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Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems

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Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2009))

Abstract

We present the trafic analysis problem and expose the most important protocols, attacks and design issues. Afterwards, we propose directions for further research. As we are mostly interested in efficient and practical Internet based protocols, most of the emphasis is placed on mix based constructions. The presentation is informal in that no complex definitions and proofs are presented, the aim being more to give a thorough introduction than to present deep new insights.

See http://www.freedom.net and http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon for examples.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc., USA

    Jean-François Raymond

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  1. Jean-François Raymond
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut Informatik, FU Berlin, Takustr. 9, 14195, Berlin, Germany

    Hannes Federrath

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Raymond, JF. (2001). Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems. In: Federrath, H. (eds) Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2009. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44702-4_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44702-4_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41724-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44702-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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