Abstract
It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort described by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis of a structural analogy between language and action, and then I will consider what kind of evidence there seems to be in favour of the thesis of a neurobiological identity. On this basis, I will subsequently focus on two definitional issues. The first is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, humans may perform an infinite number of possible actions. The second is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, what is at issue is conscious planning of action and therefore controlled processing.
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Notes
I am not considering here the way in which, even for the same utterance, communicative intention may change as a function of context. However, at a first approximation that issue may be set aside. As a matter of fact, in the quotation above Sperber and Wilson (2002) seem to suggest that communicative intentions are just as complex as it would be predicted by the syntactic structure of the corresponding utterances.
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Mazzone, M. A Generative System for Intentional Action?. Topoi 33, 77–85 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9186-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9186-7