Skip to main content

The Long Italian Stagnation and the Welfare Effects of Outsourcing

  • Chapter
Dynamic Approaches to Global Economic Challenges
  • 385 Accesses

Abstract

The stagnation of the Italian economy over the last two decades is widely documented. During this period, the world economy has become highly integrated, and foreign outsourcing has become a standard practice for firms. While trade theory predicts benefits from the internationalization of production, Italy seems to have gained negligibly from it, or, rather to have lost. In a simple model, we show that this may be the case when markets are overregulated and competition policies are weak. We study a small open economy with one oligopolistic and one competitive sector, which outsources part of its production process abroad. Advances in globalization entail lower tariff rates of outsourcing. Contrary to the common wisdom, we show that national welfare is an inverted U-shaped function of tariffs. There exists a tariff threshold, below which the economy loses from globalization because the competitive sector overproduces and the oligopolistic underproduces (the oligopolistic good has a higher marginal effect on welfare). Competition policies that target the competitive sector lower the threshold and allow the economy to benefit from increased openness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    On this point, a large economic literature (e.g. Barca 1997; Faini 2003; Faini et al. 2005; Nardozzi 2004; Ciocca 2007; Forni et al. 2010) maintains that markets in Italy were and still are less competitive than in most OECD countries. Bianco et al. (2012), for example, provide evidence of a stable or an even growing Lerner index on several final product markets throughout the whole nineties. The need for more competitive markets is also a primary policy issue (OECD 2005; CNEL 2007; Christopoulou and Vermeulen 2008) and a major objective of the National Reforms’ Program by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF 2011).

  2. 2.

    The average tariff for Italy was decreasing in the period 1990–2010 (Accetturo et al. 2013).

  3. 3.

    Italian trade in manufactures varies around 80–90 % of the trade balance (see Amighini and Chiarlone 2004; Accetturo et al. 2013).

  4. 4.

    From the technical point of view of the modeling structure, this assumption does not impinge on the results.

  5. 5.

    An example of this complementarity is Faini (2003) who includes the historical north–south divide as an explanation for the Italian stagnation of the last two decades.

  6. 6.

    Further studies with similar results are Daveri (2002), Brandolini and Cipollone (2003), Daveri (2004), and Fachin and Gavosto (2010).

  7. 7.

    Papers that, with different approaches, confirm the employment-productivity trade-off for Italy are Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Lucidi and Kleinkrecht (2010), Lucidi (2012), Jona Lasinio and Vallanti (2011) and, more recently, Orsi and Turino (2014).

  8. 8.

    Pilat et al. (2002) however distinguish between “fast-adopters” (UK, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland) and “laggards” (Italy and Spain and, to some extent, Germany and France).

  9. 9.

    The debate on the reasons for the inadequately small size of Italian firms is very wide. Some insights can be found foremost in Onida (2004) and in Trento (2003) as well as in Ciocca (2004) and Accetturo et al. (2013).

  10. 10.

    For a review of this literature, see for example, Amighini and Chiarlone (2004) and Federico and Wolf (2012) for a more historical perspective.

  11. 11.

    Against this view, Fortis and Curzio (2003) believe that the main threat for the Italian manufacturing is due to the “asymmetric” (i.e. unfair and illegal) competition by China.

  12. 12.

    Note that the economy may become autarkic if the technology in sector X is generalised to one with constant elasticity of substitution (CES).

  13. 13.

    The calibration used for Figs. 3 and 4 is \( \overline{K}=60 \), \( \overline{L}=25 \), \( {A}^X=0.8 \), \( {A}^V={A}^Y=1 \), \( \varphi =0.2 \), \( \alpha =0.33 \), \( \beta =0.4 \), \( \eta =0.4 \), \( {\overline{P}}_X={\overline{P}}_O=1 \).

  14. 14.

    See Beverelli and Mahlstein (2011) for the same assumption.

References

  • Accetturo A, Bassanetti A, Bugamelli M, Faiella I, Finaldi Russo P, Franco D, Giacomelli S, Omiccioli M (2013) Il sistema industriale italiano tra globalizzazione e crisi, Questioni di Economia e Finanza 193. Banca d’Italia, Rome

    Google Scholar 

  • Amighini A, Chiarlone S (2004) Rischi dell’integrazione commerciale cinese per il modello di specializzazione internazionale dell’Italia. Liuc Papers 150, Serie Economia e Impresa, 37

    Google Scholar 

  • Barca F (1997) Compromesso senza riforme nel capitalismo italiano. In: Barca F (ed) Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi. Donzelli, Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • Bassanetti A, Iommi M, Jona Lasinio C, Zollino F (2004) La crescita dell’economia italiana tra ritardo tecnologico e rallentamento della produttività, Temi di Discussione 539. Banca d’Italia, Rome

    Google Scholar 

  • Beverelli C, Mahlstein K (2011) Outsourcing and competition policy. J Ind Comp Trade 11:131–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bianco M, Giacomelli S, Rodano G (2012) Concorrenza e regolamentazione in Italia. Questioni di Economia e Finanza 123. Banca d’Italia, Rome

    Google Scholar 

  • Blanchard O, Landier A (2002) The perverse effects of partial labour market reform: fixed-term contracts in France. Econ J 112(480):214–244

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boeri T, Faini R, Ichino A, Pisauro G, Scarpa C (2005) Oltre il declino. Il Mulino, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Boeri T, Garibaldi P (2007) Two tier reforms of employment protection: a honeymoon effect? Econ J 117(521):357–385

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandolini A, Cipollone P (2003) Una nuova economia in Italia. In: Rossi S (ed) La Nuova Economia: i fatti dietro il mito, il Mulino, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Breda E, Cappariello R (2012) A tale of two bazaar economies: an input-output analysis for Germany and Italy. Economia e politica industrial 39(2):43–69

    Google Scholar 

  • Chari VV, Kehoe PJ, McGrattan ER (2007) Business cycle accounting. Econometrica 75(3):781–836

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christopoulou R, Vermeulen P (2008) Markups in the Euro area and the US over the period 1981–2004 – a comparison of 50 sectors. Working Paper Series, n. 856. European Central Bank

    Google Scholar 

  • Ciocca P (2007) Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d’Italia (1796–2005). Bollati Boringhieri

    Google Scholar 

  • Ciocca P (2004) L’economia italiana: un problema di crescita. Rivista italiana degli economisti 9(1)(suppl.):7–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Ciocca P (2010) La specificità italiana nella crisi in atto. Moneta e Credito 63(249):51–58

    Google Scholar 

  • CNEL (2007) Liberalizzazioni e privatizzazioni. CNEL, Rome

    Google Scholar 

  • Crettez B, Fagart MC (2009) Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy. J Econ 98:97–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Ippoliti C, Roncaglia A (2011) L’Italia: una crisi nella crisi. Moneta e Credito 64(255):189–227

    Google Scholar 

  • Daveri F (2002) The new economy in Europe (1992–2001). Oxf Rev Econ Policy 18:345–362

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Daveri F (2004) Why is there a European productivity slowdown? CEPS Working Document 205, Brussels

    Google Scholar 

  • Daveri F, Jona Lasinio C (2006) Italy’s decline: getting the facts right. Paper presented at the conference “Nuovi Temi per la Politica Economica”, Giornale degli Economisti and Ente Einaudi in Rome (14 November 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  • Dew-Becker I, Gordon R (2012) The role of labor-market changes in the slowdown of European productivity growth. Rev Econ Inst 3(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Faini R (2003) Fu vero declino? L’Italia degli anni Novanta. Il Mulino 6:1072–1083

    Google Scholar 

  • Faini R, Haskell J, Barba Navaretti G, Scarpa C, Wey J (2005) Contrasting Europe’s decline: do product market reforms help? Paper presented at the conference “Oltre il declino”, Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti (February 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  • Faini R, Sapir A (2005) Un modello obsoleto? Crescita e specializzazione dell’economia italiana. In: Boeri T, Faini R, Ichino A, Pisauro G, Scarpa C (eds) Oltre il declino. Il Mulino, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Fachin S, Gavosto A (2010) Trends of labour productivity in Italy: a study with panel co-integration methods. Int J Manpower 31(7):755–769

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Federico G, Wolf N (2012) Italy’s comparative advantage: a long-run perspective. CEPR Working Paper 8758

    Google Scholar 

  • Forni L, Gerali A, Pisani M (2010) Macroeconomic effects of greater competition in the service sector: the case of Italy. Macroecon Dyn 14(05):677–708

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fortis M, Quadrio Curzio A (2003) Alle prese con la concorrenza asiatica. Il Mulino 6:1103–1113

    Google Scholar 

  • IMF (2015) World Economic Outlook database. IMF, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Jona Lasinio C, Vallanti G (2011) Reforms, labour market functioning and productivity dynamics: a sectoral analysis for Italy. Working Papers Luiss Lab 1193, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipsey RG, Lancaster K (1956) The general theory of second best. Rev Econ Stud 24:11–32

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lucidi F (2012) Is there a trade-off between labour flexibility and productivity growth? Some evidence from Italian firms. In: Addabbo T, Solinas G (eds) Non-standard employment and quality of work. AIEL series in labour economics, Physica-Verlag HD, pp 261–285

    Google Scholar 

  • Lucidi F, Kleinknecht A (2010) Little innovation, many jobs: an econometric analysis of the Italian labour productivity crisis. Camb J Econ 34(3):525–546

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MEF (2011) Documento di Economia e Finanza 2011. III, Programma Nazionale di Riforma

    Google Scholar 

  • Nardozzi G (2004) Miracolo e declino. Italia tra concorrenza e protezione. Roma – Bari, Laterza

    Google Scholar 

  • Nardozzi G (2003) The Italian economic miracle. Rivista di Storia Economica 2:139–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Neary JP (2003) The road less travelled: oligopoly and competition policy in general equilibrium. In: Arnott R, Greenwald B, Kanbur R (eds) Imperfect economics: essays in honor of Joseph Stiglitz. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 485–500

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2005) Going for growth. OECD, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2006) Science and Technology Database

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2012) Main science and technology indicators. OECD, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Onida F (1999) Quali prospettive per il modello di specializzazione internazionale dell’Italia? Economia Italiana 3:573–629

    Google Scholar 

  • Onida F (2004) Se il piccolo non cresce. Piccole e medie imprese italiane in affanno. Il Mulino, Bologna

    Google Scholar 

  • Orsi R, Turino F (2014) The last fifteen years of stagnation in Italy: a business cycle accounting perspective. Empir Econ 47:469–494

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pagano P, Schivardi F (2003) Firm size distribution and growth. Scand J Econ 105(2):255–274

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parisi ML, Schiantarelli F, Sembenelli A (2006) Productivity, innovation and R&D: micro evidence for Italy. Eur Econ Rev 50(8):2037–2061

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pilat D, Lee F, Van Ark B (2002) Production and use of TIC: a sectoral perspective on productivity growth in the OECD area. OECD Economic Studies, n. 35

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossi S (2004) Economia italiana: perché la deriva non si muti in declino. Il Mulino 4:639–650

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterlacchini A, Venturini F (2014) R&D and productivity in high-tech manufacturing: a comparison between Italy and Spain. Ind Innov 21(5):359–379

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toniolo G (2004) L’Italia verso il declino economico? Ipotesi e congetture in una prospettiva secolare. Rivista italiana degli economisti 9(1)(suppl.):29–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Trento S (2003) Stagnazione e frammentazione produttiva. Il Mulino 6:1093–1102

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ark B, O’Mahoney M, Timmer MP (2008) The productivity gap between Europe and the United States: trends and causes. J Econ Perspect 22(1):25–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vaciago G (2003) Il declino dell’economia italiana. Il Mulino 6:1084–1092

    Google Scholar 

  • Venturini F (2004) The determinants of Italian slowdown: what do the data say? EPKE working paper 29, NIESR, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Zotti J, Lucke B (2014) Welfare-optimal trade and competition policies in small open oligopolistic economies. J Int Trade Econ Dev. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2012.742555

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacopo Zotti .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendix: Proof of Propositions

Appendix: Proof of Propositions

The proof of both propositions is based on utility function (25) and on the model solutions:

$$ {X}^D=\frac{\varphi }{1-\varphi }{A}^V{\left(\frac{\alpha }{\varOmega}\overline{K}\right)}^{\alpha }{\left(\frac{1-\alpha }{\varPsi}\overline{L}\right)}^{1-\alpha}\frac{1}{{\overline{P}}_X}\cdot {P}_{V,x}\left(\tau \right)\cdot T\left(\tau \right) $$
(29)
$$ Y=\frac{N-1}{N}{A}^Y{\left(\frac{\beta }{\varOmega}\overline{K}\right)}^{\beta }{\left(\frac{1-\beta }{\varPsi}\overline{L}\right)}^{1-\beta}\cdot T\left(\tau \right) $$
(30)

where \( \varOmega \left(\tau, N\right):=\alpha +\beta \cdot T\left(\tau \right)\cdot \left(N-1/N\right) \), and \( \varPsi \left(\tau, N\right):=\left(1-\alpha \right)+\left(1-\beta \right)\cdot T\left(\tau \right)\cdot \) \( \cdot \left(N-1/N\right) \). The conditions \( N>1 \) and \( \tau \ge 0>-\eta \) (\( \tau >-1+{A}^X{\left(1-a\right)}^{1/\eta}\left({\overline{P}}_X/{\overline{P}}_O\right) \)) guarantee positive solutions in the Cobb–Douglas (CES) case.

Proposition 1

We first show that utility (1) is continuous in τ for \( \tau \ge 0 \). This is immediately seen from the fact that Ω(τ, N) and Ψ(τ, N) are continuous in τ and strictly positive since \( T\left(\tau \right)>0 \) for any \( \tau \ge 0 \). Hence, X D and Y are also continuous in τ. Differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to the tariff rate yields

$$ \frac{\partial U}{\partial \tau }=\left[\varphi \frac{1}{X^D}\frac{\partial {X}^D}{\partial \tau }+\left(1-\varphi \right)\frac{1}{Y}\frac{\partial Y}{\partial \tau}\right]\cdot U. $$
(31)

If τ goes to infinity, utility is zero since Ω(τ, N) and Ψ(τ, N) are finite and X D collapses to zero (see Eq. (27)). For \( \tau \ge 0 \) \( 0<U\left(\tau, N\right)<\infty, \forall N>1 \). Thus, \( {U}_{\tau}^{\prime }=0 \) if and only if the term in square brackets in Eq. (31) is zero. Its opposite is equivalent to the following cubic equation in the level of tariffs:

$$ {\tau}^3+a\cdot {\tau}^2+b\cdot \tau +c=0 $$
(32)

where

$$ {\fontsize{8.5}{10.5}\selectfont{\begin{array}{l}a:=\dfrac{1}{d}\left\{\dfrac{1}{\eta^2}\dfrac{N-1}{N}\left[\dfrac{\beta \left(1-\beta \right)\left(1-\varphi \right)}{\varphi}\left(3\dfrac{N-1}{N}-\eta \right)+\left[\alpha \left(1-\beta \right)+\left(1-\alpha \right)\beta \right]\left(1+\eta \right)\right]+\right.\\[9pt] \qquad\qquad\left.+\alpha \left(1-\alpha \right)\left(\dfrac{1}{\eta}\dfrac{N-1}{N}+2\dfrac{\varphi }{\left(1-\varphi \right)\eta }-1\right)\right\}\end{array} }}$$
$$ {\fontsize{8.5}{10.5}\selectfont{\begin{array}{l}b:=\dfrac{1}{d}\left\{\left[\left(1-\alpha \right)\left(\alpha \left(1+\eta \right)+\beta \right)-\dfrac{\beta \left(1-\beta \right)\left(1-\varphi \right)}{\varphi}\left(1+\eta -3\dfrac{N-1}{N}\right)+\alpha \left(1-\beta \right)\right]\right.\\[12pt] \qquad\qquad\left.\dfrac{N-1}{N}\dfrac{1}{\eta }-\alpha \left(1-\alpha \right)\left[2-\dfrac{\varphi }{\left(1-\varphi \right)\eta}\right]\right\}\end{array}}} $$
$$ c:=-\frac{1}{d}\left\{\frac{1}{N}\left[\alpha \left(1-\alpha \right)+\beta \left(1-\beta \right)\frac{1-\varphi }{\varphi}\frac{N-1}{N}\right]\right\} $$

where

$$ d:=\frac{1}{\eta}\left\{\!\frac{1}{\eta}\frac{N{-}1}{N}\left[\alpha \left(1{-}\beta \right)+\left(1{-}\alpha \right)\beta \right]+\frac{\alpha \left(1{-}\alpha \right)\varphi }{1{-}\varphi }+\frac{\beta \left(1{-}\beta \right)\left(1{-}\varphi \right)}{\varphi }{\left(\!\frac{1}{\eta}\frac{N{-}1}{N}\!\right)}^2\!\right\} $$

Note first that \( a>0 \), \( d>0 \), and \( c<0 \), which ensure two negative and one positive solution. (The sign of b is irrelevant.) Let \( {\tau}^{\ast } \) be the positive solution. In order to prove that the positive solution is a maximum observe that \( {U}_{\tau}^{\prime}\left(0,N\right)>0 \) because \( c<0 \) and Eq. (32) is the opposite of the term in square brackets in (31). Since U(τ, N) is continuous, and the other roots of Eq. (32) are negative, it follows that \( {U}_{\tau}^{\prime}\left(0,N\right)>0 \) in \( \left[0,{\tau}^{\ast}\right) \). The fact that \( {\tau}^{\ast } \) is a root of a cubic equation with at least two distinct solutions ensures that \( {U}_{\tau}^{\prime}\left(0,N\right)<0 \) if \( \tau >{\tau}^{\ast } \). Thus, \( {\tau}^{\ast } \) is a utility maximum. This proves Proposition 1.

Proposition 2

We show first that utility function (1) is continuous in N for \( N>1 \). This is immediately from the fact that Ω(τ, N) and Ψ(τ, N) are continuous in N and strictly positive for any \( N>1 \) and so are X D and Y. Differentiating the utility Eq. (25) and setting U N (τ, N) equal to zero yields the following quadratic equation in \( M:=\left(N-1\right)/N \):

$$ A\cdot {M}^2+B\cdot M+C=0 $$
(33)

with

$$ \begin{array}{c}A:=-\beta \left(1-\beta \right)\varphi \cdot {\left[T\left(\tau \right)\right]}^2\\ {}B:=-\left[\alpha \varphi \left(1-\alpha \right)-\beta \left(1-\varphi \right)\left(1-\beta \right)\right]\cdot T\left(\tau \right)\\ {}C:=\alpha \left(1-\alpha \right)\left(1-\varphi \right)\end{array} $$
(34)

Since \( A<0 \) and \( C>0 \) for all feasible model parameters, \( \left({B}^2-4 AC\right) \) is strictly positive. This ensures the existence of two real and distinct solutions, which are discordant in sign. Since \( {N}_{1,2}=1/\left(1-{M}_{1,2}\right) \), the negative solution \( {M}_2=\left(-B-\sqrt{B^2-4 AC}\right)/2A \) is unfeasible because \( N>1 \) must hold. The positive solution is feasible only if \( {M}_1=\left(-B+\sqrt{B^2-4 AC}\right)/2A<1 \), which is equivalent to \( \left(A+B+C\right)>0 \). Replace A, B, C by their definitions and verify that this is a product of positive terms. Since \( A<0 \) and \( \left({B}^2-4 AC\right)>0 \), \( \left(A\cdot {M}^2+B\cdot M+C\right) \) is positive (negative) for \( M<{M}_1 \) \( \left(M>{M}_1\right) \) which proves that \( {N}_1=1/\left(1-{M}_1\right) \) is a utility maximum. Use definitions (34) and (26) to verify that the optimal N is

$$ {N}^{\ast }=\frac{1}{1-\eta}\cdot \left(1+\frac{\eta }{\tau}\right) $$
(35)

Observe that if τ becomes zero, \( {N}^{\ast } \) is infinite. This proves Proposition 2.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Zotti, J. (2016). The Long Italian Stagnation and the Welfare Effects of Outsourcing. In: Bednar-Friedl, B., Kleinert, J. (eds) Dynamic Approaches to Global Economic Challenges. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23324-6_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics