Abstract
I discuss the interest-relative account of vagueness and argue for a distinction between relational vague predicates and non-relational vague predicates depending on the kind of properties expressed by them. The strategy rests on three arguments arising from the existence of clear cases of a vague predicate, from contexts in which a different answer is required for questions about whether a vague predicate applies to an item, and whether such an item satisfies the interest of an agent, and from cases where an object changes up to the point of becoming P, where P is a vague predicate. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish between relational properties and non-relational properties, and I argue for the view that some vague predicates can express non-relational properties, comparative relational properties and interest-relative properties. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that vagueness cannot be reduced to interest-relativity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Like Fara I use “interest” as a general word to include desires, hopes, purposes, and so on. Similar considerations apply to my use of “satisfy”, “satisfaction”, “dissatisfaction”, and so on.
Contextualist theories of vagueness have received particular attention in the last two decades due, for example, to work done by Kamp 1981; Bosch 1983; Raffman 1994, 1996; Soames 1999; Barker 2002; Van Kerkhove 2003; Richard 2004; Shapiro 2006; Åkerman and Greenough 2010. Challenges to contextualism put forward by Stanley 2003 have been critically discussed by Ellis 2004; Raffman 2005 and Gert 2008, in addition to Fara 2008.
In this paper I focus mainly on the impact of the presence of subjects and interests in the determination of the properties expressed by predicates in different contexts, but the presence of norms might raise similar and further difficulties. For simplicity, I leave these aside, in order to focus on my main aim.
A common objection to the contextualist is that it is not possible to quantify over contexts, since it is not possible to set up a universe of all possible contexts. I do not want to pursue this issue here. My formulations of (IR-CPC) and (IR-CNC) are proposed with the aim of expressing in some sense what the constraint involves in declaring that “No matter what standard is in use, so and so”. If it makes any sense to say this (and thus to speak of clear cases in a contextualist framework), that is the sense that my formulations intend to capture.
In order to do so, the interest-relativist might have recourse to the role of the “norm” in her semantics. The kinds of norms that Fara has in mind are not linguistic, however. In her first presentation she gave as examples statistical norms, norms of expectation and idealistic norms (Fara 2000). In her reply to Stanley, in order to respond to one of his objections, she argued that norms are usually interest-relative, since the subject’s interests play a crucial role in determining the value when the range function is applied to a given comparison class (Fara 2008). Fara’s argument on this point depends on the claim that attributive adjectives are not extensional. Although I agree with her on the examples she offers, these examples are of attributive uses of vague predicates, but there are uses that are not attributive, and whose non-extensional (in Fara’s sense) character is not clear. I will not pursue this issue here. Notice that the way in which “having 0 hairs” is part of the meaning of “bald” is different from what is involved in contextual parameters, and norms are considered to be one type of these parameters, whatever be the way in which norms are determined. My argument does not depend on the particular source of interest-relativism, but on the essential independence of absolutely clear cases from the context of use and occasion of utterance.
Fara 2000 also recognises this difference when she speaks of intrinsic and relational properties, but she claims that vague predicates express always relational properties, and this is the point to which I am casting doubts.
For the sake of the argument, we assume that in this case of irony, there is a sense in which the speaker says that Nicholas is bald. This assumption is sufficient for the relevant point now, and I leave aside the discussion of the related issue concerning irony and what is said. If this does not satisfy the reader, there are other contexts that one can think of where Martha says that Nicholas is bald. Suppose that she is asked to make a guess about Nicholas's baldness with the intention to describe him with her eyes closed and before seeing him, and she utters (10).
The predicate “obsolete” offers another nice example (thanks to Roy Sorensen for suggesting it to me).
A further question is whether there is a phenomenon of ambiguity or polysemy here, and what the consequences of this would be. Although there is an effort in the literature to distinguish between the phenomenon of ambiguity and that of vagueness, the relation between vagueness and polysemy has not received the attention it deserves. I do not have the time to analyse this point now, but envisage that it might be crucial in giving an adequate account of vagueness.
References
Åkerman, J., & Greenough, P. (2010). Hold the context fixed – vagueness still remains. In R. Dietz & S. Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic (pp. 275–88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, J., & Stanley, J. (2011). Singular thoughts and singular propositions. Philosophical Studies, 154(2), 205–222.
Barker, C. (2002). The dynamics of vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25(1), 1–36.
Bogusławski, A. (1975). Measures are measures: in defence of the diversity of comparatives and positives. Linguistiche Berichte, 36, 1–9.
Bosch, P. (1983). “Vagueness” is context-dependence. A solution to the sorites paradox. In T. Ballm & M. Pinkal (Eds.), Approaching vagueness (pp. 189–210). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Ellis, J. (2004). Context, indexicals and the sorites. Analysis, 64(4), 362–364.
Fara, D. G. (2000). Shifting sands: an interest-relative theory of vagueness. Philosophical Topics, 28(1), 45–81.
Fara, D. G. (2008). Profiling interest relativity: reply to Stanley. Analysis, 68(4), 326–335.
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese, 30(3–4), 265–300.
Gert, J. (2008). Vague terms, indexicals, and vague indexicals. Philosophical Studies, 140(3), 437–445.
Kamp, H. (1981). The paradox of the heap. In U. Mönnich (Ed.), Aspects of philosophical logic (pp. 225–277). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Kennedy, C. (2007). Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30(1), 1–45.
Raffman, D. (1994). Vagueness without paradox. Philosophical Review, 103(1), 41–74.
Raffman, D. (1996). Vagueness and context relativity. Philosophical Studies, 81(2–3), 175–192.
Raffman, D. (2005). How to understand contextualism about vagueness: reply to Stanley. Analysis, 65(3), 244–248.
Richard, M. (2004). Contextualism and relativism. Philosophical Studies, 119(1–2), 215–242.
Shapiro, S. (2006). Vagueness in context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (1999). Understanding truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. (2003). Context, interest relativity and the sorites. Analysis, 63(4), 269–281.
Van Kerkhove, B. (2003). Vagueness unlimited: in defence of a pragmatic approach to sorites paradoxes. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11, 251–276.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks are due to the late Angel d’Ors, since some ideas and arguments arose initially in discussion with him and out of his suggestions. This is the first paper I have published since his departure, and I dedicate it to his memory. I would also like to thank Gloria Balderas, Pablo Cobreros, Paula Milne, Stewart Shapiro and Roy Sorensen for their useful comments. I am also grateful to audiences in St. Andrews, Navarra, Beijing, Prague and Krakow where previous versions of this paper were presented and to various anonymous referees for their valuable comments. The development of this article was made possible by financial support from the Government of Navarra [ref. 67/2006, 29 March] and the Spanish Government: Ministry of Education and Science [ref. HUM2005-05910/FISO] and Ministry of Science and Innovation [FFI2009-13687-C02-01/FISO]. Finally, thanks also go to my family; the names of some of its members appear in examples in the paper. They were kind enough to cover for me during the preparation of my parents’ 50th Wedding Anniversary party while I was writing this paper, and allowed me to enjoy the wonderful result of their efforts in preparing a great celebration.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cerezo, M. Remarks on the Interest-relative Theory of Vagueness. Acta Anal 28, 381–394 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0190-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0190-8