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Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

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Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2013 (CT-RSA 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7779))

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Abstract

We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net.

We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

    Shahram Khazaei & Douglas Wikström

Authors
  1. Shahram Khazaei
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  2. Douglas Wikström
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Future Enviroments, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, 4000, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

    Ed Dawson

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Khazaei, S., Wikström, D. (2013). Randomized Partial Checking Revisited. In: Dawson, E. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2013. CT-RSA 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7779. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36094-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36095-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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