Abstract
Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [9] recently presented an efficient mix-net, which they claim to be both robust and secure. We present five practical attacks for their mix-net, and break both its privacy and robustness.
The first attack breaks the privacy of any given sender without corrupting any mix-server. The second attack requires that the first mix-server is corrupted. Both attacks are adaptations of the “relation attack” introduced by Pfitzmann [24, 23].
The third attack is similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurusawa [4] and breaks the privacy of all senders. It requires that all senders are honest and that the last mix-server is corrupted.
The fourth attack may be viewed as a novel combination of the ideas of Lim and Lee [16] and Pfitzmann [24, 23]. It breaks the privacy of any given sender, and requires that the first and last mix-servers are corrupted. This attack breaks also Jakobsson [14], including the fixed version of Mitomo and Kurosawa [18].
The fifth attack breaks the robustness in a novel way. It requires corruption of some senders and the first mix-server. This attack breaks also Jakobsson and Juels [15].
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Wikström, D. (2004). Five Practical Attacks for “Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls”. In: Matsui, M., Zuccherato, R.J. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_12
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