating matters. Hirsch complains that the notion of naturalness is linked to resemblance, and hence is misapplied when applied beyond the predicate. Let me just say then that I think the notion should be applied more broadly, and refer you to Sider (ibid.) for arguments to that effect.
See Hirsch (2009).
Cf. Cameron (forthcoming, a).
See Sider (2009).
See Cameron (forthcoming, a) for further discussion.
I’ll say something briefly about what might influence our choice here. If we take the relationship to be identity, then the sentence of Ontologese must describe all the possible ways the world could be to make the English sentence true. That means Ontologese must contain names for mere possibilia, since one way ‘there is a table’ could be true is for there to be simples arranged table-wise that don’t actually exist. If we want Ontologese to only contain names for actual existents then we will not be able to describe every possible way fundamental reality could be to ground the truth of our English sentences; in that case we must say that the sentence of Ontologese grounds the English sentence and hold that the same sentence of English could have been grounded in ways that aren’t actually expressible in Ontologese. Either way, then, there’s an ideological cost: either admit a primitive relation of grounding, or allow the language that carves the world at its joints to name mere possibilia.
Cameron (2008b).
Dodd (2007).
Levinson (1980).
As in Lewis (1986).
Whether we need to admit the abstract sound structure itself into our ontology or whether we can make do merely with the event of Beethoven indicating it, and hence resist commitment to abstracta here, is another interesting question (as is whether we ultimately need events). I would hope to be able to resist commitment to abstracta; but one step at a time: let’s get rid of created abstracta first!
Predelli (2009).
See Levinson (1980).
See Cameron (2008a, pp. 15–16).
I owe the phrase ‘real entities have real essences’ to Kris McDaniel.
References
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to an audience at the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds, for helpful discussion, especially Elizabeth Barnes, Jason Turner, and Robbie Williams. Thanks also to Jonathan Schaffer and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.
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Cameron, R.P. How to have a radically minimal ontology. Philos Stud 151, 249–264 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2