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Focal Points in Laboratory Experiments

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

The Strategic of Conflict (Schelling 1960) introduced focal points as a solution to bargaining. Since then, experimental economics has proposed progressively more systematic designs to understand what a focal point is, what the range is of the strategic interactions in which they are applied (outside bargaining), and what the reasoning process is to reach focal points. Many (but not all) of Schelling’s initial conjectures turn out to be supported by this experimental program. In light of these experiments, some game-theoretical advances to assimilate focal points appear to be quite promising.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA

    David Rojo Arjona

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  1. David Rojo Arjona
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Correspondence to David Rojo Arjona .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Economics, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA

    Matias Vernengo

  2. Economic Development Division, Economic Commission for Latin America an, Santiago, RM - Santiago, Chile

    Esteban Perez Caldentey

  3. James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA

    Barkley J. Rosser Jr

Section Editor information

  1. Dept. of Economics, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, USA

    Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres

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© 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Limited

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Rojo Arjona, D. (2020). Focal Points in Laboratory Experiments. In: Vernengo, M., Caldentey, E., Rosser Jr, B. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3090-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3090-1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

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