Summary
Nussbaum misconstrues the difference between Plato and Aristotle over what is real for a debate over a conception of truth. She seems to mistake Aristotle's arguments against Plato' version of realism as an argument against realism per se, though the texts do not permit such a reading. She claims Aristotle is convinced that realism involves a fatal “failure of reference,” yet she produces not a single text where Aristotle is even remotely concerned about such a failure of reference given the commitments of realism. And nowhere is the crucial question of the relationship between Aristotle's antirealism and his method of appearances explicitly addressed or resolved.
Nussbaum offers us a fashionable Aristotle. I have argued that, far from being attractive and obviously right on a deep and recent metaphysuical debate, Nussbaum's Aristotle is confused and inconsistent and thus that it is a good thing the texts do not support such a characterization.
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Davidson, J.D. Appearances, antirealism, and Aristotle. Philos Stud 63, 147–166 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00381685
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00381685