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Non-Discrimination, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: Who Takes the Lead?

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The European Union as Protector and Promoter of Equality

Part of the book series: European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World ((EUNGW,volume 1))

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Abstract

It is often said that the non-discrimination case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) might diverge because of their different backgrounds and ‘raisons d’être’. In addition, it is almost an orthodoxy that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is ahead of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in developing fundamental rights doctrines in many fields, except for that of non-discrimination law. The question is, however, if these assumptions are correct. This chapter presents four examples in the field of equality and non-discrimination to show that, indeed, there are divergences that seem to reflect the differences in procedural and legal setting and rationale. It proves to be untrue, however, that the ECJ always takes the lead in developing non-discrimination law. In the past decade, several cases can be seen in which the ECtHR is setting the example and the ECJ has (or has not) followed suit. It can be derived from this that alignment and harmonisation of equal treatment and non-discrimination law are needed to avoid that the Member States are confronted with diverging or even conflicting requirements in the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See inter alia Julicher et al. (2019), Greer et al. (2018), Imamović (2018), Beijer (2017), Dubout (2017), Groussot et al. (2016), Morano-Foadi and Vickers (2015), Gerards (2015), Koffeman (2015), Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012), Van de Heyning (2011), Senden (2011), Besson (2008), Gerards (2005), Quinn (2001).

  2. 2.

    Cf. Imamović (2018), pp. 105–106.

  3. 3.

    Imamović (2018), p. 133. It also has been mentioned, however, that in practice, divergences appear to be less frequent than is often supposed; see further De Witte (2011), pp. 24 ff.

  4. 4.

    See further, with references, e.g. Gerards (2015), pp. 47 ff.; Lenaerts (2013), Ellis and Watson (2012), pp. 8–9.

  5. 5.

    On this and on the consequences for protection of fundamental rights, see e.g. Julicher et al. (2019), p. 5; Belavusau and Henrard (2018), p. 1; Imamović (2018), pp. 222 ff.; Greer et al. (2018), pp. 294–295 and 301; Beijer (2017), pp. 165 ff.; Weiß (2017), p. 72; De Búrca (2013a), Douglas-Scott (2011), p. 675; Poiares Maduro (2007), Morijn (2006), Bell (2002), pp. 6 ff. See also e.g., 2/13 Opinion of the Court (ECJ 18 December 2014), para. 1762.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Gerards (2019), pp. 59 ff.; Imamović (2018), p. 17; Gerards (2015), pp. 48–49.

  7. 7.

    Quinn (2001).

  8. 8.

    Other differences may also contribute to this, such as the differences in procedural setting and the existence or lack of specific legislation detailing fundamental rights issues; on these factors, see e.g. Greer et al. (2018), pp. 296–298; Kuijer (2018), p. 4; Beijer (2017), pp. 141 ff. See also briefly Sect. 6 of this Chapter.

  9. 9.

    E.g. Imamović (2018), Beijer (2017), pp. 169 ff.; Groussot et al. (2016), Lock (2016), Gerards (2015), Krommendijk (2015), De Búrca (2013b), Douglas-Scott (2013).

  10. 10.

    Beijer (2017), pp. 165 ff.; Garben (2017), Gerards (2015), De Búrca (2013b).

  11. 11.

    Beijer (2017), p. 174; Gerards (2015), p. 48; Douglas-Scott (2011), p. 649. It also has been said that the ECJ generally has not shown itself to be very ‘fundamental rights minded’ or has failed to recognise relevant case-law of the ECtHR; see e.g. Beijer (2017), pp. 166 ff., with further references to literature and case-law.

  12. 12.

    Gerards (2017a), pp. 323–324.

  13. 13.

    Where no such guidance was available, the ECJ’s case-law has been typified as ‘creative and eclectic’, yet not very consistent or well-principled; Weiß (2017), p. 84. For the development of fundamental rights in the EU, see generally e.g. Van de Heyning (2011), De Búrca (2011), De Witte (1999), Mancini and Keeling (1994), Coppel and O’Neill (1992), Dauses (1985). For the ECJ’s reliance on the ECtHR’s case-law, see e.g. Senden (2011), pp. 356–358.

  14. 14.

    E.g. Gerards (2013a), Muir (2013), pp. 1236 ff.; Bell (2011); but see Xenidis (2019), who contests this traditional understanding and regards it as a ‘disruptive narrative’.

  15. 15.

    See in more detail Dubout (2017), Gerards (2013a), Cartabia (2011), O’Connell (2009), Arnardóttir (2013), Arnardóttir (2007), Baker (2009), p. 714; Wintemute (2004), Arnardóttir (2003), Small (2003), p. 47. To give some examples: the ECtHR only recognised the notion of substantive inequality in 2000 (Application no. 34369/97, Thlimmenos v Greece, (ECtHR 6 April 2000)); see also Dubout (2017), p. 91 and that of indirect discrimination in 2007 (Application no. 57325/00, D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic (ECtHR 13 November 2007). However, it must also be emphasised that there are a few early and very prominent judgments in which the ECtHR developed the standards of review in Article 14 cases (in particular in the Belgian Linguistics case (Application no. 1474/62 (ECtHR 23 July 1968)), and in Application no. 6833/74, Marckx v Belgium (ECtHR 13 June 1979)) in which it developed its ‘very weighty reasons’ test (Application nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 28 May 1985), para. 77). See further on this e.g. Gerards (2017b), Gerards (2005), pp. 104 ff. It is therefore questionable if this conventional wisdom is fully correct anyway.

  16. 16.

    See further Xenidis (2019), p. 9; Belavusau and Henrard (2018), p. 6; Schiek (2012), Bell (2011), Gerards (2005), pp. 224 ff.; Bell (2002), pp. 33 ff.; More (1999), p. 522 (speaking of the ‘market unifying role’ of the equality principle).

  17. 17.

    For indirect discrimination, see further Sect. 2. For substantive equality, see e.g. Case 13/63, Italy v Commission (refrigerators) (ECJ 17 July 1963), 165) and, to a certain degree, horizontal effect of the non-discrimination principle (e.g. Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (ECJ 8 April 1976). See further Dubout (2017), p. 66; Gerards (2005), pp. 231 ff.

  18. 18.

    See the sources mentioned in footnote 15.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Dubout (2017), p. 65.

  20. 20.

    E.g. Case 345/17, Sergejs Buivids v Datu valsts inspekcija (ECJ 14 February 2019); Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige v Watson (ECJ 21 December 2016); Case C-131/12, Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (ECJ 13 May 2014); Case C-291/12, Schwartz v Stadt Bochum (ECJ 17 October 2013); Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland, (ECJ 8 April 2014), ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.

  21. 21.

    See in particular Case C-402/05, European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (ECJ 3 September 2008); Case C-584/10, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Commission (ECJ 18 July 2013). See more recently and also in relation to freedom of expression e.g. T-262/15, Dmitrii Konstantinovich Kiselev v Council of the European Union (GC 15 June 2017).

  22. 22.

    See e.g. Case 661/17, M.A. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal (ECJ 23 January 2019); Case C-673/16, Coman v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări (ECJ 5 June 2018); Case C-473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (ECJ 25 January 2018); Case C-562/13, Abdida v Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (ECJ 18 December 2014); Case C-199/12 to Case C-201/12, X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (ECJ 7 November 2013); Case C-71/11 and Case C-99/11, Y and Z v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ECJ 5 September 2012).

  23. 23.

    Greer et al. (2018), p. 301; Beijer (2017), p. 174; Weiß (2015), pp. 70 ff. See more critically, however, Groussot et al. (2016), pp. 13–14.

  24. 24.

    Some other issues, such as positive action, substantive scope of application, intersectional discrimination, segregation, discriminatory violence, harassment, reasonable accommodation, the intensity of review of justifications, burden of proof and horizontal effect, are not addressed for reasons of time and space. On those issues, for the EU, see e.g. the various chapters in Belavusau and Henrard (2018), Ward (2018), Ellis and Watson (2012); for the ECHR, see e.g. Gerards (2018), Gerards (2017b), Mačkić (2017), Gerards (2013a), Danisi (2011).

  25. 25.

    See also above, Sect. 1 and see e.g. Dubout (2017), pp. 94 ff.

  26. 26.

    For that reason, the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality figures prominently in the EU Treaties; see in particular Article 18 TFEU and several of the free movement provisions, such as Articles 36 and 37 TFEU (free movement of goods), Article 45 TFEU (free movement of workers), Article 61 TFEU (free movement of services), and Article 65 TFEU (free movement of capital). In addition, for example, discrimination based on national origin is specifically prohibited in relation to State aid (Article 107 TFEU) and customs duties (Article 200 TFEU).

  27. 27.

    It is therefore expressly prohibited by Article 40 TFEU (former Article 34 (2) TEC. See further e.g. Gerards (2005), pp. 240 ff.; Bell (2002), p. 21.

  28. 28.

    For that reason, unequal pay of men and women was prohibited already by Article 119 EEC Treaty (now Article 157 TFEU) and the EEC’s original social policy was based on primarily economic considerations connected to reducing competitive disadvantages; see e.g. Dubout (2017), p. 66; Ellis and Watson (2012), p. 23; Bell (2002), pp. 8–9; Barnard (1996), pp. 322–327.

  29. 29.

    Cf. Dubout (2017), p. 66.

  30. 30.

    In fact, the doctrine was used in the employment context first in relation to discrimination based on nationality in relation to free movement of workers; see Case 152/73, Sotigu v Deutsche Bundespost (ECJ 12 February 1974). See Dubout (2017), p. 95; Ellis and Watson (2012), pp. 148 ff.; Gijzen (2006), p. 69; Tobler (2005), pp. 110–115. The ECJ was also quick to understand the relation between free movement of workers and indirect sex-based discrimination; see already Case 96/80, Jenkins v Kingsgate (ECJ 31 March 1981); cf. Gijzen (2006), p. 69.

  31. 31.

    Of particular importance were Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 149/2-50 (1971); Directive 76/207/EEC on non-discrimination based on gender in employment, OJ L 39/40-42 (1976); and Directive 79/9/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ L 6/24-25 (1979). See also Xenidis (2019), p. 4; Dubout (2017), p. 66; and, for a full account of relevant sources, Ellis and Watson (2012), pp. 13 ff.

  32. 32.

    See e.g. Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012); Ellis and Watson (2012), p. 151 ff.

  33. 33.

    See further e.g. Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012); Schiek (2007); Tobler (2005); Gerards (2005).

  34. 34.

    E.g. Möschel (2017); Gerards (2013a).

  35. 35.

    Gerards (2013a). See expressly e.g. Application no. 8777/79, Rasmussen v Denmark (ECtHR 28 November 1984), para. 34.

  36. 36.

    On the application and meaning of the very weighty reasons test, see Gerards (2017b). On the grounds of discrimination, see also e.g. Arnardóttir (2014).

  37. 37.

    See in particular Application nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 28 May 1985), para. 85. The Court also showed reluctance to accept the notion and the ECJ’s approach in Application no. 24746/94, Hugh Jordan v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 4 May 2001).

  38. 38.

    See in particular Application no. 17209/02, Zarb Adami v Turkey (ECtHR 20 June 2006); Application no. 58641/00, Hoogendijk v the Netherlands (ECtHR 6 January 2005) (dec.).

  39. 39.

    Application no. 57325/00, D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic (ECtHR 13 November 2007). See also e.g. Möschel (2017), p. 124.

  40. 40.

    See for a few examples Application no. 32526/05, Sampanis and Others v Greece (ECtHR 5 June 2008); Application no. 33401/02, Opuz v Turkey (ECtHR 9 June 2009); Application no. 15766/03, Oršuš and Others v Croatia (ECtHR 16 March 2010); Application no. 59608/09, Sampani and Others v Greece (ECtHR 11 December 2012); Application no. 11146/11, Horváth and Kiss v Hungary (ECtHR 29 January 2013); Application no. 7973/10, Lavida and Others v Greece (ECtHR 30 May 2013); Application no. 7186/09, Di Trizio v Switzerland (ECtHR 2 February 2016).

  41. 41.

    See e.g. Application no. 66686/09, Manenc v France (ECtHR 21 September 2010) (dec.) (in which the Court did not want to recognise an indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation in a case concerning different rights for spouses and unmarried life partners); Application no. 56328/07, Bah v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 27 September 2011) (in which the Court did not further investigate the applicant’s statement that the case disclosed a structural discrimination in the domestic housing legislation); Application no. 77180/11, Leonov v Russia (ECtHR 10 April 2018) and Application no. 23608/16, Petrov and X. v Russia (ECtHR 23 October 2018) (in which the Court did not want to investigate the applicants’ statement that in Russia, a structural situation of discrimination against men existed in relation to granting residence rights).

  42. 42.

    See e.g. Application no. 55164/08, A. v Croatia (ECtHR 14 October 2010), paras. 100–104; Application no. 41237/14, Talpis v Italy (ECtHR 3 March 2017), para. 145; Application no. 49645/14, Balsan v Romania (ECtHR 23 May 2017), paras. 79 and 83.

  43. 43.

    Case C-668/15, Jyske Finans v Ligebehandlingsnævnet (ECJ 6 April 2017); Case C-457/17, Maniero v Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes e.V. (ECJ 15 November 2018). See further e.g. Atrey (2018); Farkas (2018).

  44. 44.

    Jyske Finans, para. 31.

  45. 45.

    Jyske Finans, para. 33.

  46. 46.

    For criticism of this new approach, see in particular Atrey (2018), section 5; Ward (2018), pp. 48–49.

  47. 47.

    See also e.g. Möschel (2017); Atrey (2018); Schlüter (2016). For a brief comparison, see Farkas (2018), p. 24.

  48. 48.

    Application no. 38590/10, Biao v Denmark (ECtHR 24 May 2016).

  49. 49.

    Biao, para. 98.

  50. 50.

    Biao, paras. 112–113.

  51. 51.

    Cf. Atrey (2018).

  52. 52.

    Biao, para. 110.

  53. 53.

    See also, however, Loenen and Vickers (2015), who explain that there also may be convergence visible in this field, in particular where both European Courts appear to leave a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities in making choices in relation to regulating religious expressions in the workplace.

  54. 54.

    Case C-157/15, Achbita v G4S (ECJ 14 March 2017).

  55. 55.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 15.

  56. 56.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 16.

  57. 57.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 30.

  58. 58.

    See in more detail Bell (2017), p. 791.

  59. 59.

    For criticism of the indirect discrimination approach taken in Achbita/G4S case, see e.g. Brems (2017); Loenen (2017); Spaventa (2017). The approach was received more favourably by Bell (2017), p. 792.

  60. 60.

    See e.g. Application no. 48420/10, Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 15 January 2013), para. 92; Application no. 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (ECtHR 1 July 2014); Application no. 64846/11, Ebrahimian v France (ECtHR 26 November 2015); Application no. 3413/09, Lachiri v Belgium (ECtHR 18 September 2019). See also Loenen (2009), p. 325.

  61. 61.

    See also Howard (2018), Brems (2017). This is the more interesting because the ECJ has taken a more flexible approach in other cases; see Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012), p. 52.

  62. 62.

    Loenen and Vickers (2015), p. 170; Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012), p. 79. The ECJ has been said to be more lenient towards interferences by the EU institutions than by member states or private parties; cf. e.g. Weiß (2017), p. 73. An earlier case-law analysis has shown, however, that the main distinction here is between measures that affect or promote free trade and the internal market (very strict review), or between measures where there is or is not a strong element of discretion involved in decision-making; see Gerards (2011), p. 91 ff. (also showing that in fundamental rights cases, the strictness of review may vary depending on the importance of the fundamental rights element at stake; see 100–101).

  63. 63.

    See e.g. Case C-396/17, Leitner v Landespolizeidirektion Tirol (ECJ 8 May 2019), para. 43; Case C-417/13, Starjakob v ÖBB Personenverkehr AG (ECJ 28 January 2015), para. 36. Further e.g. Gijzen (2006), p. 94; Gerards (2005), p. 276.

  64. 64.

    The ECJ has continued to do so based on the Charter, also in cases unrelated to discrimination; for some examples, see Case C-92/09 and Case C-93/09, Schecke v Land Hessen (ECJ 9 November 2010), para. 78; Case C-291/12, Schwartz v Stadt Bochum (ECJ 17 October 2013), paras. 47–63; Case C-293/12 and Case C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications (ECJ 8 April 2014).

  65. 65.

    For this terminology, see Gerards (2013b). A major role traditionally has also been played by these two tests in relation to free movement cases; see e.g. Petursson (2014), p. 137 and, with further references 148 ff.

  66. 66.

    E.g. Greer et al. (2018), p. 317; Petursson (2014), pp. 312–314; see also already Jans (2000). Specifically in relation to equal treatment cases, see Tobler (2005), p. 301 and Haverkort-Speekenbrink (2012), p. 77.

  67. 67.

    This is different in some of the more recent cases on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as cases concerning data protection or copyrights; see Greer et al. (2018), p. 317; Weiß (2017), p. 75. For some examples, see Case C-345/17, Buivids v Datu valsts inspekcija (ECJ 14 February 2019), para. 64; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v Vandersteen (ECJ 3 September 2014), para. 27; Case C-468/10, ASNEF v Administración del Estado (ECJ 24 November 2011), para. 43. Even there, however, in preliminary question cases, the final decision is usually left to the national court.

  68. 68.

    Exceptionally, this is different; see in more recent years e.g. Case C-312/17, Surjit Singh Bedi v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ECJ 19 September 2018), para. 68; Case C-414/16, Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e. V. (ECJ 17 April 2018), paras. 52-53; Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia (ECJ 16 July 2015), para. 123.

  69. 69.

    See also Weiß (2017), pp. 71–72.

  70. 70.

    Application no. 14038/88, Soering v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 7 July 1989), para. 89. See also Gerards (2019), p. 229; Lavrysen (2018), p. 316; Mowbray (2010).

  71. 71.

    See further Gerards (2019), pp. 229 ff.; for further analyses, see also e.g. Mowbray (2010); Greer (2004).

  72. 72.

    See in particular Gerards (2013b), pp. 467–468.

  73. 73.

    See further Gerards (2017b).

  74. 74.

    Cf. also Loenen and Vickers (2015), p. 169.

  75. 75.

    Case C-157/15, Achbita v G4S (ECJ 14 March 2017). See Sect. 2.3.

  76. 76.

    Application no. 48420/10 and others, Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 15 January 2013).

  77. 77.

    Eweida, para. 94.

  78. 78.

    As mentioned, this is a very common approach; indeed, as Mowbray has remarked (2010), p. 290, the ECtHR even developed its principle of proportionality in the context of the non-discrimination principle.

  79. 79.

    Cf. Brems (2017).

  80. 80.

    Case C-157/15, Achbita v G4S (ECJ 14 March 2017). See also Bell (2017), p. 794.

  81. 81.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 38.

  82. 82.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 39.

  83. 83.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 40.

  84. 84.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 42.

  85. 85.

    Achbita/G4S, para. 39.

  86. 86.

    For these examples, see Gerards (2007), p. 163.

  87. 87.

    Gerards (2007), p. 169.

  88. 88.

    See further e.g. Xenidis (2019), p. 16; McCrudden (2016); Connor (2010); Waddington (2009).

  89. 89.

    Case C-303/06, Coleman v Attridge Law (ECJ 17 July 2008).

  90. 90.

    Coleman, para. 50.

  91. 91.

    Coleman, para. 51.

  92. 92.

    Coleman, para. 56.

  93. 93.

    Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia (ECJ 16 July 2015). See also e.g. Xenidis (2019), p. 16; Howard (2018), section II.a; Lahuerta (2016), p. 809.

  94. 94.

    Xenidis (2019), p. 16.

  95. 95.

    Application no. 23682/13, Guberina v Croatia (EctHR 22 March 2016).

  96. 96.

    Guberina, para. 77.

  97. 97.

    Guberina, para. 78. The ECtHR repeated this holding in Application no. 25536/14, Škorjanec v Croatia (ECtHR 28 March 2017), para. 56 and Application no. 65550/13, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v Switzerland (ECtHR 11 December 2018), para. 97.

  98. 98.

    Application no. 55762/00 and 55974/00, Timishev v Russia (ECtHR 13 December 2005), para. 54.

  99. 99.

    See e.g. Application no. 25536/14, Škorjanec v Croatia (ECtHR 28 March 2017), para. 56.

  100. 100.

    Although Lahuerta has argued that the CHEZ case, discussed above, could be seen as an example of discrimination by assumption (and thereby a recognition of that concept); Lahuerta (2016), pp. 810–811. As mentioned above, however, the situation can perhaps better by regarded as an example of discrimination by association with the Roma-population.

  101. 101.

    Case C-354/13, FOA v KL (ECJ 18 December 2014).

  102. 102.

    Kaltoft, paras. 33–40 and 51.

  103. 103.

    Kaltoft, para. 60.

  104. 104.

    Cf. L. Waddington in her case-note to the Kaltoft case, European Human Rights Cases 2015/66, paras. 11–14.

  105. 105.

    As Lahuerta has argued, however, the ECJ may also implicitly recognise the concept; in her view, the ECJ did so in the CHEZ case discussed above; see Lahuerta (2016), pp. 810–811.

  106. 106.

    Danisi (2017), p. 198; Koffeman (2015), p. 608; Wintemute (2015), p. 193; Van der Sloot (2014), pp. 402 ff.

  107. 107.

    See in particular Application no. 30141/04, Schalk and Kopf v Austria (ECtHR 24 June 2010), paras. 54–64; confirmed in e.g. Application no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, Oliari and Others v Italy (ECtHR 21 July 2015), paras. 189–194 and Application no. 40183/07, Chapin and Charpentier v France (ECtHR 9 June 2016), paras. 48–52. See further e.g. Dondoli (2018), p. 7; Danisi (2017), p. 203; Koffeman (2015), p. 351.

  108. 108.

    See in particular Application no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, Oliari and Others v Italy (ECtHR 21 July 2015), where the ECtHR held that Italy had not met its obligations under the Convention by not providing for any sound framework to recognize and protect same-sex unions (paras. 165–185). See also e.g. Dondoli (2018), p. 7 and, in detail, Koffeman (2015), pp. 365 ff.

  109. 109.

    See e.g. Application no. 19010/07, X. and Others v Austria (ECtHR 19 February 2013); Application no. 29381/09 and 32684/09, Vallianatos and Others v Greece (ECtHR 7 November 2013); Application no. 68453/13, Pajić v Croatia (ECtHR 23 February 2016). See critically on the pace of these developments Danisi (2017), p. 212.

  110. 110.

    Application no. 51362/09, Taddeucci and McCall v Italy (ECtHR 30 June 2016). See further Dondoli (2018), p. 13 ff.

  111. 111.

    Taddeucci and McCall, para. 83.

  112. 112.

    Taddeucci and McCall, para. 97.

  113. 113.

    Taddeucci and McCall, para. 96.

  114. 114.

    Taddeucci and McCall, para. 98.

  115. 115.

    Application no. 26431/12 and others, Orlandi and Others v Italy (ECtHR 14 December 2017).

  116. 116.

    Orlandi, para. 199.

  117. 117.

    See also Dondoli (2018). The ECtHR has been criticised, however, for taking an approach that does not sufficiently identify the real ground of discrimination, that does not sufficiently acknowledge the possibilities of indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation, and that is too much focussed on the views and opinions prevalent in the European States; see Danisi (2017), pp. 214 ff.

  118. 118.

    Bell (2002), p. 97. In more detail, see Koffeman (2015), pp. 411 ff.; Tobler (2015), Wintemute (2015), pp. 179 ff.

  119. 119.

    Case 267/06, Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen (ECJ 1 April 2008).

  120. 120.

    Maruko, para. 67.

  121. 121.

    Maruko, paras. 67–69.

  122. 122.

    Maruko, para. 71.

  123. 123.

    Maruko, para. 72.

  124. 124.

    Maruko, para. 72.

  125. 125.

    The ECJ repeated the main part of its analysis in Maruko in the subsequent Römer case, Case C-147/08, Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (ECJ 10 May 2011), but there, it provided a few more clues as to the comparability assessment to be made by the national court—see in particular paras. 45–52 and see Wintemute (2015), p. 186.

  126. 126.

    Case C-267/12, Hay v Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres (ECJ 12 December 2013), paras. 34–43; see also Danisi (2017), p. 213; Koffeman (2015), p. 423.

  127. 127.

    Case C-673/16, Coman v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări (ECJ 5 June 2018).

  128. 128.

    Coman, para. 37.

  129. 129.

    Coman, paras. 36 and 43–46.

  130. 130.

    See e.g. Tryfonidou (2018), Beury (2018). Both also comment on whether the judgment really is far-reaching, or perhaps still rather narrow in its scope; see also Sumner (2018).

  131. 131.

    Or, as Wintemute has put it, the ECtHR has shown more ‘bravery’ than the ECJ has done; Wintemute (2015), p. 192.

  132. 132.

    See further Wintemute (2015), p. 192.

  133. 133.

    Cf. Greer et al. (2018), pp. 296–298; Beijer (2017), p. 145 ff.; Dubout (2017), pp. 69–71; Wintemute (2015), p. 192.

  134. 134.

    See Gerards (2013a), p. 104; Edel (2010), p. 86; O’Connell (2009), p. 222.

  135. 135.

    For the situation in EU law, see further e.g. Xenidis (2019), pp. 37 ff.

  136. 136.

    On this, see also e.g. Besson (2008).

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Gerards, J. (2020). Non-Discrimination, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: Who Takes the Lead?. In: Giegerich, T. (eds) The European Union as Protector and Promoter of Equality. European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43764-0_7

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