Abstract.
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Revised August 2001
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
van den Brink, R. An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property. Game Theory 30, 309–319 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100079
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100079