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The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes

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Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3424))

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Abstract

We apply the information-theoretic anonymity metrics to continuous-time mixes, that individually delay messages instead of batching them. The anonymity of such mixes is measured based on their delay characteristics, and as an example the exponential mix (sg-mix) is analysed, simulated and shown to use the optimal strategy. We also describe a practical and powerful traffic analysis attack against connection based continuous-time mix networks, despite the presence of some cover traffic. Assuming a passive observer, the conditions are calculated that make tracing messages through the network possible.

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Danezis, G. (2005). The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes. In: Martin, D., Serjantov, A. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3424. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26203-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31960-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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