Abstract
This chapter introduces the notion of focal points and juxtaposes the standard contexts in which focal points are usually analyzed (mathematical game theory, especially coordination games, and carefully controlled experimental laboratory settings) with the practical contexts of negotiations. It highlights the fundamental differences between these contexts, establishing the need of examining in detail the way focal points function in complex, real world settings. Making the case that negotiations offer a directly practical field where the importance of salience and focality is evident, it also shows that the ways focal points function in negotiations are much richer and more varied than an exclusive preoccupation with the context of pure coordination may initially suggest.
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Notes
- 1.
See Duer and Mateo (2007).
- 2.
On the role of focal points in the settlement of territorial issues, see Huth et al. (2013).
- 3.
This volume focuses on the context of negotiations, but it should be noted that this is by no means the only subject matter where focal points play a role; they are no less prevalent, for instance, in strategic interactions in economic contexts or in the social sphere.
- 4.
- 5.
For a discussion of the few uses of focal point coordination in negotiation studies, see Druckman and Wall (2017).
- 6.
- 7.
For a number of intuitive examples of this process, see Schelling (1960: Ch. 3).
- 8.
For more on focal points in the context of coordination, see Sect. 3 in Chapter 2 of this volume.
- 9.
This, in fact, amounts to an explanation why pure coordination problems are easily resolved as soon as minimal communication becomes possible.
- 10.
The strategy of aiming to secure an outcome that is good enough is known as ‘satisficing’.
- 11.
Note that, strictly speaking, this definition retains the group dependency of focal points described above, as it depends on the scope of ‘all involved’ whether something is considered to be a focal point or merely salient. Thus, Siniša Vuković points out in his chapter, for instance, that both sides in the negotiations on Montenegro’s referendum on independence consisted of coalitions of parties. Each of these coalitions (unionist and pro-independents) entered into the negotiations with pre-formulated objectives. As Vuković argues, the goals each coalition had set for itself have all the hallmarks of a focal point, but the objectives of the two opposing coalitions obviously did not coincide. As determining a coalition’s aims only requires the agreement of the other coalition members, the scope of ‘all involved’ only entails the members of the intended coalition. Once the two coalitions (pro-union and pro-independence) had to arrive at an agreement, the relevant group changed, as did the focal point they finally agreed on. In more generic terms: a focal point for group X does not have to be a focal point for group (X + Y). Nor does the focal point for group (X + Y) have to either be X’s focal point or Y’s focal point.
- 12.
For this reason, neither theoretical nor experimental game theory are of immediate concern to the approach taken in this volume, and though certain specific game-theoretical results are sometimes mentioned in the chapters of this volume, no chapter explicitly takes a formal game-theoretical approach. Indeed, we have deliberately endeavoured to ensure that the volume is accessible to readers who have no formal or mathematical training. The few game-theoretical terms that occur in this book are explicated in the Appendix.
- 13.
Cf. the aforementioned shift from a maximizing to a satisficing strategy.
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Schuessler, R., van der Rijt, JW. (2019). Introduction: The Significance of Conspicuity. In: Schuessler, R., van der Rijt, JW. (eds) Focal Points in Negotiation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27901-1_1
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