Abstract
Although the title of this essay is ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ I shall concentrate on philosophy of science, discussing history of science only insofar as it bears directly on the philosophy of science or where it forms part of the debate on that growing set of topics that comprise what might be called History/Philosophy of science. Not only does this focus on philosophy lead me to ignore, except in passing some of the important historical work on science that has been done in Australia, especially that valuable work done by members of the Melbourne department of History and Philosophy of Science, it also leads me to set aside much that is contained in the growth in Australia of science studies: those that emphasize the social context of science and technology, science (and technology) policy, sociology of science and so on, except insofar as they relate to developments in philosophy of science.
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Maund, B. (1992). History and Philosophy of Science in Australia. In: Srzednicki, J.T.J., Wood, D. (eds) Essays on Philosophy in Australia. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 46. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8006-9_11
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