Skip to main content
Log in

New axiomatizations of the Owen value

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, we propose three new axiomatizations of the Owen value, similar as the axiomatizations of the Shapley value of Chun (Int J Game Theory 20(2):183–190, 1991), van den Brink (Int J Game Theory 30(3):309–319, 2002), and Manuel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 77:1–14, 2013), respectively. Firstly, we show that the additivity and null player property in Owen’s (in: Henn and Moeschlin (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory, Springer-Verlog, Berlin, 1977) axiomatization can be weakened into coalitional strategic equivalence. And then, we prove that the coalitional symmetry (respectively symmetry within union) and additivity in Owen’s (in: Henn and Moeschlin (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory, Springer-Verlog, Berlin, 1977) axiomatization can be weakened into a variation of fairness, named as coalitional fairness (respectively fairness within union). Finally, we show that the two fairness axioms in our second axiomatization can be weakened into two axioms, involving a special relation between players, named as indifference. Besides characterizing the Owen value, we also illustrate that our results can be extended to the Winter value, being a common single-valued solution for cooperative games with a level structure.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For simplicities of notations, we omit the braces for singletons, when no confusion occurs.

  2. Note that E, A, and N are defined over \({\mathcal {CG}}\). As mentioned before, \({\mathcal {G}}\subseteq {\mathcal {CG}}\), they are also well-defined over \({\mathcal {G}}\).

  3. Ba-Sh can be defined for every \((N,v,{\mathcal {C}})\in {\mathcal {CG}}\) and \(i\in N\) by

    $$\begin{aligned} \text {Ba-Sh}_i(N,v,{\mathcal {C}}) =\sum _{T\subseteq N:i\in T}\Delta _v(T)\cdot \frac{\sum _{j\in N}\text {Ba-Sh}_i(N,u_T,{\mathcal {C}})}{|{\mathcal {D}}_T|\cdot |C(i)\cap T|}. \end{aligned}$$

    Following the same line with the Owen value, and considering the fact that Ba-Sh satisfies null players out [implied by A and N (Derks and Haller 1999)], it is easily to verify that Ba-Sh satisfies IPO.

  4. For more details about level games, see Hu and Li (2020) and the references therein.

  5. This definition was first presented by Calvo et al. (1996).

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xun-Feng Hu.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (71901076, 71871206) and the National Social Science Fund of China (18ZDA043).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Hu, XF. New axiomatizations of the Owen value. Math Meth Oper Res 93, 585–603 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-021-00743-z

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-021-00743-z

Keywords

Mathematics Subject Classification

JEL Classification

Navigation