Collection
Contests: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
The theory of contests is an active field within game theory that has its roots in some of the earliest games examined. In a contest, players expend scarce resources (such as capital, effort, or time) to win one or more valuable prizes. The pervasiveness of contests as allocation mechanisms, whether arising naturally because of conflict over resources, or through the design of one or more principals to influence behavior, has attracted the interest of a growing number of scholars within economics and other scientific disciplines. Despite contest theory’s increasing popularity and the large volume of recent work in the area, many open theoretical problems remain, as well as important empirical questions, demanding testing in both the laboratory and the field.
To promote the study of contests, the Review of Economic Design is solicited manuscripts for a collection on theoretical and empirical advances in contests. Papers included in this collection
- advance the pure theory of contests, including issues of equilibrium characterization, welfare properties, and contest design.
- empirically test contest theory and design in the laboratory or the field.
- analyze applications of contest design in specific areas such as sports, politics, litigation, industrial and research policy, organizational design, and military science.
Editors
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Dan Kovenock
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, USA; E-mail: kovenock@chapman.edu
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Huseyin Yildirim
Department of Economics, Duke University, USA; E-mail: hy12@duke.edu
