Abstract
It is understandable that those wishing to characterize Aristotle’s philosophical method have looked for guidance almost without exception to a passage in Nicomachean Ethics vii 1, where he prefaces his discussion of the puzzling phenomenon of akrasia (weakness of will) with an uncharacteristic methodological preamble. In this preamble, Aristotle contends, “We must set out the appearances (phainomena) and run through all the puzzles regarding them” (EN vii 1, 1145b2–4). Thereafter, having systematized the phainomena and re-interpreted or rejected those proving problematic, we may rest content: any proof we may wish for in this domain is already provided in this procedure (EN vii 1, 1145b5–7).
—About all these matters, we must try to reach conviction via arguments, using appearances (phainomena) as witnesses and standards.
EE 1216b26–29
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Shields, C. (2013). The Phainomenological Method in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In: Feser, E. (eds) Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137367907_2
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