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Uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type theorems

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Abstract

A necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type aggregation theorems is obtained as an application of Phelps’ theorem on the uniqueness of Hahn–Banach extensions.

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Notes

  1. The axiom of weak Pareto states that if every individual in the society weakly prefers alternative a to alternative b, then the society must rank a higher than b.

  2. A referee graciously pointed out the paper of Weymark (1994), who gives a thorough account of the history of the Independent Prospect Condition. The same paper also contains a formal proof of the Fishburn’s observation mentioned later in the text.

References

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  • Phelps R.R.: Uniqueness of Hahn–Banach extension and uniqueness of best approximation. Trans. Am. Math. Soc 95(2), 238–255 (1960)

  • Weymark J.A.: Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem with alternative Pareto principles. In: Eichhorn, W. (ed.) Models and Measurement of Welfare Inequality, pp. 869-887. Springer, New York (1994)

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Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions.

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  1. Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal et CIREQ, Lionel Groulx Building, Montreal, QC, H3C 3J7, Canada

    Massimiliano Amarante

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  1. Massimiliano Amarante
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Correspondence to Massimiliano Amarante.

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Amarante, M. Uniqueness of the weights in Harsanyi-type theorems. Econ Theory Bull 5, 175–178 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0111-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0111-2

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