Abstract
In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness.
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De Giovanni, P. (2013). Should a Retailer Support a Quality Improvements Strategy?. In: Křivan, V., Zaccour, G. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 13. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_7
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