Abstract
David Sanford agrees with me in rejecting sense data, and has himself worked out a new argument against sense data (1981). He therefore rejects the representative theory of perception and phenomenalism. If we call whatever is left over from the two views a ‘direct realist’ theory of perception, then both Sanford and I are direct realists. However, he makes a number of criticisms of my particular version of direct realism.
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Armstrong, D.M. (1984). Replies. In: Bogdan, R.J. (eds) D.M. Armstrong. Profiles, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6280-4_9
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