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Quiddistic Knowledge

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Abstract.

Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know. On route I shall also argue that (i) the main necessitarian arguments do not converge on a single view, (ii) properties are transworld entities that cannot be handled by counterpart theory, and (iii) quiddistic skepticism is merely external world skepticism writ small.

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  1. University of Massachussetts, 359 Bartlett Hall,130 Hicks Way, Amberst, MA, 01003-9269

    Jonathan Schaffer

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Schaffer, J. Quiddistic Knowledge. Philos Stud 123, 1–32 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5221-2

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