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Keep making sense

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Abstract

In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.

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  1. 45, Elder Avenue, N8 8PS, London, UK

    Gabriel Segal

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  1. Gabriel Segal
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Correspondence to Gabriel Segal.

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Segal, G. Keep making sense. Synthese 170, 275–287 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9583-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9583-z

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