Abstract
In this paper, we propose three new axiomatizations of the Owen value, similar as the axiomatizations of the Shapley value of Chun (Int J Game Theory 20(2):183–190, 1991), van den Brink (Int J Game Theory 30(3):309–319, 2002), and Manuel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 77:1–14, 2013), respectively. Firstly, we show that the additivity and null player property in Owen’s (in: Henn and Moeschlin (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory, Springer-Verlog, Berlin, 1977) axiomatization can be weakened into coalitional strategic equivalence. And then, we prove that the coalitional symmetry (respectively symmetry within union) and additivity in Owen’s (in: Henn and Moeschlin (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory, Springer-Verlog, Berlin, 1977) axiomatization can be weakened into a variation of fairness, named as coalitional fairness (respectively fairness within union). Finally, we show that the two fairness axioms in our second axiomatization can be weakened into two axioms, involving a special relation between players, named as indifference. Besides characterizing the Owen value, we also illustrate that our results can be extended to the Winter value, being a common single-valued solution for cooperative games with a level structure.
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Notes
For simplicities of notations, we omit the braces for singletons, when no confusion occurs.
Note that E, A, and N are defined over \({\mathcal {CG}}\). As mentioned before, \({\mathcal {G}}\subseteq {\mathcal {CG}}\), they are also well-defined over \({\mathcal {G}}\).
Ba-Sh can be defined for every \((N,v,{\mathcal {C}})\in {\mathcal {CG}}\) and \(i\in N\) by
$$\begin{aligned} \text {Ba-Sh}_i(N,v,{\mathcal {C}}) =\sum _{T\subseteq N:i\in T}\Delta _v(T)\cdot \frac{\sum _{j\in N}\text {Ba-Sh}_i(N,u_T,{\mathcal {C}})}{|{\mathcal {D}}_T|\cdot |C(i)\cap T|}. \end{aligned}$$Following the same line with the Owen value, and considering the fact that Ba-Sh satisfies null players out [implied by A and N (Derks and Haller 1999)], it is easily to verify that Ba-Sh satisfies IPO.
For more details about level games, see Hu and Li (2020) and the references therein.
This definition was first presented by Calvo et al. (1996).
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This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (71901076, 71871206) and the National Social Science Fund of China (18ZDA043).
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Hu, XF. New axiomatizations of the Owen value. Math Meth Oper Res 93, 585–603 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-021-00743-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-021-00743-z