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Humean Perspectives on Structural Realism

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The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective ((PSEP,volume 1))

Abstract

Structural Realism (SR) is a moderate variant of scientific realism and can roughly be captured by the idea that we should be committed to the structural rather than object-like content of our best current scientific theories. A quick view on the list of some of the main proponents shows that SR is basically a European philosophy of science movement (and just suits our ESF Programme): John Worrall, Ioannis Votsis, Steven French, Angelo Cei, James Ladyman, Simon Saunders, Michael Esfeld, Vincent Lam, Katherine Brading, Mauro Dorato, Dean Rickles, Fred Muller, and – exceptions prove the rule – Anjan Chakravartty and John Stachel. The list is of course not exhaustive, moreover, the debate has a broad periphery. A notable example of this is Bas van Fraassen’s structural empiricism. The paper is a kind of opinionated review paper. In what follows I will pass through the most prevailing topics in recent debates over SR. My discussion will be organised, perhaps a bit unorthodoxly, in short sections, here and then I will outline my own views.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

    Holger Lyre

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  1. Holger Lyre
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Correspondence to Holger Lyre .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna Circle, Universitätscampus, Hof 1, Vienna, A-1090, Austria

    Friedrich Stadler

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Lyre, H. (2010). Humean Perspectives on Structural Realism. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_27

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