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On the problem of scale: a general theory of morphogenesis and normative policy signals for economic evolution

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Abstract

The paper analyzes evolution to the end of furnishing a general theory of economic change. This analysis is applicable to both organisms and organizations. The general theory presented here is based on four analytical constructs: symmetry, scale, complexity, and collapse. Complexity is modeled as a force, similar to gravitation. Evolution is understood as a condition exhibiting an increase in morphological complexity. In the final analysis, economic change is linked to the structure of the political state. Pathologies of economic change, including morphostasis (in other words reaching a stage where growth and development are anemic due to the system’s form and structure becoming static), necessitate a rethinking of political organization. Polycentricity and the principle of subsidiarity [see generally Aligica and Tarko (Governance 25:237, 2012); Føllesdal (J Polit Philos 6(2):190, 1998)], with a praxis inspired by sovereign cities [see for example Gussen (J Philoso Econ 7(1), 2013a)], are imperative for the continuous evolution of societies, and hence economies. In this future, nation states become subsidiary. Sovereign cities replace nation states on the ‘international’ stage.

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Notes

  1. For other theories of evolution see for example Prigogine et al. (1972a, b).

  2. The model presented in this paper is neo-Lamarckian. It attempts to explain evolution without “random variation” and “natural selection”.

  3. Note that institutions in economics are understood as the “basic rules of the game”. See North (1990). In this paper, we expand the definition to include options (of rules) rather than enforced rules only.

  4. Both rules and options can be seen as part of institutions. This paper emphasizes the complex causational chain between the structure of such institutions and the localization of economic activities. On this point see also Martin (1999); Philo and Parr (2000); Martin and Sunley (2001); Wood and Valler (2001). Emphasis is on Original Institutional Economics (à la Veblen) were an institution is “a process of changing structure” rather than a “structure of changing process” as under New Institutional Economics (Potts 2007, 343).

  5. Boulding 1984, xix, xxix, and xxxi. This, therefore, provides a link to constitutional economics through the extension of this exchange regime to politics.

  6. Adopted from Brady (1996), Fig. 1. The 1927 map is based on data from Gibson (1927), while the 1997 map is based on data from the Electricity Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) (1996).

  7. Australian Energy Regulator (AER) (2014), Fig. 1.4.

  8. Data from the Australian Electricity Market Operator (AEMO).

  9. Adopted from Hayward and Graham (2012), Fig. 6.

  10. See Gussen (2013b) for the background of this model.

  11. For a general introduction to symmetry, see Rosen (2008) and Brading and Castellani (2003).

  12. Tensors include scalars and vectors but could also have higher dimensionality.

  13. Entropy attempts to achieve absolute symmetry where there is a total lack of differentiation.

  14. I use quantum in its physical sense, as the physical entity involved in the interactions defining a given system.

  15. See for example Zwicky 1969).

  16. But this does not mean that these living forms have to be carbon-based. See the discussion on the signs of life in Sect. 3.

  17. We can think of this along the lines of the first law of thermodynamics.

  18. This means that evolution progresses through ‘jerks’ rather than gradually as proposed by Darwin.

  19. Hyperjerk systems are not excluded by this formulation.

  20. Structure is taken to mean relationships rather than rules, and hence maintaining the ontological divide between structure and agency. See Porpora (2013, 26).

  21. A formal definition of scale and complexity is furnished in the next section.

  22. On the application of complexity in economics see Holt et al (2011).

  23. Through Evolutionary Institutional Economics we can interpret the emergence of structure as institutionalization. See Elsner (2010, 450).

  24. One of the prime examples of the interaction of competition and cooperation in economics is the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

  25. Compare to the discussion of structural attractors in Allen (2005).

  26. For the role of self-organization as a principle of economic evolution see Geisendorf (2009). Friedrich Hayek was one of the main economists to stress the role of self-organization. See also Heylighen (2009).

  27. See Sect. 3. See also Gussen (2013b).

  28. The work by Mark Granovetter is useful here to explain further the nature of coupling. See Granovetter (1973), Granovetter (1983), and Granovetter (1985).

  29. Also refer to Boulding’s five principles of morphology (structural organization) that illustrate how growth creates form and how form limits growth (Boulding 1968, 81).

  30. See also Amabile et al. (2010) for a discussion of Paul Romer’s idea of charter cities.

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  1. University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD, Australia

    Benjamen F. Gussen

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Gussen, B.F. On the problem of scale: a general theory of morphogenesis and normative policy signals for economic evolution. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 12, 81–104 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40844-015-0001-6

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