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Adaptive Artificial Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Discrete Principal-Agent Game

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Simulating Social Phenomena

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 456))

Abstract

This paper approaches the analysis of a repeated Principal-Agent model introducing automata as a device for decision making. We use “modified” Genetic Algorithms methods to analyze the process of evolution in such a model. It is argued that the above modifications furnish the analysis with an interpretation that is more suitable to the study of social systems.

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References

  • Aumann, R.J. (1981). Survey of Repeated Games. In R.J. Aumann et al. (eds.) Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern. Mannhein: Bibliographisches Institut.

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  • Miller, J.H. (1989). The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Manuscript. Carnegie-Mellon University.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departament d’Economia i Ha. Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain

    Xavier Vilà

Authors
  1. Xavier Vilà
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Psychology, CNR, V.le Marx 15, I-00137, Rome, Italy

    Rosaria Conte

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 3, D-95445, Bayreuth, Germany

    Rainer Hegselmann

  3. Department of Economics, University of Turin, C.so Unione Sovietica 218bis, I-10134, Turin, Italy

    Pietro Terna

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Vilà, X. (1997). Adaptive Artificial Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Discrete Principal-Agent Game. In: Conte, R., Hegselmann, R., Terna, P. (eds) Simulating Social Phenomena. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 456. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_35

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63329-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03366-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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