Abstract
When retrospective revaluation phenomena (e.g., unovershadowing: AB+, then A−, then test B) were discovered, simple elemental models were at a disadvantage because they could not explain such phenomena. Extensions of these models and novel models appealed to within-compound associations to accommodate these new data. Here, we present an elemental, neural network model of conditioning that explains retrospective revaluation apart from within-compound associations. In the model, previously paired stimuli (say, A and B, after AB+) come to activate similar ensembles of neurons, so that revaluation of one stimulus (A−) has the opposite effect on the other stimulus (B) through changes (decreases) in the strength of the inhibitory connections between neurons activated by B. The ventral striatum is discussed as a possible home for the structure and function of the present model.
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Introduction
Early reports of retrospective revaluation phenomena identified two different effects—namely, recovery from overshadowing (Kaufman & Bolles, 1981; Matzel, Schachtman, & Miller, 1985) and backward blocking (Shanks, 1985). In the first phase of recovery from overshadowing, a compound stimulus is conditioned (AB+). This causes overshadowing, where the stimuli of the compound each receive less associative strength than they would have had they been conditioned alone. In the second phase, only one stimulus from the original compound is presented, and it is not reinforced (A−), extinguishing that stimulus’s associative strength. Recovery from overshadowing is the finding that responding to B, the absent stimulus, is increased relative to a control group (e.g., that receiving C− in the second phase). In backward blocking, the first phase also involves conditioning a compound stimulus (AB+). In the second phase, however, one element is presented and reinforced (A+). Backward blocking is the finding that responding to stimulus B decreases below the level in a relevant control group. The phenomenon gets its name because it is the reverse of the standard blocking procedure (phase 1, A+; phase 2, AB+). Research in the years that followed these reports turned up several other forms of retrospective revaluation—namely, backward conditioned inhibition (Chapman, 1991; Urcelay, Perelmuter, & Miller, 2008), recovery from forward blocking (Blaisdell, Gunther, & Miller, 1999), recovery from conditioned inhibition (Lysle & Fowler, 1985), and others. Retrospective revaluation phenomena have not always been found when tested for, however (e.g., Dopson, Pearce, & Haselgrove, 2009; Shevill, & Hall, 2004).
The associative models in the early days of retrospective revaluation findings were unable to account for these phenomena. For example, the Rescorla–Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) predicts that no change to the absent stimulus will occur during the second phase. The Rescorla–Wagner model is defined as
where V i is the associative strength of stimulus i and parameters α i and β (both range between 0 and 1) are learning rates related to the salience of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US), respectively. The parameter λ represents the total associative strength supportable by the US (a positive value when present and 0 when absent), and ΣV = Σ j V j is the sum of the associative strengths of all stimuli present on a trial. The associative strength of a CS is updated after each trial in proportion to the surprisingness of the US (λ − ΣV) and the learning rate parameters associated with the CS and US. In recovery from overshadowing, if A and B have equal salience, an AB+ phase leaves each stimulus with half of the total associative strength. In phase 2, an A− treatment extinguishes stimulus A’s associative strength but does not affect the associative strength of stimulus B, because its absence gives it a salience, α B , of zero. Likewise, Wagner’s standard operating procedures (SOP) model (Wagner, 1981) could not account for the phenomena. In SOP, associative elements representing each stimulus can be either in the inactive state or in one of two active states (A1 or A2, corresponding to being in focal attention or peripheral attention, respectively). Whenever a stimulus is presented, some of its elements are moved from the inactive state to A1. Over time, these elements’ activity decays, moving from the A1 state into A2 and, eventually, into the inactive state. When a stimulus is presented, elements of its past associates enter A2, and again decay back to the inactive state. Associations between stimuli occur depending on the states in which their elements reside. If the elements of two stimuli are in the A1 state, the strength of their association is increased. If the elements of one stimulus are in the A1 state and the elements of another stimulus are in the A2 state, an inhibitory association from the first stimulus to the second stimulus is formed, but not vice versa. In the first phase of recovery from overshadowing, the elements of stimulus A and B are associated with those of the US and of one another. In the second phase, stimulus A is presented alone, causing its elements to enter A1 and activating elements of its associates B and the US into A2, thereby reducing its association with them. Stimulus B’s association with the US remains unchanged, since no associations are formed between two stimuli concurrently present in the A2 state.
In response to retrospective revaluation phenomena, the Rescorla–Wagner model and SOP were retrofitted to explain them (Aitken & Dickinson, 2005; Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994). Both models make use of within-compound associations presumably developed in the first phase to associatively retrieve the absent stimulus. Then each model uses a mechanism to revalue the absent stimulus. In the case of Dickinson and Burke’s extension of SOP, two associative learning rules are added. The first is that when the elements of two stimuli are in the A2 state, excitatory connections form between them. Also, when one stimulus is in the A1 state and another is in the A2 state, inhibitory associations between the stimuli are formed in both directions (e.g., A→B and B→A), instead of only one, as before. Now, when A is presented without the US in the second phase (i.e., recovery from overshadowing), the representations of both B and the US are in A2, satisfying the condition for formation of an excitatory association between them. Thus, during test, responding to stimulus B increases. If, instead, A is presented and reinforced in the second phase (i.e., backward blocking), the representations of A and the US will enter into the A1 state, while the representation of stimulus B, their associate, will be called into the A2 state. B in A2 and the US in A1 result in the formation of an inhibitory association between B and the US, thus reducing its associative strength. So the associative strength of B and the response to it in a test phase are greater in the recovery from overshadowing design than in backward blocking. In the case of the Van Hamme and Wasserman extension of the Rescorla–Wagner model, the absent stimulus is retrieved and given a negative alpha value. This leads to revaluation of the absent stimulus in the opposite direction as the presented stimulus. The Van Hamme and Wasserman model was recently elaborated upon by Witnauer and Miller (2011). Their model further develops the use of within-compound associations to enable it to account for second-order retrospective revaluation phenomena, which we will discuss later. Within-compound associations are also featured in other associative models of retrospective revaluation (e.g., Jamieson, Crump, & Hannah, 2012; Kasprow, Schachtman, & Miller, 1987; Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012). For example, in the comparator hypothesis (Kasprow et al., 1987; Miller & Matzel, 1988; Stout & Miller, 2007), the within-compound associations become important during the test phase. The presence of a stimulus at test evokes previously paired stimuli through within-compound associations. The presented stimulus’s response-evoking power becomes the associative strength of the presented stimulus B minus a fraction of the product of A’s associative strength and the strength of the A→B within-compound association. In recovery from overshadowing, subsequent extinction of cue A makes the product of the B→A association and A→US association smaller than in a control group, thereby increasing the response-evoking power of cue B at test.
A few models have taken a different approach, explaining retrospective revaluation phenomena apart from within-compound associations. The APECS model (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001; McLaren, 1993, 2011) explains these phenomena using configural units that represent memories of compound trials. A few elemental associative models (Dawson, 2008; Ghirlanda, 2005) also explain the phenomena apart from within-compound associations. Yet the models of Ghirlanda and Dawson bear a key flaw. As we will show, substantial revaluation in these models can occur without an associative history between the elements, an apparent failure to match the experimental data (e.g., Matzel et al., 1985) and the present general understanding of these phenomena. The present work pushes forward this enterprise by overcoming this particular issue. Since stimulus input excites activity in individual neurons of our model, the neurons begin to compete by inhibiting one another through lateral connections until only a subset (or ensemble) of neurons remains active. The activities of these neurons collectively express or represent the associative strength for the stimulus input. After a compound is conditioned, the constituent stimuli presented separately tend to activate a significantly similar ensemble of neurons. So, when one of the stimuli is subsequently conditioned/extinguished, learning in their common competitive lateral inhibitory connections is increased/decreased, which has the effect of oppositely revaluing the absent constituent. Without the compound conditioning phase, however, stimuli would activate largely separate ensembles of neurons (and lateral connections) and, thus, would not significantly affect one another during a revaluation.
Background
The models of Dawson (2008) and Ghirlanda (2005) represent simple elemental models of retrospective revaluation phenomena. Dawson offers a model similar to the Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) extension but gives negative α values to all absent stimuli. Ghirlanda took a different approach, which we will now discuss in some depth. This model represents stimuli in a distributed format, instead of the usual one-to-one stimulus-input arrangement. Each stimulus in this model is described as a compound of many stimulus elements (ministimuli). For a feature such as color, we could model 100 stimulus elements spanning the visible color spectrum, each element representing a different wavelength. Here, Ghirlanda represents each punctate stimulus (e.g., stimulus A) as a Gaussian pattern of stimulus elements, as shown in Fig. 1. Formally, the input provided to Ghirlanda’s model is
where S i represents the ith stimulus element’s input salience, α j is the salience of the jth stimulus (analogous to the Rescorla–Wagner model’s α term), and N represents the number of stimulus elements. Each stimulus’s Gaussian pattern of stimulus elements is centered about a specific feature value (e.g., wavelength) between 0 and 1 (μ j ) and has a certain width (σ). In simulations of Ghirlanda’s model and our proposed model, we use 100 stimulus elements spanning between feature values of 0 and 1 and use \( \sigma ={\scriptscriptstyle \frac{1}{10\sqrt{2}}} \) to fit several Gaussian-shaped stimuli into this range. The environmental context’s representation does not have a Gaussian shape. Instead, it is represented as a flat function, such that all 100 stimulus elements have the same value, K = 0.2. In a simulated trial, the input provided to Ghirlanda’s model (S i ) is the sum of the Gaussian patterns for each presented stimulus and the flat background context. The Gaussian shaped stimuli L, T, and C that we use in our simulations are shown in Fig. 1, as well as an example input LTC compound, which incorporates the context (X).
Learning proceeds after each trial as in the Rescorla–Wagner model, except that each stimulus element has an associative strength that is updated, instead of associative strengths for punctate CSs,
where W i represents the ith distributed stimulus element’s associative strength and r s computes the total associative strength for all stimuli including the context on a given trial. For simple Pavlovian conditioning (i.e., AX+, X−, where X− represents the extinction of the context during the intertrial interval), the AX+ trials pull the W i values upward toward r AX = 1, while the X− trials pull W i values downward toward r X = 0. At the end of this tug-of-war, W i values are found that satisfy both pulls, and thus asymptotes are reached. The resulting associative strengths can be pictured as a Gaussian curve shifted downward (negatively) by an amount similar to the context value, K.
One of the earliest investigations of recovery from overshadowing was reported by Matzel et al. (1985). In Experiment 3, they paired a light and a tone in the first phase, followed by reinforcement (TL+). They also reinforced separate presentations of a click stimulus (C+). In the second phase, they separated subjects into three groups: Group ET received nonreinforced presentations of the tone, Group EC received nonreinforced presentations of the click stimulus, and Group O was placed in conditioning chambers (as was done for the other groups), but no additional stimulus presentations were made. In the third phase, testing was performed. Results from their experiment and results from a simulation of this procedure using Ghirlanda’s (2005) model are shown in Fig. 2. The first phase of simulation (TLX+, CX+, X−) leads to a set of W i values that could be depicted as three negatively shifted Gaussians (r T = 0.50, r L = 0.50, r C = 1.0). In the second phase, the extinction of the tone (r T = 0.0) in Group ET inflates responding to the light (r L = 0.61), which corresponds to the ordinal findings in Matzel et al. However, when we examine Group EC, where the separately conditioned click stimulus is extinguished, we find that responding to the light stimulus has also been inflated (r L = 0.71), which is at variance with the experimental data in Fig. 2. The extinction of the tone stimulus in Group ET also inflated responding to the click stimulus above Group O, the control (Group ET, r C = 1.11; Group O, r C = 1.0) and extinction of the click stimulus in Group EC also inflated the tone above Group O (Group EC, r T = 0.71; Group O, r T = 0.50). These two revaluations also disagree with the experimental findings. In summary, these simulations show that retrospective revaluation in Ghirlanda’s model does not require a history of compound conditioning. Instead, it predicts that the revaluing of a conditioned stimulus will substantially affect the associative strength of even separately conditioned stimuli. Dawson’s (2008) model makes the same prediction, apparently employing a negative α for all absent stimuli. These simple associative models disagree not only with the findings of Matzel et al. and others (Cole, Barnet, & Miller, 1995; Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1992), but also with the current general understanding of these phenomena (but see Amundson, Escobar, & Miller, 2003; Escobar, Pineño, & Matute, 2002). In practical terms, if conditioning a stimulus could substantially alter the responses to unrelated stimuli, such interference could accumulate and confuse an organism about what each stimulus actually predicts.
Instead of simulating the experiment by Matzel et al. (1985), we could also have shown Ghirlanda’s (2005) model in a within-subjects design retrospective revaluation paradigm, with AB+ and CD+ in the first phase and A+ and C− in the second phase. This combination of recovery from overshadowing and backward-blocking designs demonstrates retrospective revaluation when response to B in the test phase is smaller than the response to D (Chapman, 1991; Shanks, 1985). Since Ghirlanda’s model revalues stimuli that have not been previously associated with one another, the conditioning of A affects stimuli C and D as much as it does stimulus B, and the extinction of C similarly affects A and B. Because the conditioning of A and extinction of C both pull on B and D, but in opposite directions, we will find a near zero change in the values of B and D relative to their pre-second-phase values, which is not the retrospective revaluation result commonly reported for this paradigm. Although interesting, the problematic mechanisms that bring about a near zero change in this paradigm are readily understood from our simulation of recovery from overshadowing. Therefore, we do not pursue a within-subjects design in later comparisons.
As we will show, the present model overcomes the problems described above and yet, like the simple associative models, does not rely upon within-compound associations. In what follows, we will describe the present model and then look at the contributions of each of its mechanisms by enabling them one at a time while simulating several classical conditioning phenomena. Ultimately, we will arrive at an explanation for retrospective revaluation phenomena.
The present model
Here, we show how associative strength is computed and updated in our neural network model, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Where possible, we attempt to maintain biological plausibility and will briefly mention where this motivation influences certain design decisions. Possible neurobiological correspondences reflecting specific structural and learning rule details are discussed in a later section.
We represent a stimulus in the same Gaussian form as in Ghirlanda’s (2005) model. Unlike the Ghirlanda model, however, the present model does not use a flat function to represent the context. Instead, the context is expressed by its own Gaussian-shaped curve, to represent that an environmental context is really a collection of stimuli itself. This approach also allows the possibility of having different contexts, if so desired. Given a certain distributed CS as input, the model responds with activity in its neurons, which equals the excitatory input minus the lateral competition. Upon stimulus presentation, each neuron is allowed to settle into an internal activity (u j ) according to
where τ = 10, N = 100 is the number of stimulus elements, and M = 2,500 is the number of neurons in the model. We use a large number of model neurons because it improves the consistency of the simulation results. The distributed stimulus elements, S i , are connected to each neuron with a certain connection probability (P I = .25). Subsequent equations appear to invoke full connectivity. However, an absent connection is represented as an immutable connection weight of zero, which helps to simplify both the formal description and implementation of the model. This partial connectivity allows certain neurons to prefer activating in response to one stimulus or another and agrees with the reality that neural projections are not fully connected. The synaptic weights receiving stimulus input, w I ij , are initialized with a value of 20 for each connection made. Note that the indices i and j represent specific stimulus elements and specific model neurons respectively. So, instead of having a single weight per stimulus element, as in the Ghirlanda model, there is a single weight per stimulus element for each neuron in the model. Each neuron also has lateral synaptic weights, which receive inhibitory inputs from competing neurons. The lateral weight w L kj is located on neuron j and receives input from competing neuron k. These weights are also initialized to 20 for connections made, and recurrent connections are permitted; the connection probability is P L = .25. The term r(u k ) is an activation function transforming the internal activation into a mean neuron firing rate,
where L(u k ) = 0 when u k < 0 and otherwise L(u k ) = u k p. L(u k ) is a threshold-linear function (Usher & McClelland, 2001), which here reflects that neurons become silent when their internal activation goes below zero (analogous to real neurons). The outputs of these model neurons converge as a sum of the neuron firing rates, r(u j ), with half of the neurons increasing the output and the other half decreasing it:
where the sgn() function returns the sign of its argument and λ S is a factor that translates the output from a sum of activities into units of associative strength (λ S = 2,500). The function T( j) is + 1 for half of the neurons (hereafter called positive neurons) and −1 for the other half (negative neurons) based on their index, j. The final sum represents the combined associative strength of the input stimuli, or the expected associative strength (ΣV), the analogue to r s in Equation 4 from Ghirlanda’s model. This approach permits both positive and negative associative strengths by using a population of positively contributing and negatively contributing neurons. For a positive associative strength, the positive neurons are (on average) more active than the negative neurons. Negative associative strengths are expressed by the opposite difference of activity. The segregation of neurons into these two groups allows all input connection weights to be consistently positive, which is more plausible biologically speaking. There are few instances where a real neural connection can switch from having a positive to a negative influence. Also, as we will see, having two segregated groups of neurons contributes to generating a novel configural mechanism from elemental inputs.
Importantly, the ensemble of neurons that wins the competition and remains active is determined by the stimulus input provided. Because it is the activities of model neurons that ultimately combine to express associative strength, the active neural ensembles come to represent the associative strengths of the stimuli that evoke them. The learning rules cooperate by only updating the active ensemble neurons and only for nonzero stimulus elements (i.e., present stimuli). The learning rule used to update the input weights of each neuron is
Note that updates to a neuron are proportional to its internal activation when it is above zero only (i.e., L(u j )) and thus is part of the ensemble of active neurons. Also note that weights associated with distributed stimulus elements that have zero salience will also not change. This ensures that input weights are updated only for presented stimuli. The learning rule for the lateral weights, which receive inputs from other neurons, is
where H() is the Heaviside or unit step function (1 when the argument is greater than zero and 0 otherwise), which means that learning will occur only if the sending neuron, indexed as k, is active. The parameter ρ in Equation 10 is the learning rate parameter for lateral weights (ρ = 0.5β). In this model, an individual neuron’s weights, w I ij and w L jk , are always positive. This keeps the stimulus input influence excitatory and the lateral influence inhibitory in Equation 5. Weight changes must have opposite signs for the positive and negative neurons, so that these opposing pathways learn cooperatively. The function T(j) defined in Equation 8 achieves this. Equation 9 is essentially a Hebbian learning rule (from its pre- and postsynaptic activity terms) modulated by the US surprisingness error term.
Classical conditioning simulations
The present model is readily integrated into trial-based simulations of classical conditioning experiments. A single trial consists of presenting stimuli, presenting the outcome (US or no US), computing the surprisingness, and adjusting synaptic weights according to the learning rules. Although we simulate phenomena that develop CS–US associations, the model does not explicitly exclude the notion of developing CS–CS associations, although these do not occur in the present simulations. The present model, like many others, does not define any CS–US timing, thereby excluding certain temporal phenomena (e.g., serial feature-positive discrimination) from its scope. Experimental findings and model predictions are ordinal in nature, so the usual assumption that associative strength is monotonically translated into conditioned responding is made here.
Salience levels play a role in our simulations. The US (β = .1) has a value of λ = 100 when the US is present and λ = 0 when it is absent. Conditioned stimuli have a salience of α = 1, while the context (X) has a salience of α = .2. Each intertrial interval is simulated like a single conditioning trial, where the context is presented but not reinforced (X−), just as in simulations of Ghirlanda’s (2005) model. Associative strength accrued to the context is partly extinguished during these intertrial intervals. Parameters of the model used in simulations have been specified in the preceding section. A similar version of the present model was described in Connor and Trappenberg (2011) and shows how performance of the model varies within appropriate ranges for selected parameters.
An example of how conditioning proceeds in this network is shown in Fig. 4. In excitatory conditioning (CS→US) trials, the synaptic weights of active positive neurons are increased, while the synaptic weights of active negative neurons are decreased. This results in increased activity in the positive neurons and decreased activity in the negative neurons for subsequent trials. The difference between the activity in these two pathways gives a final positive associative strength. As conditioning trials continue, the associative strength will grow until it matches that supportable by the US. More and more neurons are also silenced through lateral inhibition as an ensemble of neurons increasingly dominates. During extinction, the opposite process happens, cutting down positive neuron activity and restoring negative neuron activity. Also, the active ensemble will grow to include more neurons once again. In short, increases and decreases in associative strength track increases and decreases of synaptic weights in the positive neurons, and the opposite relationship exists between associative strength and the synaptic weights of negative neurons.
In the following sections, we use additional classical conditioning simulations to show how certain model mechanisms affect model behavior. Beyond the acquisition example in Fig. 4, we do not revisit demonstrations of the mechanisms borrowed from the Rescorla–Wagner model but, rather, focus on the unique mechanisms of the present model. Building upward, we first show how the combination of the activity-dependent learning term L(u j ) and having dual pathways (i.e., positive and negative neurons) develops configural representations from individual stimuli. Then we demonstrate how adding lateral inhibition sculpts ensembles of active neurons and, finally, how learning in these lateral connections enables retrospective revaluation effects.
Activity-proportional learning and dual pathways perform configuration
Recall that there are positive and negative neurons in the model whose influences sum to provide the overall associative strength. Changes to the weights of these neurons are made in proportion to their internal activation, L(u j ) (Equations 9 and 10). The combination of these two mechanisms leads to the development of configural cues. To demonstrate this, we simulate the negative patterning procedure, which in a single phase interleaves trials of AB− with A+ and B+ trials. The ordinal finding is that responding to the compound AB during a subsequent test is less than responding to either A or B alone (Delamater, Sosa, & Katz, 1999; Harris, Gharaei, & Moore, 2009; Redhead & Pearce, 1995; Woodbury, 1943). To demonstrate the combined efforts of the two mechanisms, Fig. 5 shows simulated negative patterning results for our model with and without each of them. In addition, results when lateral inhibition and lateral learning are enabled are also given to show that these additional mechanisms do not interfere. Note that to disable the dual-pathway nature of the model, we eliminate excitatory input to the negative neurons to silence them. To disable activity-proportional learning, we simulate without the last term in Equations 9 and 10. Disabling lateral inhibition is accomplished by fixing all lateral weights to zero and disabling lateral learning is done by setting ρ = 0.
As Fig. 5 shows, when either the dual-pathway or activity-proportional learning mechanisms work alone, negative patterning fails. When both mechanisms are engaged, however, the phenomenon emerges. The way in which the model accomplishes this can be seen from the input weights. Figure 6 shows that when activity-proportional learning and both pathways are enabled, positive neuron weights specialize for either stimulus A or B, while negative neuron weights grow similarly for each stimulus. When only a single stimulus (A or B) is present, the specializing positive neurons activate strongly, whereas the unspecialized negative neurons activate little. The sum of large positive neuron activations minus small negative neuron activations results in asymptotic (λ) conditioned responding. Now, recall that the activation function is r(u j ) = L(u j )2, which means that doubling the stimulus input (which doubles u j ) will quadruple a neuron’s output. So, when both stimuli are present (AB), the negative neurons’ activations are increased exponentially, which enables them to balance out the positive neuron activations, resulting in zero conditioned responding. The weights develop as follows. Initial stages of training show that for positive neurons that are activated more strongly for a certain stimulus (e.g., A), the input weights increase more on A trials than they decrease on AB− trials. Conversely, weights receiving connections from the stimulus for which a positive neuron’s activation is weaker (e.g., B) will have a net decrease because their reinforced trial increases the weights less than does the decrease occurring from AB− trials. Negative neuron weights decrease in early stages because the reinforced trials have a larger positive error term (which decreases negative neuron weights) than the negative error term on AB− trials. As associative strength increases to the individual stimuli, however, this situation reverses, and negative neuron weights begin to grow more on the AB− trials and do so roughly evenly for A and B.
Although not the focus of the present article, this approach to developing configural cues is quite novel. Its elemental basis puts it in the same realm as Harris’s elemental model (Harris, 2006) and the replaced elements theory (Brandon & Wagner, 1998; Wagner, 2003; Wagner & Brandon, 2001). In such models, each stimulus is represented by a set of elements. Elements that are active (or within an attentional buffer) during conditioning receive larger changes in associative strength than do the others. Certain elements for each stimulus are allowed to become activated depending on whether the stimulus is presented alone or in compound. Therefore, in the negative patterning procedure, some stimulus elements are primarily conditioned in the single-stimulus trials, but not the compound trials, and vice versa. This allows some elements to encode the single-stimulus associative strength and others to help represent an opposite compound associative strength. The present model departs radically from this idea, not needing to deactivate stimulus elements but, instead, deriving its configural ability from its dual pathways and activity-proportional learning in the context of a squared activation function. Additional work is needed to evaluate this approach by simulating other experimental paradigms and drawing thorough comparisons with the other configural models on the market. For the present work, however, we have focused on the model’s ability to explain retrospective revaluation phenomena, which is supported by lateral inhibitory connections and the learning therein, to which we now turn.
Adding lateral inhibition
Figure 7 shows the neuron response following negative patterning for a model with only 200 neurons for illustration purposes, where both panels show models that have activity-proportional learning and both pathways are enabled. In the top panel, lateral inhibition is disabled, and in the bottom panel, it is enabled (without learning, ρ = 0). Although the difference in associative strength between the two conditions will be small (see, e.g., the comparison in Fig. 5), the neural activity takes a new form. Without lateral inhibition, all neurons are active for every input. When lateral inhibition is enabled, a unique ensemble of active neurons takes shape in response to the presentation of each stimulus or compound. On the surface, it may seem that this mechanism is very similar to the replaced elements mechanism of models, noted above, that perform configuration. Although lateral inhibition may technically be able to behave in this way, it is ancillary in our simulations. In fact, lateral inhibition does not appear to explain any additional phenomena in this context, besides taking part in helping lateral learning explain retrospective revaluation phenomena, which will be discussed later. A potential benefit, however, is that because it uses fewer neurons to represent the same information, the overall capacity of the system to learn further stimulus–outcome relationships should increase.
With lateral inhibition enabled, unique active ensembles emerge for specific input stimuli, such that when the input stimuli change, so will the active ensemble to some degree. Roughly speaking, the weights of the neurons in the ensemble match the distributed stimulus input profile more closely than do the weights of neurons that are silenced. Thus, the similarity between two ensembles depends on the similarity of the two stimuli and is reduced as stimuli become dissimilar. This is shown in Fig. 8, where the ensemble similarity between a previously conditioned stimulus having a specific feature value (e.g., green light) and all feature values (i.e., green, red, blue, yellow, etc.) is computed, both for when lateral inhibition is disabled and for when it is enabled (but no lateral learning). Although there is no difference in associative strength with and without lateral inhibition (upper panel), the similarity between the neural activations of vastly different features (e.g., 0.5 vs. 0.2 or 0.5 vs. 0.9) is smaller with lateral inhibition (lower panel). Without lateral inhibition, there will be a greater similarity between the neural activations of different features, because every neuron is active for every feature.
Until now, we have discussed similarity between two distinct stimuli. Consider a related case in which one stimulus is joined by a second stimulus to make a compound. Because there is substantial similarity between the compound and its constituents, the activation of neurons by the compound will be more similar to the activation evoked by one of its constituents than to the activation evoked by an unrelated stimulus.
Adding lateral learning
Simulations of recovery from overshadowing using the present model are shown in Fig. 9, following Matzel et al. (1985) and the simulations of Ghirlanda’s (2005) model described earlier. In particular, these simulations show (1) that recovery occurs only when lateral learning is enabled and (2) that revaluing a conditioned stimulus significantly affects only the associative strengths of stimuli with which it was previously paired, and not unrelated stimuli.
To understand how lateral learning accomplishes all of this, we will focus on two positive neurons and explain how recovery from overshadowing can occur, as shown in Fig. 10. Negative neurons do not play a major role in this phenomenon but may take a more significant role in other retrospective revaluation phenomena (e.g., recovery from conditioned inhibition by extinction of the excitor). Excitatory conditioning of a compound (phase 1) increases the input weights of its active neurons. Because ρ > 0, the lateral inhibitory connections between the active neurons grow as well. In phase 2, only one of the constituents (A) is presented. Because of its history of activating the ensemble associated with the compound (AB), there is a substantial degree of similarity between the ensembles activated by AB and A, and thus these same two positive neurons are activated again. When the presentation of A is followed by no reinforcement, these active neurons’ A-specific input weights and their lateral weights are decreased. In phase 3, when the absent stimulus (B) is tested, we detect a change. Although the B-specific input weights did not change (because there was no input from stimulus B in phase 2), its active ensemble’s lateral inhibitory weights are smaller. As a result, there is less inhibition, which increases these positive neurons’ overall activities and, thereby, increases the associative strength of B. Intuitively speaking, excitatory conditioning of a compound ties its constituents together in terms of causing them to activate similar ensembles of neurons in future trials. Then interactions occur between these stimuli through lateral learning in their shared connections. The result is that extinguishing one increases the associative strength of the other (i.e., recovery from overshadowing), and increasing one’s associative strength will decrease the other’s (i.e., backward blocking). In this way, the shared lateral connections play a similar role as the within-compound associations found in other models but do not retrieve explicit stimuli per se. Without the compound conditioning step, as is the case for unrelated stimuli, there would be fewer shared neurons (and thus, lateral connections) in the ensembles of the individual stimuli. As a result, there would be far less change in the lateral inhibition for an absent stimulus were an unrelated stimulus presented and revalued.
Second-order retrospective revaluation and relation to other models
In recent years, theorists have focused on the phenomena of second-order retrospective revaluation. The second-order retrospective revaluation procedure involves conditioning, in successive phases, two compounds that share a common element (i.e., phase 1, AX+; phase 2, XB+) and, in a third phase, revaluing one of the nonshared stimuli (A).
Houwer and Beckers (2002) ran three experiments, using a weapons/tanks procedure. In the first experiment they did the following: phase 1: CT1+, phase 2: T1T2+, and phase 3: either C+ or C− between groups. Group C+ had a much higher rating of C, a lower rating of T1, and a higher rating of T2. The next experiment looked at third-order retrospective revaluation: phase 1: CT1+, phase 2: T1T2+, phase 3: T2T3+, and phase 4: C+ or C− between groups. Group C+ had higher ratings for C and T2 than Group C− did, but lower ratings for T1 and T3. All the effects were substantial. The next experiment looked at second-order retrospective revaluation in a within-subjects design—essentially, phase 1: C1T1+, C2T3+, phase 2: T1T2+, T3T4+, and phase 3: C1+, C2−. Ratings of C1 were higher than those of C2, and T3 was rated higher than T1 (first-order retrospective revaluation). There was also a big second-order retrospective revaluation effect: T2 was higher than T4. Melchers, Lachnit, and Shanks (2004) obtained results similar to those of Houwer and Beckers in a within-subjects experiment within the foods/allergies setting. Their Experiment 3 looked at second-order retrospective revaluation (e.g., phase 1: AB+, BC+, phase 2: C+ vs. phase 1: DE+, EF+, phase 2: F−) and its direct analogue (e.g., where the element trials came before the compound trials). First-order retrospective revaluation occurred (e.g., B < E), and second-order retrospective revaluation was in the opposite direction (e.g., A > D). Denniston et al. (2001), using rats, employed a between-groups paradigm: phase 1: CA+, phase 2: BA+, then either C− or nothing. The conditioned response to B was lower in the C− group than in the controls. This finding is consistent with Houwer and Beckers and with Melchers, Lachnit, and Shanks (2004).
McLaren, Forrest, and McLaren (2012) reported an experiment on retrospective revaluation using the foods/allergies setting. First- and second-order retrospective revaluations were assessed in a within-groups design: phase 1: BC+, DE+, phase 2: AB+, EF+, and phase 3: A+, F−. Ratings of B and C both declined, relative to D and E, and the first-order effect was about as big as the second-order effect. Their second-order result is the opposite of the findings described above. McLaren et al. reported that if they instead provided all the data at once on handouts, which they interpreted as entailing a low memory load, then they got a different result; ratings of B and C moved in opposite directions after A+, and ratings of D and E moved in opposite directions after F−. They further suggested that the findings of Melchers et al., which were opposite to their own, were the result of a relatively low memory load. This hypothesis needs to be tested in an experiment that varies memory load.
So, we have a data conflict, but what do the models predict? McLaren et al. (2012) said that their participants who received all the data on handouts reported using rational inference to derive their conclusions, so that after phase 1: BC+, phase 2: AB+, and phase 3: A+, they reasoned that if food A was responsible for the allergy, then food B must not have been, and if food B was not responsible, then food C was responsible.
Witnauer and Miller (2011) compared the second-order retrospective revaluation predictions that are made by the Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) extension of the Rescorla–Wagner (1972) model with their own extension that involved more development of the role of within-compound associations. The Van Hamme and Wasserman extension modeled retrospective revaluation by updating an absent stimulus’s associative strength with a negative learning rate, whenever a stimulus was presented with which it had a within-compound association. Witnauer and Miller’s extension additionally multiplied this by the sum of within-compound associations between each of the present stimuli on a trial and the absent stimulus. Witnauer and Miller show that while both models demonstrate first-order retrospective revaluation effects, only their extension demonstrates the most commonly observed second-order retrospective revaluation effects, in which the first- and second-order associates move in opposite directions. It appears that the critical difference is that Witnauer and Miller’s enhanced within-compound model encodes the sign of the within-compound associations (i.e., the inhibitory association between the nonshared elements of the two compounds), whereas the Van Hamme and Wasserman extension does not. Witnauer and Miller noted that Stout and Miller’s (2007) SOCR model also predicts the second-order (and higher-order) effects and that Dickinson and Burke’s (1996) modification of SOP does not. They concluded that all models that can explain the most commonly observed higher-order retrospective revaluation effects use within-compound associations.
In a second-order retrospective revaluation experiment with phase 1: AB+, phase 2: BC+, phase 3: A−, the present model predicts a different result than would be made by within-compound models. Because of lateral learning, recovery from overshadowing will occur to the shared element (i.e., B’s associative strength will increase), but the model also predicts that the other, nonshared element (C) will also elicit more responding, when tested. The reason for this is that when BC is conditioned, it will gravitate toward using a relatively similar ensemble of neurons as the previously conditioned AB. As a result, as A is extinguished, C’s somewhat similar ensemble will have its lateral inhibition lowered as well. This leads to greater positive neuron activity upon presentation of C and, thus, greater associative strength.
If retrieval by within-compound association is the mechanism by which retrospective revaluation occurs, we would expect that large within-compound associations should lead to greater retrospective revaluation than weak within-compound associations. Consider the following procedure: phase 1: AX+, phase 2: AX-−, phase 3: AY+, BX+, phase 4: A−, phase 5: X−, Y− (test). After the first two phases, the within-compound associations between A and X should be relatively large, despite the fact that responding to AX after the second phase should have returned to near initial conditions (i.e., low responding). In the third phase, A and X are separated but conditioned in compound with Y and B, respectively. Given that the AX within-compound association is stronger than the AY within-compound association after phase 3, then within-compound models predict that stimulus X should be revalued more than stimulus Y. The present model makes the opposite prediction, that Y will be revalued more than X. The first phase develops a neural ensemble for AX, but the second phase extinguishes this, essentially restoring the network to initial conditions. The third and fourth phases are then seen as a simple recovery from overshadowing paradigm, where Y is revalued more than X. Rational inference makes the same prediction as the present model because, at the end of phase 2, the inference would be that neither A nor X predicts the US. In this way, the third and fourth phases become a simple recovery from overshadowing paradigm.
The present model differs from other models of retrospective revaluation that do not employ within-compound associations. Although it revalues an absent stimulus according to associative mechanisms, it does so only when the stimulus presented in the second phase was previously paired with the absent stimulus to be revalued (i.e., unlike Ghirlanda, 2005, and Dawson, 2008). The present model also does not make use of memory retrieval, although this is another route apart from within-compound associations to explain the phenomena. For example, the APECS model (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001; McLaren, 1993, 2011) takes this approach. It is a connectionist style approach that recruits a new hidden layer neuron for each unique trial it experiences (e.g., separate nodes for A+, A−, and AX+). Although a detailed description of the model is not feasible here, the bias of a node representing a compound behaves in much the same way as our lateral inhibition mechanism. In recovery from overshadowing, the first phase establishes a compound node (“AB+”) and associates it with the US. During the intertrial intervals of this phase, the “bias” weight for this node is made negative, to offset the increased prediction made by the node when the inputs are absent. In the second phase, a new node is established (“A−”), and during the intertrial intervals of this phase, the “AB+” node’s bias is increased. This increases the “retrievability” of node “AB+,” which then leads to an increased response upon presentation of stimulus B (i.e., recovery from overshadowing). The bias of the APECS model functions like the lateral inhibition of the present model, except that it has the opposite sign: In our model, during extinction of stimulus A in the second phase, lateral inhibition is decreased, making the positive neuron response to B larger. In both models, the second phase does not change the input weights associated specifically with the absent (B) stimulus but, rather, the lateral weights for the present model and the bias for APECS.
Having two opposing pathways to compute associative strength is also a feature of the comparator hypothesis (Kasprow et al., 1987; Miller & Matzel, 1988). However, the comparator hypothesis uses the second pathway to evoke CS–CS associations and compare the associative strengths of different stimuli, while the present model simply uses the second pathway to help represent negative associative strengths. The dual-pathway structure also bears resemblance to the division of CS–US and CS–no-US associations discussed in Le Pelley (2004). A model of spontaneous recovery from extinction by Pan, Schmidt, Wickens, and Hyland (2008) uses positive and negative weights, which are changed in opposite directions and are summed to produce a measure of responding.
Application to other retrospective revaluation findings
In Fig. 11, we show that the present model can also explain the backward-blocking effect (Denniston, Miller, & Matute, 1996; Shanks, 1985; Wasserman & Berglan, 1998). Using the backward-blocking procedure in Shanks along with an additional control group (see Fig. 11 for details), we correctly simulate the effect (p < .001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, for 15 different model initializations or stat rats) with the present model. In the figure, it appears that without lateral learning, the procedure increases, rather than decreases, responding to the blocked stimulus relative to a control group (BX). However, this is simply due to greater extinction of the context in the control group, which is overwhelmed when lateral learning is enabled.
Backward conditioned inhibition (Chapman, 1991; Urcelay et al., 2008) refers to the paradigm in which a nonreinforced compound is presented in the first phase (AX−) followed by a phase where one element is reinforced (A+). The result is that the other element becomes inhibitory relative to a control group. An experiment by Espinet, Iraola, Bennett, and Mackintosh (1995) preexposed compounds AX and BX (AX−, BX−). In the second phase, conditioning to one of the nonshared constituents was conducted (A+). The result of these manipulations was that stimulus B’s association with illness either was weakened or became inhibitory. This is called the Espinet effect. Formally, the Espinet paradigm is the second-order analogue of the backward conditioned inhibition paradigm. The present model does not explain these effects. For the same reasons as in the Rescorla–Wagner model, preexposure has no effect on subsequent conditioning phases. As a result, no sharing of neural representations occurs, unlike compound conditioning when a US is presented. If the present model were extended to develop similar neural representations during a preexposure phase (as occurs in a conditioning phase), then the model might also come to explain these two effects.
Reminder-induced recovery from overshadowing (Kraemer, Lariviere, & Spear, 1988) is the finding that presentation of the overshadowed stimulus somewhere between the conditioning sessions and test sessions (the day following conditioning and 2 days prior to test in Kraemer et al., 1988) enhances responding to an overshadowed stimulus. Corresponding reminder-induced recovery has also been discovered in the blocking (Schachtman, Gee, Kasprow, & Miller, 1983), relative validity (Cole, Denniston, & Miller, 1996), and latent inhibition (Kasprow, Catterson, Schachtman, & Miller, 1984) paradigms. One prominent interpretation of the reminder-induced recovery from overshadowing findings is that the overshadowed stimulus’s associative strength is not reduced by being conditioned in compound, as the notion of cue competition suggests, since later we find that responding has “recovered.” More formally, the interpretation says that overshadowing is due to a deficit in performance (e.g., memory retrieval failure in the test phase), rather than to a deficit in acquisition through cue competition in the conditioning phase. The question remains, however, as to what mental processes the reminder treatment might invoke. One remaining potential acquisition-deficit explanation (but see Schachtman et al., 1983) is that the reminder treatment strengthens a within-compound association between the overshadowed stimulus and the overshadowing stimulus. Then, when the overshadowed stimulus is later tested, the overshadowing stimulus is thereby retrieved and submitted as internal input to the associative learner, thereby generating a greater (or “recovered”) level of responding. A similar mechanism might also explain spontaneous recovery from overshadowing (Kasprow, Cacheiro, Balaz, & Miller, 1982), which has also been thought to indicate a performance deficit rather than an acquisition deficit in learning. In this phenomenon, responding to the overshadowed stimulus is greater after a retention interval. The acquisition-deficit explanation would say that time, instead of a reminder treatment, may lead to stronger within-compound associations. There is some evidence within a sensory preconditioning paradigm, however, that within-compound associations degrade, rather than strengthen, when there is a delay between conditioning and test (Pineño, Urushihara, & Miller, 2005). Additional experimental work testing the strength of within-compound associations after reminder treatments and postacquisition delays may better discriminate between the performance-deficit and acquisition-deficit explanations.
Retrospective revaluation effects are not always observed (Dopson et al., 2009; Shevill & Hall, 2004). Within-compound association-based approaches can often explain this as a failure in within-compound association-based retrieval during either conditioning or test. In the present model, retrospective revaluation phenomena are reduced when the conditioned stimuli in the initial pairing are similar—that is, when there is significant overlap between their distributed input representations. Consider when stimuli are nearly identical. This will generate strongly similar input representations such that subsequent conditioning or extinction of one will similarly affect the other, because the model treats them as essentially the same stimulus. This is the opposite of retrospective revaluation behavior and is referred to as mediated conditioning, which has been found to occur when the paired stimuli are strongly similar (Liljeholm & Balleine, 2009). Then to observe neither mediated conditioning nor retrospective revaluation in the present model, one explanation is that the stimuli making up a compound stimulus have some middle-ground degree of similarity. From our model, another possible explanation of why retrospective revaluation is sometimes not observed is that the lateral learning rate (ρ) changes dynamically. In the present model, we set ρ > 0, which supports retrospective revaluation phenomena. As is noted in Fig. 9, when ρ = 0, no retrospective revaluation occurs. Furthermore, if we set ρ < 0, the opposite of retrospective revaluation would occur (i.e., mediated conditioning) because lateral learning would change weights in the opposite direction. For example, recall the process in Fig. 10. Instead of reducing lateral weights, which increased the absent stimulus B’s associative strength, the lateral weights would be increased, which would reduce activity and associative strength when B is presented. Thus, as stimulus A is extinguished, so would be its previously partnered stimulus B.
In a recovery from overshadowing experiment, Liljeholm and Balleine (2006) found that the extinction of the more salient element of the compound revalued the less salient element more than the other way around. In the present model, the more salient stimulus takes a larger share of the associative strength due to cue competition. This means that the more salient stimulus will have more associative strength to extinguish and its lateral weights will be reduced proportionally. Thus, extinction of a salient stimulus will lead to more revaluation of the absent stimulus than will extinction of a weakly salient stimulus. In more general terms, the larger the change in a present stimulus’s associative strength, the more the absent stimulus is revalued.
The present model’s relationship to the neurobiology of the striatum
The present model, although described in an abstract way, can be readily related to features of the neurobiology of the ventral striatum and basal ganglia. The positive and negative neurons map to the striatal projection neurons belonging to the direct and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia, respectively. The input weight learning rule (Equation 9) corresponds with experimental findings regarding the effects of dopamine (λ − ∑ V) and pre- (S i ) and postsynaptic activity (L(u j )) on cortico-striatal synapses (Frank & Fossella, 2011; Reynolds & Wickens, 2002; Schulz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Shen, Flajolet, Greengard, & Surmeier, 2008). The key feature of the present model that sets it apart from related neurobiological models of the basal ganglia (Frank, 2005; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995) is its lateral inhibition and lateral learning. The projection neurons of the striatum have inhibitory (Plenz, 2003; Tunstall, Oorschot, Kean, & Wickens, 2002) lateral connections that freely contact other projection neurons, regardless of pathway (Yung, Smith, Levey, & Bolam, 1996). There is, at most, about a one-third probability of one neuron sending an inhibitory connection to another (Taverna, Illijic, & Surmeier, 2008). As a result, these lateral inhibitory connections are usually one-way (at best only one in nine connections are reciprocated in a randomly connected network). Although the lateral inhibitory connections are believed to be weak, fast spiking inhibitory interneurons provide additional inhibition (Gruber, Powell, & O’Donnell, 2009; Tepper, Wilson, & Koos, 2008). Therefore, the lateral inhibitory component of this model could roughly be viewed as representing the contributions of both types of inhibition. Neurobiology concerning the lateral learning rule, however, is less clear than evidence concerning its input weight counterpart. Long-term learning has been found to occur in the lateral synaptic connections of striatal projection neurons (Rueda-Orozco et al., 2009), although how this relates to a dopamine-based error term is not clear. In the model, the learning rule for these lateral connections is similar to that of the input connections, except that the CS intensity, I, is replaced by a term related to the activity of one of its laterally inhibiting neurons.
Conclusions
The present model provides an elemental associative explanation for key retrospective revaluation phenomena apart from within-compound associations, based on novel mechanisms that correlate to some degree with neurobiology. The present model only allows stimuli previously conditioned in compound to revalue one another, rather than permitting the conditioning of a CS to substantially revalue a separately conditioned CS. This model thus not only matches experimental data that speak to this issue, but also agrees with the natural intuition that independently conditioned stimuli should have little effect on one another when one is revalued.
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Author Note
This work was financially supported by CIHR, NSERC, the Walter C. Sumner Foundation, and Dalhousie University.
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Connor, P.C., Lolordo, V.M. & Trappenberg, T.P. An elemental model of retrospective revaluation without within-compound associations. Learn Behav 42, 22–38 (2014). https://doi.org/10.3758/s13420-013-0112-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13420-013-0112-z