Abstract
A broadcast exclusion protocol allows a broadcaster to transmit a encrypted message to a set of n users over a broadcast channel so that all but some specified small group of k excluded users can decrypt the message, even if these excluded users collude with each other in an arbitrary manner. Recently, Matsuzaki et al. pointed out a potential problem in the earlier works regarding the number of modular exponentiation, and proposed an extended scheme in which decryption requires only two modular exponentiations regardless of n and k. However, our analysis shows this scheme has a limitation of the number of rounds.
The contribution of this paper is to present a new broadcast exclusion protocol maintaining security within a virtually unlimited number of rounds without spoiling the efficiency. First, we demonstrate a limitation of the rounds of the previous work by showing how a user can derive the system secret parameters after more than a certain number of rounds. Then, we present a new protocol for which we can provide rigorous security proof under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
We note that even if we point out some limitation of the previous work, we still consider it nevertheless significant. In particular, we derived our new protocol by modifying some of their fundamental techniques.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Broadcast encryption. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 480–491. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Naor, D., Naor, M., Lotspiech, J.B.: Revocation and tracing schemes for stateless receivers. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 41–62. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Asano, T.: A revocation scheme with minimal storage at receivers. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 433–450. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Kumar, R., Rajagopalan, S., Sahai, A.: Coding constructions for blacklisting problems without computational assumptions. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 609–623. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Anzai, J., Matsuzaki, N., Matsumoto, T.: A quick group key distribution scheme with entity revocation. In: Lam, K.-Y., Okamoto, E., Xing, C. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1716, pp. 333–347. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Desmedt, Y., Frankel, Y.: Threshold cryptosystems. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 307–315. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Efficient trace and revoke schemes. In: Frankel, Y. (ed.) FC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1962, pp. 1–20. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Matsuzaki, N., Anzai, J., Matsumoto, T.: Light weight broadcast exclusion using secret sharing. In: Clark, A., Boyd, C., Dawson, E.P. (eds.) ACISP 2000. LNCS, vol. 1841, pp. 313–327. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Kurosawa, K., Desmedt, Y.: Optimum traitor tracing and asymmetric schemes. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1403, pp. 145–157. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Kurosawa, K., Yoshida, T.: Linear code implies public-key traitor tracing. In: Naccache, D., Paillier, P. (eds.) PKC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2274, pp. 172–187. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Berlekamp, E.R.: Factoring polynomials over large finite fields. Math. Comp., 713–735 (1970)
Knuth, D.E.: Seminumerical algorithms - the art of computer programming. Addison-Wesley, Reading
Courtois, N., Klimov, A., Patarin, J., Shamir, A.: Efficient algorithms for solving overdefined systems of multivariate polynomial equations. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 392–407. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Watanabe, Y., Numao, M. (2003). Multi-round Secure Light-Weight Broadcast Exclusion Protocol with Pre-processing. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2003. ESORICS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2808. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20300-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39650-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive